Eric,

 

I doubt an idea before I ever apply for a grant. Then I deceptively claim to be 
trying to replicate an authorities claims. But the devil within me recalls that 
at least once maybe more often , I have noticed

that the authority’s prediction failed. That knowledge is my group’s secret 
until publication. Then it becomes everyone’s knowledge.

 

I have in my memory a perfect “Black Swan” event. I suppose that I have more 
faith in water birds than in statisticians. Perhaps we often hide behind 
obscure math to shield our superstitious insights.

Some times using the math first reveals an outcome that is used as a gloss to 
hide the unknown. For instance the Griffith’s Crack Theory  widely held in 
Classic Mechanics. Exactly what is the use of a singularity zone

when a crack propagates in wild directions? The material does not use it but 
then at that scale the material uses Quantum Mechanics but the engineer favours 
The Classic Mechanics. So indeed certain materials do emit light

from crack tips. At the edges of any discipline anomalies will define limits or 
boundaries for paradigms. Without doubt and secret devilish memories Science 
would not evolve so quickly.

 

At this point I am reminded of an eminent chemist , Polanyi? who received the 
Nobel Prize and afterward became a philosopher who suspected something like 
superstition, drives many scientists much like

Isaac Newton.

I think as civilized people we prefer to stick with conduct rules knowing 
perfectly well how to violate them and the consequences of doing so. 

vib

I guess we should never believe the whole of PR.

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: March-02-17 1:04 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal 
discussion Landscape-bird songs

 

Glen, 

To "Peirce-up" the discussion of doubt a touch. To doubt something is to be 
unable to act as-if-it-were-true without reservation. So, for example, you do 
not doubt Newtonian mechanics under a wide range of conditions (you are willing 
to act as if it is true under many circumstances), however, there are 
conditions under which you would be nervous acting as if they were true. Your 
doubt is not absolute, and the "caveats" you refer to, could be expressed as a 
description of the circumstances under which you start to get nervous. 

 

Your description of replication is good, but non-typical (particularly among 
the chemists, which are Peirce's favorite scientist). We now think of 
replication as part of the falsification process, but that is actually a weird 
way to think about (a symptom of the degenerate state of many current fields). 
The most natural reasons to replicate a research report is a) because the 
outcome is itself useful or b) because you intend to build upon it. For 
example, if someone publishes a novel synthesis for artificial rubber, I would 
probably try to replicate it because I need artificial rubber, or because I 
intended to start with that artificial rubber and try to synthesize something 
new. Under those conditions, anyone trying to replicate would be very 
frustrated by a failure (given some tolerance for first attempts). 

 

Nick, 

I think Glen is prodding, in his second part at an extremely important point, 
and one that I have been wrestling with quite a bit lately. It is quite unclear 
why "trusting the work of other scientists" - as currently practiced - is not 
simply another deference to authority. The current resurgence of assertions 
that people shouldn't argue with scientists (e.g., that we should care what an 
astrophysicists thinks about vaccines, or what a geneticist thinks about 
psychology) is bad, and "science-skeptics" are not wrong when they attach a 
negative valence to such examples. Let us ignore those flagrant examples, 
however. How do I determine how much weight to give to a report in a "top 
journal" in psychology? Does it matter that I know full well most articles in 
top journals turn out to have problems (as flashy reports of unexpected results 
are prone to do)? And if I am suspicious of that, what do I make of the opinion 
of a Harvard full professor of psychology vs. a bartender who has been helping 
people with their problem for 5 decades? Etc. etc. etc. I think there is a very 
deep issue here, which I'm not sure I've ever seen explained well. I think, in 
part, it is a challenge that was not as prevalent even 50 years ago, but that 
may just be imagined nostalgia. 

 

 

 

 

 





-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps

 

On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 4:13 PM, glen ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote:


Heh, your lack of social salve has left me unclear on whether I should respond 
or which parts to respond to. >8^D  So, I'll just respond to what I think is 
the most important point.

>  That implies that what you say below supports arguments from authority. 
> [NST==>I don’t think we can EVER escape arguments from authority.  Science is 
> locked in a matrix of trust.  Doubt in science is really important, but it 
> has to be relatively rare, or we would never know which of a million doubts 
> to take seriously.  <==nst]

I think you use "doubt" differently than I do.  Even if we replace "doubt" with 
"falsified", it's not a binary thing.  When I doubt something an authority 
says, I'm not refuting, denying, or rejecting it.  I'm simply expressing that 
the saying probably has caveats, some of which I might know about, some of 
which I might not.  The same is true of (critical rationalist) falsification.  
Even though we know Newtonian physics isn't end-all, be-all True with a capital 
T.  It's satisficing in most circumstances.  To (When I) say it's been 
falsified simply means it has caveats.

And, in this sense of the two terms, doubt and falsification are _rampant_ in 
science.  When you try to replicate some other lab's experiment, you must 
doubt, say, the methods section in their paper, usually because you don't have 
the exact same equipment and the exact same people ... doubt is what promotes 
reproducibility to replicability. ... at least in this non-scientist's opinion.

>  I.e. we can't treat a lack of salve as an assertion of objectivity without 
> implicitly asserting that every statement without such salve is fallacious. 
> [NST==>Yep.  All statements are more or less fallacious.  So does that render 
> all statements the same?  If I flip the coin once and it comes up heads, what 
> evidence do I have that the coin is biased.   None.  If I flip it twice, a 
> little.  If I get a hundred heads, the probability that the coin flips 
> represent a population of fair coin-flips is finite, but vanishingly small.  
> I’ld bet on it, wouldn’t you?  All statements of certainly of that character. 
>  <==nst]

No, not all fallacies are the same.  Different statements are fallacious in 
different ways.  And the argument from authority fallacy, in my opinion, is the 
worst one because it's opaque.  You can't learn from it.  At least with, say, 
assuming the conclusion, it encourages us to understand the relationship 
between premises and conclusion... it helps us grok deduction as well as the 
host of concepts surrounding languages, formal systems, algebras, etc.

Your inductive argument, by the way, isn't obviously an argument from authority 
(obvious to me, anyway -- see how annoying it is), particularly with (as 
someone recently phrased it) interpersonally assessable things like coin 
flipping.  Anyone with the usual complement of sensorimotor manifolds (!) can 
put in place the kernel and carry out the iteration.  The only authorities 
involved are whatever physical structures are required for coin flipping and 
counting.

But, more importantly, self-consistency (local coherence) is the governor of 
induction.  Can you imagine if "successor" were redefined at each iteration?  
So, it helps make my larger point that it's irrelevant what you or I believe or 
state with authority.  What matters is whether the method(s) hang(s) together.

--
☣ glen


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