They say all mathematicians are Platonists. The interesting thing is that this 
thing that is not about anything can be so surprising.

--Barry

On Apr 16, 2013, at 3:53 PM, "Nicholas  Thompson" <[email protected]> 
wrote:

> Owen,
>  
> One of the reasons that mathematical language can be so precise is that it 
> isn’t ABOUT anything, right?   The minute one adds semantics …. the minute 
> one applies mathematics to anything … all the problems of ordinary language 
> begin to manifest themselves, don’t they? 
>  
> Nick
>  
> From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Owen Densmore
> Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2013 3:50 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Isomorphism between computation and philosophy
>  
> One has to be careful with nearly all the "impossibility" theorems: Arrow's 
> voting, the speed of light, Godel, Heisenberg, decidability, NoFreeLunch, ... 
> and so on.
>  
> To tell the truth, Godel .. it seems to me .. says to the practicing 
> mathematician that the axioms have to be very carefully chosen.  Its sorta 
> like linear algebra: a system can be over constrained .. thus contain 
> impossibilities, or under constrained thus have multiple solutions.
>  
> But all I'm hoping for is any attempt to make the words Nick and others have 
> be as precise as a computer language.  If this is the case, then we can use 
> the lovely computation hierarchy from FSA, to CFL to Turing/Church.  But 
> then, most mathematicians know none of this structure either.  Sigh. 
>  
> I wish philosophy had the same constraints where bugs could be found.  On the 
> other hand, ambiguity can be a huge plus, as any spoken language shows.
>  
>    -- Owen
>  
> 
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Barry MacKichan 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>  Curious. Isn't the proof of Godel's theorem a special case of this?
>  
> As I understand it, the proof is this:
>  
> Consider the statement: This theorem is not provable. If it is false, the 
> theorem is provable. Since 'provable' implies true, this is a contradiction. 
> Therefore the theorem is true, which means it is true and not provable.
>  
> The genius in Godel's method is that he created an isomorphism between the 
> domain of the previous paragraph, and arithmetic, and the isomorphism 
> preserves truth and provability. Thus the above theorem corresponds to a 
> statement in arithmetic that is true and not provable. What is this 
> statement, you might ask. Well, evidently it is far to complex to compute or 
> write down (although it would be interesting to see if more powerful 
> computers or quantum computers would change this.)
>  
> Anyway, that true but non-provable theorem shows that number theory (aka 
> arithmetic) is incomplete -- that's the definition of incomplete in this 
> context.
>  
> --Barry
>  
>  
> On Apr 16, 2013, at 10:25 AM, Owen Densmore <[email protected]> wrote:
>  
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> Can anybody translate this for a non programmer person?
>  
>  
> Nick's question brings up a project I'd love to see: an attempt at an 
> isomorphism between computation and philosophy. (An isomorphism is a 1 to 1, 
> onto mapping from one to another, or a bijection.)
>  
> For example, in computer science, "decidability" is a very concrete idea.  
> Yet when I hear philosophical terms, and dutifully look them up in the 
> stanford dictionary of philosophy, I find myself suspicious of circularity.
>  
> Decidability is interesting because it proves not all computations can 
> successfully expressed as "programs".  It does this by using two infinities 
> of different cardinality (countable vs continuum).
>  
> Does philosophy deal in constructs that nicely map onto computing, possibly 
> programming languages?  
>  
> I'm not specifically concerned with decidability, only use that as an example 
> because it shows the struggle in computer science for modeling computation 
> itself, from Finite Automata, Context Free Languages, and to Turing Machines 
> (or equivalently lambda calculus).
>  
> I don't dislike philosophy, mainly thanks to conversations with Nick.  And I 
> do know that axiomatic approaches to philosophy have been popular.  
>  
> So is there a possible isomorphism?
>  
>    -- Owen
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