Do you mean 'assuming', or "assuming"? --Doug
On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 12:27 PM, Nicholas Thompson < [email protected]> wrote: > For some reason, I am assuming that those were ironic squiggles. > > Nick > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Douglas Roberts <[email protected]> > *To: *[email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[email protected]> *Cc: *[email protected]; John > Kennison <[email protected]>; [email protected] > *Sent:* 6/19/2009 11:46:47 AM > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior > > Well, that certainly cleared things up! > > ;-} ;-{ > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 11:33 AM, Nicholas Thompson < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Dear Doug and "List", >> >> I hope it is clear to everybody by now that "Nick" is a philosophical >> example. He was borrowed for this purpose because the best discussions are >> reflexive ... i.e, they become examples of themselves. Doug and Nick (the >> real one, this time) fell into a paradox. He is arguing that I falsify my >> own mind when I say that I dont understand expressions like "I feel >> nauseous". I am arguing that he doesnt know what he is saying when he uses >> them. Notice the paradox: if "Nick" is right, then Russ is right; if >> "Russ" is right, then Nick is right. You are correct to demand that we call >> a truce on this discussion for long enough to clarify why anybody should >> give a damn. >> >> Part of the purported importance has just become clear in Russ's most >> recent message. He feels that ethical behavior necessitates our respecting >> the sanctity of the inner life of others. To respect the inner life of >> others one must first embrace one's own, and so my statement that I dont >> "have" an inner life begins to feel like an attack on the most central of >> moral principles. As one of my graduate students used to [cheerfully] say, >> "but Nick, if you don't have an inner life, it's ok to kill you, right?" >> >> Now, my wisest response to this line of argument would be to go all >> technocratic and to deny that I have any ethical dog in this fight at >> all. One can, after all, be a moral naturalist and assert that reasoning >> and argument only come into play when people are trying to violate their >> ethical impulses and that, on the whole, people are designed by nature so >> that they dont kill each other. Just as I dont think it makes any >> difference whether you believe in evolution or creation whether you are a >> good person, I dont think it makes any difference to being a good person >> whether you believe others have an inner life or not. Thus, I escape the >> argument by asserting that it has no MORAL consequences. I reassure Russ >> that my absense of an inner life does not make me dangerous, and, once he >> takes that reassurance seriously, he doesnt have to kill me. Peace is >> re-established. >> >> But we behaviorists are fierce (if covert) moralists. Just read >> Skinner's Walden II. We deplore the metaphysics of the inner life because >> we think of it as a way of thinking that encourages people to act badly >> while claiming good intentions. Now it will become clear to you why I have >> tolerated the conversation about my "honesty", or, more accurately "Nick's" >> honesty : because I am holding a similar judgment behind my back like a >> mailed fist. *The function of the inner life view (in evolutionary >> history) has been to promote dishonesty! * >> >> Animal behaviorists from time to time have tried to serve as expert >> witnesses in the societal debate concerning who you can kill (or enslave, or >> whatever). I regard my colleagues participation in this argument as akin to >> that of the psychologists who consulted in the CIA torture techniques. One >> of my best collegial friends -- bless his heart -- wrote an essay entitled >> "Does octopus suffer ?" and came to the conclusion that well, perhaps, yes, >> but nothing LESS than octopus could possibly feel pain. Therefore you can >> dissect a cockroach with impunity, right? Well, anybody who has stuck a >> needle in a cockroach knows they dont like it. So, any attempt to draw a >> line between creatures that suffer and those that dont strikes me as >> casuistry of the worst sort. And people who object to clubbing a cow over >> the head but who will happily eat a salmon that has suffocated in the hold >> of a boat under a pile of his own kind seems to me to be ... well, kidding >> himself. >> >> In short, I Russ thinks people would be better if they believed in the >> inner life; I think people would be better people if they didnt. >> >> This is probably where the argument should stop, because I dont see any >> way to resolve it. I am overjoyed if The People have come to understand >> that The Inner Life is a way to think, not the way things are. Russ will >> have to speak for himself, but I guess he will be more or less satisfied if >> we understand that The Inner Life is fundamental to what we are as humans. >> We will just have to hold those contradictory thoughts in our minds and move >> on to issues we can resolve. >> >> Two places where I would like to see this discussion go from here are as >> follows: >> >> (1) What about "self-awareness" in computers? Now, that discussion got >> off to a strange start because I expected the experts on the list to treat >> as trivial the proposition that computers ... in some loose sense at least >> ... collect information about themselves. That assertion seemed to be >> already controversial, and I would really like to understand why. Modern >> automobiles gather all sorts of information about themselves. What exactly >> is going on when they do this. I see this as a detailed, matter-of-fact, >> discussion of self-reference in control systems. >> >> (2) What about "emergence"? Discussions concerning emergence always >> stray into discussions about consciousness because, for many, the origin's >> of consciousness in the brain is the only truly interesting example of >> emergence. But I think the most interesting examples of emergence are the >> most prosaic ones. I would like to see us get back to the emergent >> properties of ... triangles. I would like to see us build an error-free >> language for talking about simple forms of emergence ... triangles, gliders, >> etc. -- so that we can have some confidence and discipline the next time we >> get together to talk complexity babble face to face. >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, >> Clark University ([email protected]) >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Russ Abbott <[email protected]> >> *To: *John Kennison <[email protected]> *Cc: *The Friday Morning >> Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>; >> [email protected]; [email protected] >> *Sent:* 6/19/2009 8:58:14 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior >> >> As I wrote to Nick directly, I think Nick is gracious and kind and a man >> of great integrity. >> >> But this doesn't make sense to me: "We don't have to believe in inner >> minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply hurt." >> What could it possibly mean to say that a person is deeply hurt if there is >> no such thing as first person experience? And if there is no such thing as >> being deeply hurt in a first person way, what could it possibly mean to say >> that someone is behaving as if deeply hurt? >> >> This suggests that it is very dangerous to claim that there is no first >> person experience and that observable behavior is all there is. It would >> encourage "treating people as objects" because that's exactly the position >> it takes. An attitude of this sort would seem to discard millennia of >> progress in our understanding and acceptance of what ethical human-to-human >> interaction consists of. >> >> -- Russ >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 7:40 AM, John Kennison <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Nick and I are on opposite sides of the consciousness debate. I think >>> there is an inner mind and that I experience it. Nick rejects statements not >>> made from the third person perspective. Perhaps the debate suffers from a >>> feeling that if we take Nick's third person view, we are not allowed to use >>> metaphorical statements that suggest an inner mind. But clearly we can say >>> "The computer had an illusion" or a "breakdown" etc. to describe behavior. >>> (e.g. The behavior was as we imagined it would be if the computer had a >>> inner mind which suffered a breakdown.) Moreover, not only can these >>> metaphorical statements about behavior be defined rigorously, but we can >>> formulate and test rules about how they are related. We don't have to >>> believe in inner minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as >>> if deeply hurt. That is why we should not casually make such accusations nor >>> assume they will be without negative consequences even if there is no inner >>> mind. >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: [email protected] [[email protected]] On Behalf Of >>> Russ Abbott [[email protected]] >>> Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2009 11:07 PM >>> To: [email protected] >>> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] >>> >>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior >>> >>> Nick wrote: >>> >>> To call a man "dishonest" (my word, I admit, but you have embraced it) is >>> very harsh in my world, and seems (to me) to require a level of certainty >>> about another person's motives that I just don't know how you could come by >>> from your limited experience with me. ... >>> >>> You are insisting on the correctness of your view of my mind based on >>> inferences from my behavior. >>> >>> Yes, I'm doing exactly that, judging you on the basis of your behavior -- >>> in this conversation. (The past 40 years aren't relevant to that.) Your >>> position in this discussion seems to be that your behavior is all there is. >>> So why are you objecting that I'm doing it? >>> >>> Furthermore, your objection seems to be that I don't know what your >>> "motives" are. I'm not sure what you mean by motives in this case. I'm not >>> assuming any particular motive. In fact I'm confused about what your motives >>> might be and why you are acting so dishonestly. Yet you are acting >>> dishonestly. >>> >>> To review: a good example of your dishonest behavior was your answer to >>> my question about nausea. Your provided a very nice first person description >>> of what it means to feel nauseous. >>> >>> If you say that you are "feeling nauseous" i will understand that your >>> world seems like it is churning around but that your visual cues do not >>> confirm (i.e., you are dizzy) and that your stomach feels the way it does >>> when on previous occasions you have thrown up. >>> >>> Note your use of the first person words seems and feels. But then you >>> refused to answer whether that description would ever apply to a robot. >>> Instead you offered a 3rd person description of what it looks like to feel >>> nauseous and said that of course a robot could fit that description. I call >>> that dishonest. You know what a first person description means because you >>> used it yourself. But then you refused to answer the question whether such a >>> first person description could apply to a robot. Furthermore, you refused to >>> acknowledge that this is what you were doing. I see that as dishonest. But I >>> don't know what your motives for acting this way might be. >>> >>> Besides, why are you so concerned about my characterizing your behavior >>> as dishonest? Why is that a very harsh term? It's simply a description of >>> your behavior. >>> >>> Are you upset because you are taking my use of the term dishonest to >>> apply more broadly than to your behavior? In the second passage of yours >>> quoted above, you talked about my view of your mind. Are you unhappy that I >>> seem to be implying that your mind is dishonest? I thought your position was >>> that there is no mind for me to have a view of. I thought your position was >>> that behavior was all that mattered. It should not matter to you what "my >>> view of your mind" is if it doesn't mean anything to talk about minds. >>> >>> >>> -- Russ >>> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> > > > > -- > Doug Roberts > [email protected] > [email protected] > 505-455-7333 - Office > 505-670-8195 - Cell > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > -- Doug Roberts [email protected] [email protected] 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell
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