Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > For instance, a motive, or an intention, is not some inner thing that > directs behavior, but rather the limit of its behavioral direction. > Or it could be that the so-called `motive' or `intention' was merely a rationalization of a subconscious impulse that had already been revealed in a whole pattern of related behaviors. If so, the behaviourist would be ahead of the game using careful observation or perturbation of either the behavior of the individual, or of its brain.
The easy way out of the category error, whether in regard to mentalism or calculus is to regard them as models -- separate standalone things. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
