Of course, Heisenberg and Bohr made this point regarding the quantum world. Languages are constructed, or emerge, to operate within certain bounds.
Grant > On Dec 10, 2019, at 12:44 AM, Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: > > Ineffable! > > There are many things that "cannot be expressed in words." > > There are many experiences "that cannot be expressed in words." > > Perhaps the "words" simply do not exist - or exist at the moment — the > vocabulary problem you mention. > > Perhaps the constructs of the language — copulas / the verb "to be" in > English, for example — prevent accurate assertions, or mandate unresolvable > paradox. > > Perhaps no language with appropriate expressive power is extant. (Unless > Nick, in his researchers, has rediscovered the "language of the birds" that > Huggin and Munnin used to converse with Odin.) > > Perhaps a 'process of investigative scrutiny' other than the one we commonly > use to talk about common things is required; i.e. we simply have yet to > invent the appropriate "science." > > Why do limitations in epistemology mandate exclusions from ontology? > > davew > > > > On Mon, Dec 9, 2019, at 7:40 PM, Eric Charles wrote: >> Ineffable? >> >> F it! >> >> I will try for a more thorough reply later, but the short version is that >> no inherently ineffable things exist, because "exist" and "real" are >> awkward ways we talk about the object of those concepts that will sustain >> the scrutiny of investigation. For that process to happen, we have to be >> able to talk about the thing being investigated, i.e. it must be >> in-principle effable. If we lack the necessary vocabulary at the moment, >> that's a different problem. >> >> On Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 12:03 PM <thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> Dave, >> >> >> >> Thanks for this; and thanks, Frank, for forwarding it, else I should never >> have seen it. >> >> >> >> Well, that’s what I get for labeling my Monism. Once labeled, monisms >> become dualisms. Let me just say that the experiencer of an experience is >> simply another experience. >> >> >> >> Isn’t admitting to the ineffable throwing in the towel? >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nick Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> >> Clark University >> >> thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> >> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly >> Sent: Monday, December 9, 2019 6:20 AM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com >> <mailto:friam@redfish.com>> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >> >> >> >> I think we've gotten somewhere. >> >> >> >> Frank >> >> >> ----------------------------------- >> Frank Wimberly >> >> My memoir: >> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >> <https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly> >> >> My scientific publications: >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >> <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2> >> >> Phone (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 4:08 AM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm >> <mailto:profw...@fastmail.fm>> wrote: >> >> Nick, >> >> >> >> No need to be ill at ease — I do not mean illusory in, or with, any >> sense/degree/intimation of dualism. >> >> >> >> Ultimately, either: I am more of a monist than thou. Or, you are equally a >> mystic as I. >> >> >> >> You cannot speak of Experience without explicitly or implicitly asserting an >> Experiencer --->> dualism. If there is an Experience "of which you cannot >> speak," or of which "whatever is spoken is incorrect or incomplete;" then >> you are as much a mystic as Lao Tzu and the Tao. >> >> >> >> Because your sensibilities will not allow you to admit your mysticism, I >> offer an alternative: you are an epistemological monist but not an >> ontological monist. On the latter point; I have already accused you of >> believing in an ontological "Thing" other than experience: a human soul or >> essence or spirit. >> >> >> >> My monism is both ontological (except for the myth that infinitely long ago, >> and infinitely in the future, there were two things "intelligence" and >> "matter") and epistemological (accepting that my epistemology is ineffable). >> >> >> >> >> >> davew >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 8:49 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi, David, >> >> >> >> Thanks for channeling me so accurately. It is a talent to channel what one >> does not agree with so faithfully that the person channeled is satisfied. >> Thank you for that. >> >> >> >> I would have only one ill-ease, about the last part of your version: >> >> >> >> both equally illusory. >> >> >> >> I think “illusory” is used here, in your way, not in the way I would use it, >> but to refer to the world that truly is but which we an never truly grasp. >> I.e., dualistically. For me, an illusion is just an experience that does >> not prove out. I arrive at my coffee house three days in a row and there is >> a “day old” old-fashioned plain donut available for purchase at half price. >> I experience that “donut at 4” is something I can count on. That turns out >> not to be the case because, another customer starts coming in at 3.59 and >> commandeering all the donuts. My experience was illusory. Or, think flips >> of a coin. You flip a coin 7 times heads and you come to the conclusion >> that the coin is biased. However, you flip it a thousand times more and its >> behavior over the 1007 flips is consistent with randomness. You come to the >> conclusion that the bias was probably an illusion. >> >> >> >> My understanding of illusory is probabilistic and provisional. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> >> >> Nick Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> >> Clark University >> >> thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> >> On Behalf Of Prof David West >> >> Sent: Friday, December 6, 2019 10:16 AM >> >> To: friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >> >> >> >> I dare not really speak for Nick, but I think the essence of his position is >> that there is no "out there" nor is there any "in here." There is only a >> flow of "experience" that is sometimes "evaluated" (interpreted?) to a false >> distinction of in or out — both equally illusory. >> >> >> >> davew >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 3:27 PM, John Kennison wrote: >> >> Hi Nick, and Eric, >> >> >> >> I am grappling with Nick's ideas that mental states must be physical things >> and even are "out there" rather than "in here". What about delusions? If I >> think I see bear in the woods but I am mistaken, is this false perception >> "out there" even when the bear is not? >> >> >> >> --John >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> >> on behalf of Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com >> <mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>> >> Sent: Thursday, December 5, 2019 8:41 PM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com >> <mailto:friam@redfish.com>> >> Subject: [EXT] Re: [FRIAM] A pluralistic model of the mind? >> >> >> >> Nick, >> >> Your need to complicate things is fascinating. You are a monist. You are a >> monist is the sense of not thinking that "mental" things and "physical" >> things are made of different stuffs. At that point, you can throw a new word >> in the mix (e.g., 'experience', 'neutral stuff'), or you can throw your hat >> in with one or the other side of the original division, e.g., "I am a >> materialist" or "I am an idealist". To that, you add the insight that that >> later discussion is all a bit weird, because once you have decided to be a >> monist it weirdly doesn't matter much what you call the stuff.That insight >> is in need of support, because the old dichotomy is so built in to our >> language and culture that the claim it doesn't matter which side you choose >> is very unintuitive. That is solid, and you should develop it further. >> >> >> >> Instead, you bring up some sort of discussion about serial vs. parallel >> processing that has nothing to do with that topic at all, then you muddle >> the issues up. Whether you think of "consciousness" as "serial" or >> "parallel" has no bearing on the prior issue. Given that you are talking >> with a bunch of computationally minded people, and that you brought up >> Turing Machines, the first problem is that a serial system can simulate a >> parallel system, so while parallel buys you time savings (sometimes a >> little, sometimes a lot), it doesn't change what the system is capable of in >> any more fundamental way (assuming you are still limited to writing zeros >> and ones). But you don't even need that, because it just doesn't matter. >> Being a "monist" has nothing to do with the serial vs. parallel issue at >> all. There is no reason a body can't be doing many things at once. Or, you >> can change your level of analysis and somehow set up your definition so that >> there is only one thing the body is doing, but that one thing has parts. It >> is just a word game at that point. If I have a 5-berry pie, is it 5 >> different types of pie at once, or is it its own 1 flavor of pie? We can >> talk about the pros and cons of labeling it different ways, but it is the >> same thing whichever way we label it.... and... it has nothing to do with >> monism vs. dualism.... >> >> >> >> Admonishment over. >> >> >> >> So... Say more about the monism part... That is a solid issue and you are >> getting somewhere with it... >> >> >> >> It SEEMS so important a difference if one person claims that all we can >> never know is ideas ("You don't know 'the chair', just your idea of the >> chair!") and another person claims that knowing isn't ever a thing and that >> there is just material ("There is no 'idea' of the chair, there is only your >> physical body in relation to the physical world!"). It seems that they are >> making vastly different claims, and that they should disagree about almost >> everything. How is it that THAT doesn't matter? >> >> >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> >> >> >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> >> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >> >> American University - Adjunct Instructor >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 1:20 AM <thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Hi, everybody, >> >> >> >> I have gotten all the communications off of nabble and concentrated them >> below. If you read this message in plain text, a lot of useful formatting >> will go away, so I encourage you to enable HTML. Or perhaps, I can fit it >> all up as a Word file, tomorrow. >> >> >> >> . I have not had time to dig into the contents much. I am pleased that >> everybody took the issue straight on, and I look forward to grappling with >> your comments. >> >> >> >> A recapitulation of the thread: >> >> >> >> First, some text from the review which Roger sent: >> >> >> >> This is exactly as radical as it sounds. Bishop Berkeley and other idealists >> argued that objects are dependent on mind; Manzotti argues the reverse of >> this: Mind exists in objects. In The Spread Mind, Manzotti contends that we >> are mistaken to believe that objects “do not depend on our presence. . . . >> Our bodies enable processes that change the ontology of the world. Our >> bodies bring into existence the physical objects with which our experience >> is identical. We are our experience. We are not our bodies.” And later: “We >> are the world and the world is us—everything is physical.” This includes >> dreams, hallucinations, memories—all are the imagined physical objects >> themselves, not neural firings or mental representations (we must at one >> time have perceived an object to hallucinate or dream it, although it can be >> an unreal combination of other objects, as in the case of flying pink >> elephants). Manzotti impishly dubs this doctrine no-psychism. It’s idealism >> turned on its head, a reductio ad absurdum of scientific materialism. (If >> you’re confused, well, I’m not sure I understand it myself, and I read the >> book.) >> >> Manzotti first drew Parks’s attention during a conference at IULM University >> in Milan, where Parks is a professor, by bellowing “There are no images!” in >> response to a neuroscientist’s discussion about how the brain transforms >> visual stimuli into images. On Manzotti’s view, the brain does nothing of >> the kind. There are no pictures, only objects. “He really couldn’t believe >> how stupid we were all being, he said, buying into this dumb story of images >> in our heads.” Parks was besotted. >> >> He could as easily have said “There are no objects, only pictures!” >> >> >> >> MY COMMENT ON THE REVIEW: >> >> >> >> I think this review may be a wonderful example of what happens when a >> (Romantic) dualist tries to explain monism to dualists. >> >> >> >> What nobody in this discussion seems to understand is that one can have >> objects OR images BUT NOT BOTH. The lunacy begins when people imagine that >> there are things outside of experience. Or experience outside of things… >> really it doesn’t matter: they are both equally crazy. The fact is, >> everything we know comes in over one channel – I call it experience – and >> from that channel every form of experience is derived. So, images and >> objects are not different sorts of stuff, they are arrangements of the same >> stuff. And once you have agreed that there is only one kind of stuff, it >> doesn’t make a damn bit of difference what you call it, “images” or >> “objects”. >> >> >> >> Take phantom limb, for instance. I feel like I have a leg but when I put my >> weight on it I fall down. Now the dualist will artificially divide >> experience into the feeling that I have a leg (i.e., I start to put my >> weight on it) and the experience of falling down, and call one the ineffable >> experience the other the brute reality. But this is an artificial division. >> Not falling down when you put your weight on your leg is as much part of >> the experience of having a leg as expecting that you wont fall down. >> >> >> >> This is where I always imagine that glen and I must ultimately find >> agreement. He has to concede that he is a monist in that everything we >> experience is, well, experience. I have to concede that I am a pluralist, >> in that experience can be be organized in a zillion different forms >> depending on how, and the degree to which, it proves out Hypothesis testing >> is as much a part of experience as hypothesis formation. >> >> >> >> Now, there is a a hidden assumption in my monism which I would think you >> computer folks would be all over me about. I am thinking of consciousness >> as serial, rather than parallel. Where do I stand to assert that what ever >> else can be said about experience, it comes down to a series of single, >> instantaneous points from which all the varieties and forms of experience – >> objects and fantasies, etc. – are constructed. This is where ProfDave has >> me, because there is no more reason to believe on the basis of looking at >> the brain that it has a single point of convergence, a choke point in its >> processing, than to believe the same of the kidneys. Kidneys can make urine >> and clean the blood at the same time. This is why I wish I understood the >> Turing Model better, because I intuit that the computers we use are based on >> just this seriel fallacy. Now, I suppose behavior provides something like a >> choke point. We either walk to the supermarket or we drive. But we may do >> a dozen different things on our way to the supermarket, whether or not we >> walk and drive. We can listen to a pod cast, we can plan our summer >> vacation, we can muse about which tuxedo we will wear for our Nobel >> Address. And if we don’t, as I suspect Frank and Bruce will want us to, >> artificially separate these musements from the circumstances that occasion >> them and the actions they ultimately occasion, we will see that the myth of >> the choke point (the fallacy of the turing machine model?) is contradicted >> by the fact that we can do and do do many things at once all the time. >> >> >> >> >> >> RESPONSES TO MY COMMENTS: >> >> >> >> Glen’s First >> >> >> >> But why is serialization different from any other monist tendency? >> Serialization is a reduction to the uni-dimensional *sequence*, whereas >> parallel implies pluralism, anything > 1 dimension. It would be inconsistent >> of you to allow for parallelism and retain your monism. So, to me, you're >> better off sticking with a sequential conception. >> >> >> >> And don't forget, as we've discussed before, any output a parallel machine >> can produce can be "simulated" by a sequential machine. So, again, monism is >> moot. Yes, it may well be True in some metaphysical sense. But if it walks >> like a pluralist and quacks like a pluralist ... well, then it's a pluralist. >> >> >> >> Unification is only useful in so far as it *facilitates* multiplication, >> i.e. demonstrates constructively how we get many things from few things. If >> you can't show your work, then you don't understand the problem (or you >> haven't read the instructions 8^). >> >> >> >> Dave West’s Comment: >> >> >> >> Nick, I read your Old New Realist paper, but to get a grip on it I must read >> some Tolman and Holt - or at least it appears so. However, I have come to >> one conclusion so far: that in your academic persona you are a committed >> experience monist, but in your public/political persona you are an >> irredemptive dualist, believing that humans have a soul/spirit/essence apart >> from mere experience. (I know, how dare I cast such an aspersion?) >> >> >> >> Other things. I will not attempt to explain the Turing Model, others have >> the technical expertise to do so, but I will speak a bit about the Turing >> Metaphor. >> >> >> >> Metaphorically, a Turing machine is a device with three elements: a >> read/write head, a set of instructions "in memory," and an infinite tape >> divided into cells with each cell containing a 1 or 0. >> >> >> >> A cell of the tape is available to the read/write head and, depending on the >> instructions in memory, will read or write (or both in sequence) and advance >> or retire the tape for 1 to n positions. >> >> >> >> The Turing machine "computes" the tape and, simultaneously, the tape >> "instructs" (programs) the computer (read/write head plus tape >> advance-retire mechanism). >> >> >> >> The "instructions in memory" are just sequences of the same "stuff" — ones >> and zeros — as the "stuff" on the tape. >> >> >> >> Subsequent to some "bootstrap" set of instructions (you have no interest in >> "end cases" so I will not pursue), the "instructions in memory" can >> originate on the tape, i.e. the tape contains both "program" and "data." As >> the "instructions on tape" "move" to "instructions in memory," the >> "instructions in memory" can become arbitrarily complicated. >> >> >> >> So far, nothing that contradicts your "experience monism." >> >> >> >> A favorite science fiction meme: once enough ones and zeros have moved from >> the tape into "memory" the Turing Machine "wakes up" becomes conscious. >> Instant dualism, but without much reason as mere "location" changes nothing >> about the "stuff" which is still ones and zeros. (one "stuff," two values) >> >> >> >> Because the tape is infinite in length, it matters not that it is "serial" >> because any parallel computational experience can be replicated serially >> just takes longer. >> >> >> >> Still nothing to interfere with your experience monism. The interesting >> questions might be: >> >> >> >> 1- Is each individual human being a separate (but equal) instantiation of a >> Turing Machine consuming a separate (but equal) infinite tape. If yes, then >> the door seems to be opened for "private" experience/consciousness. >> >> >> >> 2- each human is a separate Turing Machine, but all consume the "same" >> infinite tape. "Same" meaning mostly identical, but with some allowance for >> perspective (slight variation in which portions of the tape are consumed >> when??). I believe that this would be your preferred interpretation as it >> might allow some kind of dialog among Turing machines as each one "wrote" to >> the infinite tape that all were consuming and, perhaps, somehow, thereby >> lead to some kind of "consensus computation." >> >> >> >> 3- there is but One Turing Machine, co-extensive with the Universe and One >> infinite tape, also co-extensive with the Universe and therefore the >> Universe is constantly "computing" itself. (Writing to the tape equals >> popping quantum quiffs, i.e. collapsing wave functions by observing.) >> >> >> >> I am pretty certain that option three is the only one possible for one >> committed to both ontological and epistemological monism. Ouroboros Rules!! >> >> >> >> Glen’s Second: >> >> >> >> Well, I did reply, as did Dave. If you're ever wondering whether someone >> replied, you might check the archive at: >> >> http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=I3i4o%2FUwNgskuqC9FZm%2FJ7ih8ktHpk7XmBUVU2wsO8M%3D&reserved=0> >> >> >> Dave's was rather interesting w.r.t. Turing machines. Mine was more >> flippant. But to continue mine, your discussion of serial attention or >> behavior hearkens back to our prior discussions of quantum computing. >> Parallelism vs. serial(ism? ... sequentialism?) can be monified/unified by >> considering a 2 dimentional space of "space" vs time. In the ideal, even >> things at, say, space = 1 billion can operate that the same *time* as things >> at space = 1. Similarly, space at time = 1 billion can be at the same >> position as time = 1. But reality doesn't work that way. And quantum >> computing demonstrates this kinda-sorta painfully. But traditional >> distributed computing demonstrates it, too. Parallel computations across >> large spaces run into inter-process communication bottlenecks. I.e. sure, we >> can have 10 computers compute the same thing with different inputs and fuse >> the outputs. But we can't do the same thing with 1k computers without having >> "bus" or "backbone" bandwidth problems. >> >> >> >> This sort of thing seems pragmatically clear when you talk about your issues >> handling "serial consciousness". And, at risk of conflating 2 unrelated >> weird things (quantum with consciousness) for no good reason, there's a >> *coherence* to the parallel processing that goes on in quantum computing >> that kinda-sorta feels like your reduction to a serial attention/behavior in >> parsing consciousness. A loss of that coherence results in separate things, >> whereas a retention of the coherence maintains your "monism". But, in the >> end, it's all about the orthogonality between space and time and the >> *scales* of space and time wherein such orthogonality breaks down. >> >> >> >> I hope that's clear. I'm a bit occupied with debugging an uncooperative >> simulation at the moment. >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=RDHisw3JFGEmSjT77Fl%2BA0v8pG8%2Bcp%2FBoh99Hbc9wv0%3D&reserved=0> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=H2NpyLgc3eaJwlES6o90%2BvU0jUvVNWWGjpGfg%2FR8d34%3D&reserved=0> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=VnHPywdwh3fIha%2BF8j6HC3vpssUpGTxZUUXCIMsAZZk%3D&reserved=0> >> by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=Cy3zmueXnztFYde4YZESTlQrgSaePwNMk2XdjVndhTM%3D&reserved=0> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=QrCPHEda7eV5SFAREpst%2BPvOQQ3oH3WQHlSD9NGE7UY%3D&reserved=0> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386699686&sdata=EJd2lqtzwaN16sf7wf5nAkcQqnk0iZr0PljsBpsKSuY%3D&reserved=0> >> by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> by Dr. Strangelove >> >> >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> by Dr. Strangelove >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> by Dr. Strangelove >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
