I have two problems with it. 1. Turning left may happen to be a low level aspect of some more significant action. For example, I suspect it would be difficult to say why I am about to move my right index finger to the left and then down. (It had to do with the letter "h", which I was striking because it was in the word "right", which I was typing because ... . Not only that, I knew that striking the letter "h" would include it in the message I was constructing ... . How can you be behaviorist about things that are that conceptual?) 2. More important (or at least equally important), all those explanations seem to depend on the notion of reward or reinforcement. How is reward/reinforcement defined within a behaviorist framework? I can't immediately think of a way to talk about what reward or reinforcement means without going "inside" the subject.
Both of these would seem like obvious vulnerabilities in behaviorist thinking. They must have been raised many times. Behaviorists must have answers. It's hard for me to imagine what they are. -- Russ On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 7:08 PM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[email protected]> wrote: > Russ, > The behaviorist's point, first and foremost, would involve comparing the > questions "Why did he choose to turn left?" with the question "Why did he > turn left?" They are the same question, the behaviorist claims, except > perhaps, at best, that the first question does a little bit more to specify > a reference group of alternative circumstances and behaviors that our > explanation needs to distinguish between. For example, we might read it as > saying "Why did he turn left under circumstances in which other people turn > right?" > > As for the acceptable answer to such a question... well... there are > several varieties of behaviorism, and the acceptable answers would vary. The > stereotypical villain of Intro Psych stories is a behaviorist who insists on > explanations only in terms of immediate stimuli. However, those are mostly > mythical creatures. Most behaviorists have a bias towards developmental > explanations, and as members of this list will readily recognize, behavioral > development is complex. The most standard forms of behaviorism make heavy > use of drooling dogs and lever-pressing rats as their primary metaphors. In > this case we might prefer a maze-running rat. Upon his first encounter with > choice point C, which has vertical stripes, rat 152 turns left. Why? > Because, in the past, this rat has been reinforced (i.e., got to the peanut > butter faster) when it turned left (the critical behavior) at intersections > that have vertical stripes (a discriminative stimuli). The nature of the > contingencies and stimuli can be quite complex, but we have lots of data > about how those complexities reliably produce certain patterns of behavior. > Similarly, we might argue that the person turns left because in his past, > under circumstances such as these, he has been reinforced for turning left. > What circumstances, well, I would have to elaborate the example a lot more: > When following directions which state "turn left at the next light" and at > "an intersection with a light". The individual's choice is thus explained by > his long-term membership in a verbal community that rewards people for doing > certain things (turning left) under certain conditions consisting of a > combination of discriminative stimuli (which are complex, but clearly > possible to define in sufficient detail for these purposes). This training > started very young, for my daughter it formally started at about 1 and a > half with my saying "look right, look left, look right again" at street > corners. > > -- Admitted, the above explanation for the person's behavior is a bit > hand-wavy and post-hoc, but the explanations for the rat's behavior is > neither. Behaviorism, loosely speaking consists of two parts, a philosophy > of behaviorism and an application of behaviorism (applied behavior > analysis). We could take our person, subject him to empirical study, and > determine the conditions under which he turns left. This would reveal the > critical variables making up a circumstance under which such turns happen. > The science also allows us to determine some aspects of the past-history > based on the subjects present responses. Further, just as we built our rat, > we could build a person who would turn left under such circumstances, and > for that person, all the conditions would be known and no hand-waving or > further investigation would be necessary. The fact that we usually cannot > perform these kinds of investigation, is no excuse for pretending we > wouldn't get concrete results if we did. -- > > In the absence of an observed past history, the behaviorist would rather > speculate about concrete past events than about imaginary happenings in a > dualistic other-realm. > > Personally, I think many behaviorists overdo the role of conditioning. I > have a bias for a more inclusive view of development, such as that advanced > by the epigeneticists of the 60's and 70's, the kind that leads directly > into modern dynamic systems work. Those behaviorists I most like recognize > the limitations of conditioning as an explanation, but argue that > conditioning is particularly important in the development of many behaviors > that humans particularly care about. Pairing the verbal command "left" with > the contingency of reinforcement for turning left, they argue, is just as > arbitrary pairing the visual stimuli "red light" with the contingency of > reinforcement for pressing the left lever in the skinner box. A reasonable > position, but I've never been completely sold. I will admit though that > conditioning is important in unexpected places - you cannot even explain why > baby geese follow the object they imprint on without operant (skinner-box > style) conditioning. > > How was that? > > Eric > > P.S. Returning to Robert's query: It should be obvious that the above > explanation, if accepted as an explanation for the behavior, is also an > explanation for all concurrent neural happenings. > > > On Sun, May 2, 2010 07:34 PM, *Russ Abbott <[email protected]>* wrote: > > Eric, Can you provide an example of an acceptable behaviorist answer to > your question about why a person turned left instead of right. By example, > I'm looking for something more concrete than "the explanation for the choice > must reference conditions in our protagonists past that built him into the > type of person who would turn left under the current conditions." What might > such an explanation look like? > > > -- Russ Abbott > ______________________________________ > > Professor, Computer Science > California State University, Los Angeles > > cell: 310-621-3805 > blog: http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ > vita: http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/ > ______________________________________ > > > > On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 4:03 PM, ERIC P. CHARLES > <[email protected]<#1285bebc159d5350_> > > wrote: > >> Robert, >> You accuse Nick of talking about "the brain", when he was talking about >> "the mind". >> >> The most basic tenant of behaviorism is that all questions about the mind >> are ultimately a question about behavior. Thus, while some behaviorists deny >> the existence of mental things, that is not a necessary part of behaviorism. >> On the other hand, the behaviorist must deny that the mind is made up any >> special substance, and they must deny that the mental things are somehow >> inside the person (hence the comparison with soul, auras, etc.). If the >> behaviorist does not deny tout court that mental things happen, what is he >> to do? One option is to claim that mental things are behavioral things, >> analyzed at some higher level of analysis, just as biological things are >> chemical things analyzed at some higher level of analysis. So, to answer >> your question: There IS a brain, and the brain does all sorts of things, but >> it does not do mental things. Mental things happen, but they do not happen >> "in the brain". As Skinner would put it, the question is: What DOES go on in >> the skull, and what is an intelligible way to talk about it? The obvious >> answer is that the only things going on in the skull are physiological. >> >> For example, if one asks why someone chose to go left instead of right at >> a stop sign, one might get an answer in terms of the brain: "He turned left >> because his frontal cortex activated in such and such a way." However, that >> is no answer at all, because the firing of those neurons is a component part >> of the turning left! Ultimately, the explanation for the choice must >> reference conditions in our protagonists past that built him into the type >> of person who would turn left under the current conditions. In doing so, our >> explanation will necessarily give the conditions that lead to a person whose >> brain activates in such and such a way under the conditions in question. >> >> Put another way: To say that he chose to turn left because a part of his >> brain chose to turn left misses the point. It anthromorphizes your innards >> in a weird way, suggests homunculi, and introduces all sorts of other ugly >> problems. Further, it takes the quite tractable problem of understanding the >> origins of behavior and transforms it into the still intractable problem of >> understanding the origins of organization in the nervous system. >> Neuroscience is a great field of study, and it is thriving. Thus, people >> hold out hope that one day we will know enough about nerve growth, etc., >> that the origin of neuronal organization will become tractable. One day they >> will, but when that day comes it will not tell us much about behavior that >> we didn't already know, hence they won't tell us much about the mind we >> didn't already know. >> >> Or at least, so sayith some behaviorists, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 2, 2010 05:09 PM, *"Robert J. Cordingley" < >> [email protected] <#1285bebc159d5350_>>* wrote: >> >> Nick >> Let me try this on(e)... it's because the brain is the physical structure >> within which our thinking processes occur and collectively those processes >> we call the 'mind'. I don't see a way to say the same thing or anything >> remotely parallel, about soul, aura, the Great Unknown and such. Is there >> an argument to say that the brain, or the thinking processes don't exist in >> the same way we can argue that the others don't (or might not)? >> Thanks >> Robert >> >> On 5/2/10 12:52 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >> >> </snipped> >> >> How is banging on about mind any different from banging on about soul, or >> aura, or the Great Unknown? >> >> Nick >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > Eric Charles > > Professional Student and > Assistant Professor of Psychology > Penn State University > Altoona, PA 16601 > > >
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