Hi, Dave, 

 

FWIW, see below. 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[email protected]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2020 10:38 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [FRIAM] Behavior??

 

"Turkey mothers are good mothers—loving, watchful and protective. Virtually all 
of this mothering is triggered by one thing: the "cheep-cheep" sound of young 
turkey chicks.  For a mother turkey the polecat is a natural enemy whose 
approach is to be greeted with squawking, pecking, clawing rage. If a stuffed 
model of a polecat  is drawn by string to a mother turkey it evokes the 
appropriate offensive behavior, but if the same model has a hidden tape 
recorder that emits the "cheep-cheep" sound the mother not only accepts the 
oncoming polecat, but gathers it beneath her.

 

This kind of "fixed action pattern" can involve intricate sequences of 
behavior, such as entire courtship or mating rituals. (see attachement). The 
interesting aspect of this is how the sequences are activated — with a "trigger 
feature;" e.g. a particular shade of red or blue chest feathers, but not a 
perfect replica of a rival bird absent colored chest feathers.

 

Then my questions.

 

1- Is a "behavior" always a movement plus an X-factor?

   1A. is the X-factor other nuances of movement, e.g. rippling eyelashes on 
the contracted eyelid? 

[NST===>Earlier in this discussion, I was forced to take the position, contra 
EricC, I think, that an intention is not necessary to the identification of a 
behavior.  On the other hand, I don’t want to fall for “muscle-twitchism”, the 
doctrine that ANY movement is a behavior.  So I think I am stuck saying that 
what distinguishes a muscle twitch from a behavior is that a behavior is a 
response to something.  So is the patellar reflex a behavior? Yes, I have to 
day, but there the trick is saying what it is a behavior OF.  Where Geertz/ryle 
can help us out in the usual way.  The patellar reflex is a behavior of a 
subsystem of you, not of you.  Faking a patellar reflex would be a behavior of 
you.  <===nst] 

   1B. is the X-factor an intentional signal? or is it "meaning." is intention 
required?

[NST===>I regret I can’t say it any better than I did above, and may change my 
mind tomorrow.  I am awaiting a dope-slap from EricC. <===nst] 

 

2- Is behavior compositional? e.g. squawking, pecking, clawing behavioral 
"atoms" compose to an anti-polecat behavioral composition? (thinking of some 
kind of analog with atom --> molecule --> cell -- organism)

[NST===>I don’t understand “compose” in this context. <===nst] 

 

3- If meaning | signalling | intention is a required aspect of behavior, from 
whence it cometh?

[NST===>In the paper just published, I argued that a sign cannot be understood 
in the absence of an intention, but on the logic just above, I think one can 
carve out behaiors without identifying their intentions. <===nst] 

 

4- is "behaviorism" necessarily a subset of semiology?

[NST===>I think you could argue that much of my career has been spent trying to 
make semeiology a subset of behaviorism.  I could supply several publications, 
but I am sure you are all tired of my doing that, so I’ll just link one 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333455804_SIGNS_AND_DESIGNS> 
.<===nst] 

 

5- If behavior is compositional, are there rules or regularities of composition?

[NST===>I am beginning to think I will like this metaphor when I understand it. 
 Please say more. Are you asking if there is a grammar of behavioral 
sequencing?  Certainly that is true of all behavior that is communicative, and 
perhaps of any telic behavior, since to be telic, behavior must be organized 
into repeatable “higher” (or deeper) spacio-temporal patterns<===nst] 

 

6- Can culture be seen as a collection of allowable patterns of composed 
behaviors?

 

7- Is it necessary to have a well developed discipline of what is observed 
outside the black box before attempting to infer what is within and whatever 
that might be, its relation to what is observed outside?[NST===>You must have 
rules for how to deploy the metaphor of “inside”.  In science, the deployment 
of metaphors must be rigorous and, ultimately, falsifiable.  <===nst]  

 

davew

 

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