Glen said "So the problem of qualia and, say, whether or not we could build a machine that *enjoys* playing the piano, you fall in the camp of the strong-AI people. We can definitely build a machine that thinks and feels just like a human. Is that right?"
To paraphrase Nick's answer: Yes, of course we *can *build such a machine, so long as you agree to treat "enjoy" and "think" and "feel" in the way that I do, and NOT as Chalmers or the other dualists would. My approach does not contain a Chalmers-esque hard problem. ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist American University - Adjunct Instructor <[email protected]> On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 7:17 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Absolutely. If strong AI people are in the "quacks like a duck" school, > than I am a strong AI person. > > > > Devil’s advocate: So a robot could be made that would feel pain? > > Well, you are cheating a bit, because you are asking me to participate in > a word game I have already disavowed, the game in which pain is something > inside my brain that I use my pain-feelers to palpate (see also Natsoulas, > this volume). To me, pain is an emergency organization of my behavior in > which I deploy physical and social defenses of various sorts. You show me a > robot that is part of a society of robots, becomes frantic when you break > some part of it, calls upon its fellow robots to assist, etc., I will be > happy to admit that it is “paining.” > > Devil’s advocate: On your account, nonsocial animals don’t feel pain? > > Well, not the same sort of pain. Any creature that struggles when you do > something to it is “paining” in some sense. But animals that have the > potential to summon help seem to pain in a different way. > > I apologize for constantly citing that paper. But how could I possibly > know what I believe if I don’t know what I have written. > > > > By the way, back before Methuselah, there was a lovely psychological > literature demystifying hypnosis. The basic set up was you have a bunch of > “judges” on one side of a one-way glass window and subjects on the other > side. Two conditions: the subjects are hypnotized to do all the things > they do OR the subjects are simply asked to do those things. Judges could > not distinguish the two kinds of subjects. > > > > Nick > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nicholas Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > [email protected] > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:56 PM > To: FriAM <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve > > > > Excellent! Now we're getting somewhere. So the problem of qualia and, say, > whether or not we could build a machine that *enjoys* playing the piano, > you fall in the camp of the strong-AI people. We can definitely build a > machine that thinks and feels just like a human. Is that right? > > > > (Full disclosure: I'm a strong-AI person. But I'm also pretty practical in > my understanding of AI and the achievement of it exists far beyond at least > one inflection point. And we'll probably all go extinct before it happens.) > > > > On 5/1/20 2:50 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > > Perhaps I misspoke. I certainly agree that working out an entity's > point of view is a problem. I just don't see why it's a hard problem. In > otherwords, when Chalmers asserts that there is a Hard Problem of > consciousness, him implies that he is pointing to some problem unique in > its hardness. I think I am only denying there is not such uniquely hard > problem, not that there is not a problem of working out what is from > different points of view or a problem of working out some entity's point of > view from what is. > > > > -- > > ☣ uǝlƃ > > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
