I like this Eric.  Thank you. 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

 <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> 
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 7:12 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Movement vs. Behavior, and what's in the Black Box

 

Glen said:  

In principle, if EricC's principle is taken seriously, the inner world of a 
black box device will be *completely* represented on its surface. Any 
information not exhibited by a black box's *behavior* will be lost/random. 

 

David said: 

Machine "behavior" is either a metaphor or an error of anthropomorphism.  This 
is true, I believe, whether one speaks of a computer's UI (the computer is but 
a lump and sans any behavior) or a robot.

 

Both questions point out that as a field, psychology has never properly settled 
upon a definition of "behavior". 

 

We can all agree that behavior refers to something more than mere movement, 
right? The dead body in Weekend at Bernie's is not behaving, despite tons of 
movement. A dead duck thrown out of a window isn't behaving as it falls to the 
ground, a live duck thrown out a window and flying away is behaving. A 
marionette under the control of a skillful artist might look like it is 
behaving, but as we widen the lens we see that the marionette is just moving, 
while the artist is behaving. Etc. 

 

We can also agree that the difference between behavior and mere movement not a 
mere matter of constituent parts, right? The dead duck and the live duck are 
basically the same physically (so sayeth Dr. Manhattan). We can also all 
imagine that there might be other planets in which life looks very different, 
perhaps having silicon as its core atomic characteristic instead of carbon, for 
example, or using a physiological system without neurons. 

 

So, we have a box. For some questions we might care what is inside the box. For 
other questions we don't. For the questions where we don't, we can treat it as 
a philosophical "black box" if we want. For those questions, we aren't 
asserting that the surface of the black box tells us what's inside it, we are 
merely asserting that for the purposes of those questions everything we want to 
know can be known from the surface. 

 

Opening such a box can help you get a certain type of explanation for what was 
on the surface, but that is a different matter altogether. Any "inner-world of 
the black box" that creates the same surface has created the same surface. 
Dynamic systems are messy things, even when producing stable outcomes. 

 

The characteristics that distinguish movement from behavior are visible without 
opening the box. We readily distinguish the dead duck from the live one without 
looking inside them; we distinguish the marionette from the artist by looking 
at more of the situation, not by cutting the marionette open. We certainly 
could come up with questions that lead us to look inside the marionette, but 
they wouldn't be questions about its behavior.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


-----------

Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist

American University - Adjunct Instructor

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