There's a lot of that I could respond to. But I'll try to stay focused. I would not argue for pan-consciousness, at least not for this argument. It's a fine idea. But it's not necessary for this conversation. I'm arguing that consciousness has types and scope. By "type", I mean something fuzzy, where one type could actually be another (proximal) type, but that very distant types are distinguishable. And by scope, I mean something like domains and co-domains.
So, I think we can distinguish between being barely conscious of, say, standing on one leg in the shower, cleaning between our toes *while* thinking about, say, changing the oil in the car. The awareness that you're cleaning your toes is (somehow) different from being aware of your car (1000 feet away) and the algorithm for changing the oil. That implies that consciousness (or awareness if you'd like to distinguish) has types. Further, the scope of the awareness for toe-cleaning is distinguishable from the scope of the awareness for changing oil. E.g. they can both be dangerous... you can slip in the shower or you can be crushed under your car. But the consequences and extent to which you take precautions against those dangers is distinguishable. The same is true with being aware of one's "agency" or "capability for causal action". E.g. if I wake up in the middle of the night all tied up in my sheets, I'm never wholly ignorant of how that situation came to be. I either slept restlessly and tossed a lot *or* I was having an active dream. The *type* of that self-awareness, that "I" that caused my body to be tied up in those sheets is distinguishable. So distinguishable, that there are actually 2 I's, the one that was running from monsters vs. the one that simply couldn't get comfortable enough to sleep well. When you ask your "Oh ho! Now I've got you!", sophist question of *who* is convincing or being convinced if there's no me, nor you, you are *explicitly* denying the above types and scopes. You're suggesting there is a well-defined sense of self in the first place and that denying that somehow violates some law of the excluded middle or somesuch. That's not very useful. What is useful, though, is taking seriously the suggestion that we are huge complicated systems that wander in and out of consciousness, whose attention waxes and wanes, and wanders from object to object, sometimes in a loopy way so that the subject becomes the object. Etc. *That's* what I'm suggesting. I think we ought to give ourselves over to our "tribes" in much the same way we give ourselves over to, say, eating pizza because our body likes high-glycemic food, every once in awhile. Every so often, it just feels good to be part of the *mob*. To quote Slayer: Close your eyes And forget your name Step outside yourself And let your thoughts drain As you go insane, insane On 01/22/2018 03:58 PM, Steven A Smith wrote: > How in the world can the "indviduated self" I call YOU or "Glen" (or > uǝlƃ ☣ for that matter) convince the individuated self/*me* that > signifies identity here as sasmyth or Steven A. Smith if those > individuated selves don't exist or exist merely as an illusion... And > then one (if not me/I/self) must ask just *who* or *what* holds this > illusion? Is your model that there is a pan-consciousness which is > *somewhat* compartmentalized into myriad illusory selves, of which the > "you" and the "me" in this discussion are merely degenerate examples > thereof? -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
