Quite a positive
review<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/books/review/book-review-soul-dust-the-magic-of-consciousness-by-nicholas-humphrey.html?>by
Alison Gopnik.  Here's a lot of it.  She starts out by explaining why
the
moon looks so much larger when it’s at the horizon than when it’s overhead,
at the zenith.

 This is a question about conscious experience — about how the world looks
to us — not about behavior and brains. And there is a clear and convincing
evolutionary explanation.

The visual system wasn’t designed to deal with objects that are thousands of
miles away. It was designed to accurately judge the size of close,
evolutionarily relevant objects like apples. As an apple moves closer or
farther away, it will project a larger or smaller image on my retina. But I
don’t see the apple expand and contract. I see an apple with a concrete,
stable size. This is because my brain evolved to combine information about
the size of the retinal image with information about distance to create a
single, constant visual experience.

The retinal image of the moon is always about the same size. But the horizon
looks farther away than the zenith, perhaps because we see that other
objects are in front of the horizon while the zenith is unoccluded. The
brain determines that the horizon moon must therefore actually be larger
than the zenith moon. And, *voilà*, the rising moon looks much bigger.

Neat! I had never heard this.

 So we actually have a good and interesting naturalistic explanation for
this particular feature of our conscious experience and many others like it.
But it seems that we can’t explain the most important thing: Why does the
moon look like anything at all? What explains that ineffable *je ne sais
quoi*, that irreducible magic of experience? That big, beautiful moon
doesn’t just feel like the outcome of a cool calculation. And it isn’t
looming up at just anyone, but at me, the equally ineffable and irreducible
self.

Humphrey’s clever and original idea is to treat these intuitions about
consciousness — this sense of ineffability, specialness, irreducibility and
point of view — as simply more features of experience to be explained, the
way we explain the apparent size of the moon. Maybe we experience
consciousness as special because it really *is* special. But maybe those
intuitions are as illusory as the shrinking and growing moon.

We know how the details of our visual experience, like the experience of
size constancy of objects, are related to our need to survive. But what is
the evolutionary function of the experience of the ineffable and
irreducible? Humphrey points to a feature of consciousness that has been
surprisingly neglected. “The bottom line about how consciousness changes the
human outlook — as deep an existential truth as anyone could ask for — is
this: *We do not want to be zombies*,” he writes. “We *like* ‘being
present,’ we *like* having it ‘be like something to be me.’ ”

Humphrey ingeniously works out the many consequences of this apparently
simple fact. He points out, for example, that we humans will work as hard to
get a newer or more vivid or more intense experience as we will to get a
meal or a mate. Almost as soon as we could use tools to make hearths and
spears, we also used them to construct consciousness-­expanding art
installations in painted caves like Altamira. We fear death so profoundly
not because it means the end of our body but because it means the end of our
consciousness — better to be a spirit in heaven than a zombie on earth.

There is a story that Samuel Beckett was walking through the park with a
friend, and exclaiming at the beauty of the day. “Yes,” said the friend,
“it’s the sort of day that makes you feel good to be alive.” “Ah, now,”
Beckett replied, “I wouldn’t go that far.” But most of us, most of the time,
would go that far.

Humphrey argues that this is the result of a benign evolutionary illusion.
It does feel good to be alive, and it feels especially good to be me being
alive. And that in turn makes us go to great lengths to extend our lives and
to fend off death. Human beings don’t do this just with the blind struggle
of the hunting predator and the fleeing prey, but with elaborate long-term
inventive planning. And that does help us extend life and hold off death.

Similarly, we are most vividly conscious of the unexpected and the novel —
consciousness is linked to curiosity and exploration. So, Humphrey argues,
the thirst for consciousness keeps us on the move, reveling in new
information even when the immediate usefulness of that information isn’t
apparent. In the long run, though, pursuing new information does give us
important and distinctively human evolutionary advantages.

Just as the moon illusion is an effect of size constancy, the illusions of
ineffability and irreducibility, in Humphrey’s view, are effects of our
human capacity for self-reflection, long-term planning and innovation. The
brain knows the real secret of seduction, more effective than even music and
martinis. Just keep whispering, “Gee, you are really special” to that sack
of water and protein that is a body and you can get it to do practically
anything.


*-- Russ *
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