"Where does vernacular "computation" stop and this high-falutin fancy-pants "computation" begin? The same sort of question occurs in questions about the neural correlates of consciousness."
I don't buy there is a meaningful distinction -- I mean one that should be preserved -- between those who do analysis and those who do calculations. (There's history and prejudice about this of course.) There's just differences in domain knowledge, and a formalism gap where misunderstandings occur. Ideally there would be automated proofs (and context) all the way down. If a code can be shown to be correct and as intended, and tolerances of the machine are known as are numerical sensitivities in the algorithms, then there is no reason to trust analytical results more or less than calculations. The latter just takes longer. As for neural correlates of consciousness, same thing: If it turns out there are neat, modular ways to model cognitive function, great, but decoupling different kinds of evidence into stove-piped areas of expertise is just throwing away information. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
