It's unclear to me whether you want dialogue with the Q:A thing, or just to compare unadulterated answers (or not even that). But what I did was try to couch my answers so that they generated the parts of your answers I agree with and contradict the parts of your answers with which I disagree.
Steve Smith wrote at 05/07/2013 12:42 PM: > Maybe taking a fresh run will be better? > > Q. Can Science be done without language? > A(smith). Some, almost for sure. A(gepr): No, probably not. Language is an denser/compressed replacement for other behaviors (e.g. grooming) and serves to bring about behavioral coherence in a group. Behavioral coherence is necessary for science. (Thought coherence is irrelevant to science except when/where it facilitates behavioral coherence.) > Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language? > A(smith). It seems as if this is the case. A(gepr): Yes, which seems like a natural consequence of my answer to the first question. > Q. Is Science a "collective thing" > A(smith). Some uses of the term Science are specifically a > collective thing. To wit, the collection of all artifacts of a > specific methodology including the hypotheses (tested or not), the > methods and apparatus for testing them, the resulting data gathered > during the testing, the logic and mathematics used to analyze the > data, and most familiarly, the conclusions drawn (scientific theories). A(gepr): By definition, science consists of testable conjecture. In order to be tested, the conjecture has to be reified, embedded into a context collectively constructed by a population (even if that population is 1 human and 100,000 rodents). Hence, testing requires the artifact be part of, fit in with, a collectively co-evolved context. There is no instantaneous or infinitesimal science, i.e. all science has spatial and temporal extent. If the conjecture cannot be reified, instantiated into the external world, then it is not science. > Q. Is Science created *by a collective* > A(smith). Individual elements in the collective thing we call > Science can be created by very small collectives. When an > individual generates hypotheses, contrives experiments, executes > them, gathers data and draws conclusions, this is an important > *part* of science and will be included in the collective artifact. > Without independent verification (and nobody seems to agree on just > how much independence and how much verification is sufficient), the > artifacts are not yet fully vetted and I suppose not "quite" > science. In this sense, Science requires a collective. A(gepr): Yes. By definition, science consists of testable conjecture. Testability implies multiple individuals willing to share enough similarity to engage in the testing. So, that's a slam dunk. Shared conjecture requires sharing in one (or both) of two forms: 1) shared anatomical or physiological structure or 2) shared mental constructs. Hence, complete orthogonality (or autonomy) would prevent the production of science. However, the existence of collectives does not necessarily imply their produce is science. Collectives are necessary but not sufficient. > And I think you will agree that anthropomorphism is a form of figurative > thinking as much as the use of metaphor. In fact it seems like a > special kind of metaphor (where the metaphorical source domain is > humanity which is ultimately sourced from one's sense of one's self)? I just can't get beyond this. I try, but I can't. Anthropomorphing (-izing?) is not figurative or metaphor. I may be mincing words, here. But I believe these physiological processes are NOT representative. They aren't symbolic. When I refer to a robot (or a tree sapling or my cat) as _he_ or _him_, I'm not thinking of the robot as a _symbol_ for anything. I'm imputing that robot (or sapling or cat) with its own first class presence. It's an "end in itself" a "person", as it were, with as high an ontological reality as my self. To think of them figuratively or metaphorically would be an entirely different thing. In fact, if I were to think of, say, my cat as merely a _symbol_, I'd be more psychopathic than I already am. ;-) Now, I admit that when I use the tagline "putting oneself in the other's shoes", that has an element of the figurative or metaphorical, in the sense that it requires an abstracted "replacement". The idea requires a sense of being able to pluck one's self out of its context, pluck the other out of its context, and do a switcheroo. I admit that. But it's a failing of language and not indicative of real figurative thinking. When I empathize with my robot, I don't really replace the robot with my self. Instead, I promote the robot to personhood status. And that's not using the robot as a symbol at all. It's a completely different way of thinking about the world. So, anthropomorphism is _not_ figurative or metaphor, it's an ontological commitment (or delusion). > I'm not sure that I can say that my "thoughts are not real". I can > agree for the sake of arguement that they are *different* than my > immediate sensations, but then my immediate sensations (go experience > one of many perceptual illusions) are not *real* either. We fit our > *raw* perceptions (whatever that means) onto some series of layers of > models. I would contend that at some point those models are entirely > linguistic/abstract/symbolic (for humans) and that wherever that divide > lies might be an important one. OK. Maybe I'm just not saying this correctly. I disagree and counter-contend that at NO point are our models entirely linguistic/abstract/symbolic. There is no divide. Everything in our heads _is_ biochemical. What I mean by "thoughts are not real" is that our word "thought" is short-hand for the wildly complex and feedback rich biochemical processes inside us. It's fantasy to think that thoughts are somehow separate or separable from the wet stuff inside us. > But I would claim that what I am doing (whilst manipulating said > objects) is manipulating abstractions... in particular, I am using the > (relatively accurate) physical conservation of length in these > objects/materials to "add" and then using the *abstraction* of > exponential notations and arithmetic to then *multiply* and/or to simply > *look up* other functions (e.g. trigonometric) using the device of marks > on a movable pair of objects with an (also) moveable reticule. > > When I do "simple" arithmetic in my head, I use a combination of > conventional symbols (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) and rules (decimal positional > numbers) and more rules (addition, multiplication, division, etc) to > achieve these answers. I happen *also* to have a strong intuition about > much arithmetic/mathematics which I not as obviously symbolic. But I > would claim this intuitive calculation is more like a sloppy version of > the slide rule described above. I may do long division in my head > using some short-cuts, but it is entirely symbolic, and I may check my > answer using various intuitive tricks (including visualizing the number > as a rectangular area and the divisor and result as the length of the > sides). Sorry about the willy-nilly snipping. But I get irritated when others quote too much. So I may quote too little (though I'll never be as zealous as Marcus at snipping down the quote ;-). I recall an accusation leveled at list participants awhile back when we were talking about the definition of math and what mathematicians do. It went something like: "those who talk a lot about math don't tend to be very good at math" or something like that. The point, I think, is that _doing_ math is what makes one comfortable with it, whether one is an engineer, an artisan, or a pure mathematician, the only thing that can make one good at it is to do it. Now, that says nothing about what those symbols mean while you're doing it. But the consensus seems to be that most people who are good at math tend toward a Platonic understanding of math. The "symbols" are more than just symbols, whose meaning can be applied, unapplied, and re-applied willy nilly. To people who are good at math, the "symbols" are less symbolic than they might be to those of us who are only adequate at math. Good mathematicians aren't just manipulating symbols, they're discovering reality. This means, I think, that we animals are less capable of abstraction than I think you assert. When you do that "higher" more abstract math, you're doing the _exact_ same thing as manipulating the slide rule, or matching the length of your string to marks on a board ... exactly, not nearly, not figuratively. > Ok... I think I agree that Science (as opposed to mathematics) requires > an embedding in the (real, messy, wet, etc.) world. What I'm not clear > on is whether the abstractions we have developed (linguistic in general > and mathematical in particular) are not neccesary (or at least very > useful?). > > [...] If a person (or culture) had > the stamina/capacity to store all such examples and index them > effectively, I suppose the abstractions of algebra would be irrelevant > or unneccesary and maybe even considered a "cheap trick" by those who > had the capacity to hold these problems in their heads? If you don't regard the conceptual/linguistic objects as abstractions, but instead regard them as compressions, then we can agree that they are necessary. Whether the compressions are lossy or lossless depends, I think on the biochemical structures involved. For example, the autonomic wiggling of our eyes or fingers when we look at or manipulate an object filters out some concrete detail so that the compressed version of it in our heads has less detail than the uncompressed version impinging on our outer senses. Similarly, we can be tricked (by a prestidigitator) into faulty compressions. (I.e. when we decompress it, it looks nothing like the original.) But the skill being developed by compressing and decompressing a LOT is not an abstracted thinking-in-isolation skill. It's a filtering skill, determining signal from noise, what to include in the compression and what to leave out. That's the key skill, not manipulating the abstractions/compressions inside our heads. The key to being a good scientist, doing science, lies in the embedding into or out of the environment, not the thinking/manipulating abstractions in one's head. Preserving the applicability or embeddability of what's in your head is the most important part, no matter how you manipulate thing in your head. > PostScript: > > THIS is why I shot my TV! I also stay away from Youtube except for > instructional videos for tearing down, repairing (and most importantly) > re-assembling my complex devices (pieces of my Digital as well as my > Analog ecology (aka Swamp)). And it's precisely why I will never willingly get rid of my TV, any more than I'd get rid of my scissors ... or my books ... or my belt, shoes, pencils, hammer, etc. It amazes me when people purposefully handicap themselves by refusing to use a tool. We have lots of self-described TV murderers here in Portland. I do turn off the TV just as often as I turn it on, though ... more, actually, since Renee' tends to leave it on. All tools need on-off buttons. ;-) I also reserve the right to pray to my imaginary friends and change my mind on a regular basis. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
