either that, or in the event of war take the evidence as being that someone has apparently made a huge mistake and anyone anywhere near it better *watch out*.
Phil Henshaw ¸¸¸¸.·´ ¯ `·.¸¸¸¸ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 680 Ft. Washington Ave NY NY 10040 tel: 212-795-4844 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] explorations: www.synapse9.com <http://www.synapse9.com/> -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of John Goekler Sent: Friday, April 13, 2007 6:12 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] Clausewitz Thanks for the Clausewitz piece. Im not sure I agree with the authors conclusions however. Not least because . . . ¨ Clausewitzs strategic and tactical parameters are largely linear and hierarchical. (He wrote of and for the commander and essentially parallels Sun Tzus claim that Management of the many is the same as management of few.) ¨ His work occurred during and analyzes the era of 2nd generation (massing) warfare, during which battles were often logistically complicated, but I would argue, not truly complex. (As Wellington said, God is always on the side of the big battalions.) ¨ His underlying assumption is of state actors and their monopoly on organized violence. For looking at complexity in warfighting theory, military types seem to prefer Galula (Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice), Hammes (The Sling and the Stone), Van Creveld (Transformation of War) or even Lawrence (Seven Pillars of Wisdom), all of whom anticipate or describe what is now increasingly called fourth generation warfare (4GW). (Rather than the more traditional counterinsurgency.) In 4GW, the battle is for the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population and public opinion, which Clausewitz did acknowledge, but did not explore. The modern necessity of armed social work or armed propaganda was unimaginable during Clausewitzs time. John Robb (Brave New War coming April 27) pushes the envelope with the concept of open source warfare in which he suggests there will be as many armies as there are causes to fight for. (Which will include high value extortion and simple criminality - something we're already seeing with burglary 'crews' around the country.) More important, he argues that extremely small groups will fight states using swarming tactics, sometimes in temporary alliance with gangs, mercenaries, religionists, rogue states or mafias and frequently win. He advocates that states decentralize and distribute vulnerable systems, as well as make all citizens responsible for some part of security. (A whole new application of distributed leadership.) Check his blog at <http://www.globalguerrillas.typepad.com/> http://www.globalguerrillas.typepad.com/ You might also like RANDs work on Swarming and the Future of Conflict ( <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf> http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf) or Kilcullens new (and currently being field tested in Iraq!) Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency ( <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf> http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf) which is quite a good complexity manual. So . . . as you might guess, I think one of the best entry points for exploring complexity is 4GW / NetWar. Anyone else interested in this discussion? jdg The future has already arrived; its just not evenly distributed yet. William Gibson
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