Yes. I am struggling with your use of the word closure, but I think you have it as I would have it. Philosophers (at a wild guess) seem to identify intensions with the ineffable mental states that (known only to the actor) guide the actors actions, or, even more narrowly, with the entailments of statements including verbs of mentation. I think intensionality is everywhere in the world around us. Every control system embodies intensionality. Your thermostat is an intensional device.
Thanks for hanging in with me on this. Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2020 11:16 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] intension/extension Nick, >From the Stanford Encyclopedia article: "Although the meaning of the word ‘intentionality’ in contemporary philosophy is related to the meanings of such words as ‘intension’ (or ‘intensionality’ with an s) and ‘intention,’ nonetheless it ought not to be confused with either of them. On the one hand, in contemporary English, ‘intensional’ and ‘intensionality’ mean ‘non-extensional’ and ‘non-extensionality,’ where both extensionality and intensionality are logical features of words and sentences. For example, ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’ have the same extension because they are true of the same individuals: all the creatures with a kidney are creatures with a heart. But the two expressions have different intensions because the word ‘heart’ does not have the same extension, let alone the same meaning, as the word ‘kidney.’ On the other hand, intention and intending are specific states of mind that, unlike beliefs, judgments, hopes, desires or fears, play a distinctive role in the etiology of actions. By contrast, intentionality is a pervasive feature of many different mental states: beliefs, hopes, judgments, intentions, love and hatred all exhibit intentionality. In fact, Brentano held that intentionality is the hallmark of the mental: much of twentieth century philosophy of mind has been shaped by what, in this entry, will be referred to as “Brentano’s third thesis.”" One point you made in chat that I found interesting is the possible intersection of the two concepts. You mention that an individual who bought a ticket for the Titanic did not intend to buy a ticket for a sinking ship. You suggest a sort of closure operator which acts over entailments. If we consider a space of entailments and objects to be defined by these closures, perhaps intentionality becomes intensionality. The sea-farer's intent is to buy a ticket for a sinking ship, intensionally. Jon
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