Russ stated:
Normal
0
false
false
false
EN-US
X-NONE
X-NONE
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}
"If Peirce wants to define belief in that way, it's not clear to me what
good that does in clarifying anything." Similar qualms were expressed about
'truth'.
These seem like important statements that have not been addressed, so I would
like to try to address them. I apologize for the length, but the questions seem
important to me, because they strike right at the heart of the matter: If
Peirce, or Holt, or any of the other thinkers at play here, are not adding
clarity, then they are, by their own criterion, missing their mark. From the
perspective of a scientific psychologists, which was one of many perspectives
Peirce was concerned with, a great deal of confusion is entrenched in modern
thought about the relationship between mind and behavior. In particular, I
would argue, we have confused the thing to be explained with a particular
variety of explanation that is commonly offered. One goal is Peirce's
definition of 'belief' is to clarify what we are trying to explain, which is a
necessary first step to judging the possible explanations.
Before we get too deep into the psychology, it should be noted that progress is
often made in the "hard" sciences when the thing-to-be-explained is made more
clear. For example, Newton's theory of gravity was a 'theory' because he
declared that the cause of terrestrial bodies falling towards the earth was one
and the same as the cause of planets moving in orbits; that is, a falling apple
can be used as a metaphor or model for explaining orbiting planets. People had
for centuries declared that celestial phenomenon had different causes than
terrestrial phenomenon, and Newton progressed the field by clarifying the
thing-to-be-explained. Though I can't put an exact name on the event, chemistry
was similarly advanced when its basic descriptive content was clarified to be
the way that atoms combine to form molecules - and again advanced when it was
further clarified that we were concerned with atoms and molecules measured in
terms of moles (a metric regarding the number of atoms/molecules) instead of
their combination in metrics of weight or mass.
Back to psychology, you must start by granting me, at least for the moment,
that language is a distraction to psychologists - either because people don't
know themselves perfectly, because they may intentionally lie, or because
speaking just isn't a perfect tool. Language is also problematic because when
we focus on verbal interaction, we forget that, in our day-to-day lives, we go
about much of our business without language, or with language as a supplement
to things that are already happening. For example, I might see a boy trying to
hit a bee hive with a rock, and ask, "Why on earth are you trying to hit that
hive?!?" He replies, "I don't like bees." The analysis being offered of these
events is as follows: 1) By observing the behavior of the boy, I could see what
he was trying to do - hit the hive. 2) I asked for an explanation of this
behavior. 3) The boy explained his trying-to-hit-the-hive on the basis of a
dislike. Similarly, let us imagine that we see a woman studying a jigsaw puzzle
for a while, then confidently picking up a piece and attempting to put it in a
hole. Whether the piece fits or not, we might ask, "Why on earth did you
believe that would work?!?" and she might reply "I rotated it in my head, and
the shape and colors seemed to line up." The analysis being offered of these
events is as follows: 1) By observing the behavior of the woman we have seen
her belief - that the piece would fit. 2) I asked for an explanation of this
behavior. 3) The woman explained by reference to manipulations of an internal,
mental model of the pieces.
When I asked about the boy's trying, I was asking for an explanation of
something I saw him doing. Thus, trying = something about behavior. When I
asked about what the woman's belief, I was asking for an explanation about her
behavior. Thus belief = something about behavior. If those questions were not
asking about something observable, then the whole interaction is nonsensical.
Now, both the woman and the boy offered explanations that we would normally
take to be dualistic in some manner (perhaps mind-body dualism, perhaps
brain-behavior dualism). There are many who would argue that the boy's
explanation, in terms of his 'dislike', is not dualistic, but that is a
somewhat different discussion, and the woman's explanation is clearly
dualistic. In any case, while we must take seriously the explanations people
offer for their own behavior, we must also maintain our suspicion of language.
Thus, we must treat the explanation they offered as a hypothesis.
To make their hypothesized-explanations even potentially coherent, we must be
absolutely sure to not confuse their explanation with the thing to be
explained. We must at all costs not confuse the woman's "belief" with "that she
mentally rotated the object and it lined up in her head." That is, to explain
the belief is one thing, to explain the lining up in her head is another thing.
That she believed is that she acted confidently in placing the piece. That she
acted confidently might or might not be well-explained by things that occur in
her inaccessible (to us) mental theater.
So, that's it. What Peirce's observation allows us to do is to judge these and
other possible explanations based on the evidence we can amass to support them.
We can ask, "Is the relevant something-about-behavior best explained using
dualistic explanations, or by using non-dualistic explanations in terms of
operant and classical condition, more dynamic and full-bodied developmental
effects, evolutionary processes, etc.?"
Now, I will readily admit that I have a bias against dualistic explanations ---
both because I think the force of evidence is against them and because I think
they are somewhat incoherent --- but that is a different issue. Step 1 is in
advancing the science of psychology (130 years ago, and still today) is to
clarify the thing-to-be-explained when we ask about things like 'belief', so
that the the thing-to-be-explained can be kept separate from the explanation,
and so that the plausibility of different explanations can be coherently
investigated and the resulting evidence can be judged fairly. The
thing-to-be-explained is why people act the way they do, with different aspects
of their actions taking center stage in different questions.
The end there seems a bit rambling, but hopefully Russ's question is no longer
left hanging.
Eric
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
