Now I'm even more worried that epiphenomena is not the right concept, even in it's (I think) less common Pyrrhonian form. To the extent that the phenomenal layer can be treated as (at least somewhat) independent of its generative layer or, further, the extent to which the outer layer might "structure" the inner layer, I think they've graduated to primary phenomena.
On 7/27/20 9:56 AM, jon zingale wrote: > That > these higher-order structures then support notions that may not exist in a > direct way relative to the structures they are built from, one can view > these newly supported notions as a kind of *epiphenomena* relative to the > underlying structure. > > [...] The structural > functors (G and F) can be seen as *founding* a category of monoids upon a > category of sets, and dually *structuring* the category of sets by the > category of monoids. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
