Right. I am not claiming to speak to the hyper-game, but rather something closer to the pooh-rabbit discussion. I feel that I am witnessing sciency-minded analytic types groping around for what other modalities exist, still will one foot on the "If there were a different kind of rigorous thinking, well then it would be science, and therefore inside of my science" boat. I am suggesting at the very least the work of Deleuze on "Difference and Repetition" as a starting point. Much of developed scientific thought, to its praise and its folly, is extensional thought. OTOH, there are many beginnings toward a science of the intensional, though much of it remains in wait as philosophy. It seems most often encountered in the "softer" sciences: biology, evolutionary theory, psychology. For instance, riffing off of my discussion with EricC last Friday, the American naturalists[1] seek a non-representational science of mind, that is, one that is not amenable to substitutions and symmetry claims. Rather, there is something agent-based in its explanation. For instance, when SteveG makes the leap to Feynman's integrals and duality arguments, he loses Nick, and not just because SteveG is using sexier science, but because SteveG leaves the project of American Naturalism. This is all to say, that when we look inside even the node of Science, we see irreconcilable structure as it ought to be.
To some extent, the emphasis on the low dimensional nature of distance in Heidegger misses the point. The end of the frontier and the reality of our compact environment confers a radical change in psychological kind, and a change in topology is no trivial matter. Anyway, back to wealth. [1] Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, pg 28 -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
