Glen, I wanted to reply more fully but I don't have time at the moment, so I'm just going to say that this:
> The existence proof I'm pointing out as an example of how math is more > than formal systems (Tarski's indefinability or the GIT) merely shows > that what we call math is not fully captured by formal systems (or _a_ is not true; interpreting Gödel/Tarski or whomever does not show anything of the kind without a _prior_ philosophy of mathematics which is actually just begging the question. In fact, as Webb argues, Gödel's (and Tarski is a "weaker" Gödel) Inc. Theorem actually speaks _for_ mechanism (but this remark is definitely too cryptic in this short email). I will try to respond more completely when I find the time, if you are interested in this stuff I suggest getting hold of this book (I already recommended it once on this list; also a recommendation for the Rosenites on this list for a quite different take on things (in a _fundamental_ sort of way)): Webb, J. Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics: An Essay on Finitism. http://www.amazon.de/Mechanism-Mentalism-Metamathematics-Finitism-Synthese/dp/9027710465/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books-intl-de&qid=1218479843&sr=8-2 (it is unfortunately so expensive that one can only hope that a local library has it: but reading it pays off :-)) (and: some familiarity with the discussions in the foundations of mathematics (hilbert, frege, dedekind, peano, russell etc) is assumed in the book) Cheers, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/ Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
