[ph] An intelligent person will predictably come up with unexpected points of view and solutions for new problems. That seems to display something of a tendency to accept mystification in place of explanation, but I don't see the root meaning of intelligence in it.
[ph] This is a great issue. Making a world model in our minds the way we do does seem to require that the qualities of things are those we bestow on them by changing our images of them. All we have to guide us is our world model, so when we change our own or each other's world models it displays our ultimate control over the world in which we operate. [ph] Another view is that things are what a scientific study would tell you, their web of relationships with other things and the nest of internal structures with which those other related things connect. This refers to a an extensive group of physical systems most of which are and will remain largely or entirely unknown. It's hard to have it both ways, and the former surely seems to dominate, but getting rid of the latter all together seems dangerous, don't you think? [rh] Its like the 100-year history of quantum in six words: Discrete Duality Unpredictable Small Mystical Chaotic.... I wonder what marketing will bring next decade. My guess is that, like quantum mechanics, where the definitions only make sense when we realize that were part of the measurement process and not independently isolated from it, a definition for intelligence and consciousness will likewise only make sense when we realize that we are part of the measurement process too. We define ourselves as intelligent and conscious with respect to ourselves. Then we attempt to project that reflexive definition onto outside things and act surprised when the reflexivity instantly disappears. We are the baseline because we have said so! Earlier examples of this defining process applied to the definition of life. We are alive because we say so! So we look for these characteristics in other animals. Early theocracy associated life with a soul only to deduce that insects must not really be alive because they of course, have no soul. Later science, wanting to include this taxonomy, starts looking at dynamic qualities, such as burning food and exhaling the byproducts. Along comes the industrial age fuel-burning machines, and then self replication becomes the quintessential element of life. Then certain crystallization processes are observed to satisfy the definition. Wanting to exclude them (I suppose for aesthetic reasons) science then adds mutation, fitness functions and other evolutionary terms to the definition. Someone takes a closer looks at RNA-viruses isolated from their hosts, and well, its back to the drawing board. Are we not playing the same self-referential definitions game with intelligence and consciousness as we once did, and are still doing, with life? Robert Howard Phoenix, Arizona Well, how about the ability to respond to unexpected situations with useful choices? Is that low or high on the tests of intelligence? Phil Henshaw ¸¸¸¸.·´ ¯ `·.¸¸¸¸ -----Original Message----- From: Rob Howard Sent: Monday, December 25, 2006 12:32 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The what is AI question >What if the analogy of intelligence is unexpected predictability? >I can roll a pair of dice, and that is unpredictable; but its not >unexpected. I expect a Gaussian curve of totals. [ph] I think you're saying that people have frequently bestowed 'intelligence' on things that were merely predictable. That seems to display something of a tendency to accept mystification in place of explanation, but I don't see the root meaning of intelligence in it. An intelligent person will predictably come up with unexpected points of view and solutions for new problems. It's the aspect of invention there, not the mystery of the process, that displays the intelligence involved I think. ph >A few thousand years ago, the states of the moon were unpredictable >(eclipses, elevation, and to some extent, phases). Humans consequently >animated it with intelligence by calling it Lunathe moon goddess. >All deities have intelligence. The same occurred with the planets, >weather; and even social conditions like love and war. Only when these things became >expectedly predictable did they loose their intelligence. You all >remember ELIZA! At least for the first five minutes of play, the game >did take on intelligence. However, after review of the actual code did >the game instantly lose it mystery. Kasparov bestowed intelligence on >Deep Blue, which Im sure the programmers did not. >In this sense, intelligence is not a property that external things >have. Its something that we bestow upon, or perceive in external >things. Is not one of the all time greatest insults on ones >intelligence the accusation of being predictable? [ph] This is a great issue. Making a world model in our minds the way we do does seem to require that the qualities of things are those we bestow on them by changing our images of them. All we have to guide us is our world model, so when we change our own or each other's world models it displays our ultimate control over the world in which we operate. [ph] Another view is that things are what a scientific study would tell you, their web of relationships with other things and the nest of internal structures with which those other related things connect. This refers to a an extensive group of physical systems most of which are and will remain largely or entirely unknown. It's hard to have it both ways, and the former surely seems to dominate, but getting rid of the latter all together seems dangerous, don't you think? >I suspect that any measure of intelligence will be relative to the >observers ability to predict expected causal effects and be pleasantly >surprisednot too unlike the Turing Test. >Robert Howard >Phoenix, Arizona _____ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Phil Henshaw Sent: Tuesday, December 26, 2006 5:33 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The what is AI question I checked the description of Touring's test again... [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=touring+test] Doesn't it actually say "a good fake is the real thing"? I always thought the identifying characteristics of 'real thing' included having aspects that make a real difference that can't be faked, there for anyone to see if they look for them? Phil Henshaw ¸¸¸¸.·´ ¯ `·.¸¸¸¸ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 680 Ft. Washington Ave NY NY 10040 tel: 212-795-4844 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] explorations: www.synapse9.com <http://www.synapse9.com/> -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, December 25, 2006 8:51 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The what is AI question in a reverse turing test, if a human could convince other humans that he was a macine/computer would he then be unintelligent. From" fooled by randomness", if memory serves.
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