hi paolo
(alan :-))
people often misunderstand security as weirdly encrypting and signing stuff, the more the better... security is much more about management - management of the security associations.
so, basically i would agree with alan's point. i.e. it's pretty useless, in the global sense it IS useless. however, alan's sentence below
I don't see why. The server will have access to the password/key for the database, and therefore so will any attacker.
should be extended to "who succeeded in attacking the radius server".
that also can be the only reason to do such things: you establish the single point of entry and thus can be sure that whoever entered the system, he had to pass over the radius server.
Questions about encrypting databases would best be asked on database lists.
once again: i agree :)
i think that to achieve the above you shouldn't encrypt the whole database. databases store DATA, not information. there is thus no use to encrypt it for "data security" makes no sense at all :)
instead encrypt what you WRITE into your database. e.g. create a new rlm_sql_ * driver which will take anything coming from rlm_sql, encrypt it according to its configuration and write it into the DB in a usual way, e.g. by using rlm_sql_mysql.
in any case, you DON'T want the DB to decrypt the information or to check the provided encryption key, etc. since you would lose your single point of entry.
ciao artur
ps alan, what about those neat certificates i sent to you? have you by any chance managed to put those things somewhere so folks can test them?
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