Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 07:58 PM: > On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 5:14 PM, glen e. p. ropella < > [email protected]> wrote: >> I disagree. I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of >> anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-). An explicit and eminent > > "concepts is a peculiar form of anthropocentrism" is a very interesting > point. You raise the issue of consciousness and in particular what it means > to have concepts. Are you saying that having concepts is limited to humans? > Perhaps it is.
No, sorry. I wasn't clear. The _emphasis_ on concepts is anthropocentric. It's a natural consequence of our being very reflective animals. I suspect each animal has its own degree of reflection. An animal that acts purely "on instinct", and doesn't engage in much self-reflection, doesn't spend a lot of time wondering about their concepts. So, no, concepts are definitely NOT limited to humans. But humans spend an extraordinary amount of time talking and thinking about their concepts. Hence, the _emphasis_ on concepts is anthropocentric. The point being that concepts are trivial and it's the symbols that are important. > If that's the case, do you expect to find symbols generated > elsewhere in the universe through non-conscious processes? Yes. A symbol can occur anywhere there is some sort of "proxy", "placeholder", or "agent" mechanism. Symbols are just special cases of networks. Any indirect effect can be said to be symbolic. Perhaps the example of a line of dominoes would make it clear what I mean. The force exerted on the first domino knocks over the last domino. The first domino can be a means to knocking over the last domino. Hence, the first domino can be a symbol for the last domino. The grounding doesn't have to be made by a conscious observer. The first domino is networked to the last domino through the objective rules of physics. Hence, it's physical cause-effect that makes the first domino a symbol or stand-in for the last. If your definition for "symbol" requires a conscious observer, then that's fine. I'll change my usage from "symbol" to "potential symbol". One object is a potential symbol for another when there is some network of connections between them. In the context of math (and other languages), the network of connections is spanned by the alphabet and rules of the language. When one (simpler) formal system is embedded in another (more complex), we can say that the simpler language is grounded in the more complex one. And this would be true regardless of whether there are humans using the language to map sentences to concepts. >>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the >> internal) are way more important than the concepts. >> >> ... >> >> > You say that you disagree, but what you are saying is very much what I said > -- but you seem to be taking it negatively > > We use symbols to externalize concepts. (In fact I wrote a paper to that > effect: "If a tree casts a shadow is it telling the > time?<http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/6/66/If_a_tree_casts_a_shadow_is_it_telling_the_time.pdf>") > I agree. The concepts come before the symbols in that case. I'm very strongly disagreeing with that statement. (Note that I am playing Devil's Advocate... but pretend that I am disagreeing strongly for the moment.) The concepts do NOT ever come before the symbols. The concepts are trivial or epiphenomenal. The symbols are what's real. The symbols come before the concepts. In fact, the symbols cause the concepts. We can see this quite well by imagining the origins of language. When we started using our paws/fins to _point_ at things, "concepts" were born. Prior to that, it was just symbols (or "potential symbols" -- see above -- ... artifacts that can be used as symbols). > The symbols help > us be clear and keep us honest about our concepts. I don't understand why > you say you disagree with that. Symbols by themselves have no meaning. I'm > not sure if you are agreeing about that or not. And in order for something > to have meaning, it must have meaning in the mind of a conceptualizing > being. Symbols by themselves have ALL the meaning. It's the abstract concepts in our minds that have no meaning. To go back to math and science, one can sit around all day _thinking_ and it doesn't matter at all. Thinking is totally and completely useless without the languages into which we translate our thoughts. Concepts are NOT important in this context. The external, objective, language is the important thing. Math and science have, as a primary objective, the task of constructing linguistic objects that at least guide the thoughts of others, if not outright _create_ thoughts in others. Hence, the symbols (e.g. equations) are the most important part of math. Similarly, the most important part of science is the _stuff_ ... the beakers, telescopes, dosage protocols, etc... everything you find in the "methods" section of the papers. That's the most important part, not the random, bizarre, baroque, peculiar, and particular concepts in any given scientist's mind. (Remember that I'm arguing this _strongly_ just to make my point clear. What is actually true is that symbols and concepts are two aspects of the exact same thing. Neither precedes the other. Neither is more important than the other. I'm making the strong case for the eminence of symbols just to make my point clear.) -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
