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> On Dec 7, 2019, at 1:25 PM, <[email protected]> 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Glen, 
> 
> Most streams of experience don't converge.  Random streams predict nothing.  
> They are of no use to the organism.  Only streams that converge, "are".  I.e, 
> only they exist.  Random streams, aren't.  Most co-occurrences in stream are 
> random, they reveal no existents.  Since you can never know for sure whether 
> you are in a random or a non random stream, you can never know whether the 
> parts of the stream you are responding to exist or not.  But you can sure 
> make educated (i.e., probabilistic)  guesses, and that's what organisms' 
> learning mechanisms do.  So, I don’t have a ==>faith<== in convergence.  I, 
> like all learning creatures, have a lack of interest in non-convergence.  Non 
> being interested in convergence in experience would be like going to a poker 
> game in which some cards are marked and not being interested in the relation 
> between the cards and the marks.  
> 
> Nick 
> 
> Nick Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
> Clark University
> [email protected]
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of glen?C
> Sent: Saturday, December 7, 2019 9:40 AM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
> 
> Excellent! So, your *scalar* is confidence in your estimates of any given 
> distribution. I try to describe it in [†] below. But that's a tangent.
> 
> What I can't yet reconstruct, credibly, in my own words, is the faith in 
> *convergence*. What if sequential calculations of an average do NOT converge?
> 
> Does this mean there are 2 stuffs, some that converge and some that don't? 
> ... some distributions are stationary and some are not? Or would you assert 
> that reality (and/or truth, given Peirce's distinction) is always and 
> everywhere stationary and all (competent/accurate/precise) estimates will 
> always converge?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [†] You can be a little confident (0.01%) or a lot confident (99.9%). I don't 
> much care if you close the set and allow 0 and 1, confidence ∈ [0,1]. I think 
> I have ways to close the set. But it doesn't matter. If we keep it open and 
> agree that 100% confidence is illusory, then your scalar is confidence ∈ 
> (0,1). Now that we have a scale of some kind, we can *construct* a typology 
> of experiences. E.g. we can categorize things like deja vu or a bear in the 
> woods as accumulations of confidence with different organizations. E.g. a 
> composite experience with ((e1⨂e2⨂e3)⨂e4)⨂e5, where each of ei experiences 
> has some confidence associated with it. Obviously, ⨂ is not multiplication or 
> addition, but some other composer function. The whole composite experience 
> would then have some aggregate confidence.
> 
>> On December 6, 2019 8:22:29 PM PST, [email protected] wrote:
>> Elegant, Glen, and you caused me truly to wonder:  Is the population 
>> mean, mu,  of statistics fame, of a different substance than the 
>> individual measurements, the bar x's that are stabs at it?  But I think 
>> the answer is no.  It is just one among the others, a citizen king 
>> amongst those bar-x's, the one on which the others will converge in a 
>> normally distributed world.  I guess that makes me a frequentist, 
>> right?
>> 
>> And it's not strictly true that Mu is beyond my reach.  I may have 
>> already reached it with the sample I now hold in my hand.  I just will 
>> never be sure that I have reached it.
>> 
>> Could you, Dave, and I perhaps all agree that all ==>certainty<== is 
>> illusory?
>> 
>> I don't think that's going to assuage you.  
>> 
>> I am going to have to think more. 
>> 
>> Ugh!  I hate when that happens. 
> 
> 
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> 

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