dmolnar wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Dec 2000, Aaron P Ingebrigtsen wrote:
>
> > I just thought of something. Since they aren't able or trying to attack
> > the people who originaly inserted illegal content, only the routers of
> > content on Freenet, that means that THEY could insert the illegal
> > contenet and then imediately attack any node from which they are able to
> > request the data that THEY inserted. Pretty sneaky and underhanded don't
> > you think?
>
> Yup. They have no way to prove that they didn't do it, and you have no way
> to prove that they did it. (At least, if everything works the way it
> should). Unfortunately in that case, the "bad data" is or was still
> sitting on your server...
Which they can only prove if they physically confiscate it, which again is only
possible if the content is stored non-encrypted or with the key still present,
whereas a simple (anygivenfileone+offseta XOR anygivenfiletwo+offsetb XOR
bitcounter XOR bitfromcontent) with the two keyfiles chosen from the latest AOL
CD or a game or some other weird file you have that day, and two or three
MBytes long each, chosen at node boot and stored in RAM only (tricky part for
lamerz: -must- somehow be locked against swapping out), could produce a pretty
silly long key that is easy to re-install by a human but impossible to find in
any secret key-files collection in your floppy-box.
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