For explanations of all those rules see Sprites, Glymour and Scheines "Causation, Prediction and Search" second edition, MIT Press, 2001.
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Aug 20, 2024, 9:26 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: > I'll see your bet with: < > https://pedermisager.org/blog/seven_basic_rules_for_causal_inference/> > > On August 20, 2024 5:59:20 PM PDT, Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > https://books.google.com/books?id=ccFHXMDXFdEC&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover&dq=Causation+and+Explanation+Campbell,+O%27Rourke,+Silverstein&hl=en&source=gb_mobile_entity#v=onepage&q=Causation%20and%20Explanation%20Campbell%2C%20O'Rourke%2C%20Silverstein&f=false > >--- > >Frank C. Wimberly > >140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > >Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > > >505 670-9918 > >Santa Fe, NM > > > >On Tue, Aug 20, 2024, 5:12 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> > >> > I hate thought experiments. But I need this one. > >> > >> See: > >> > >> Book Chapter3: Actual Causes and Thought Experiments > >> By > >> > >> Clark Glymour , > >> > >> Frank Wimberly > >> > >> MIT Press 2007 > >> > >> --- > >> Frank C. Wimberly > >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 > >> > >> 505 670-9918 > >> Santa Fe, NM > >> > >> On Tue, Aug 20, 2024, 2:53 PM Santafe <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >>> Second inadequate reply, to Glen, unhappily similar to the first to > Jon: > >>> > >>> > On Aug 19, 2024, at 23:37, glen <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> > >>> > There's so much I'd like to say in response to 3 things: 1) to > >>> formalize and fail is human, 2) necessary (□) vs possible (◇) > languages, > >>> and 3) principle vs generic/privied models. But I'm incompetent to say > them. > >>> > > >>> > So instead, I'd like to ask whether we (y'all) think a perfectly > rigid > >>> paddle, embedded in a perfectly rigid solid, with a continual twisting > >>> force on the handle, exhibits "degenerative" symmetry? Of course, such > >>> things don't exist; and I hate thought experiments. But I need this > one. > >>> > >>> I got lost here because I don’t know what “degenerative” symmetry is > >>> meant to refer to. In context of your next para, I see a contrast > between > >>> discrete symmetries, such as the rotations that would preserve a > >>> crystalline unit cell, versus continuous symmetries, which I need as a > >>> formal model to derive restoring forces. Is “degenerative” somehow > another > >>> term for the continuous ones? > >>> > >>> The question when a continuum model can be seen as a limit of discrete > >>> models on finer and finer grains, and when one needs it to be an > >>> independent construct, is interesting. It feels like it goes back to > the > >>> Eleatics. > >>> > >>> I have often thought that Zeno’s paradoxes nicely illustrate the things > >>> you can’t do if you have a mechanics that mathematizes only positions. > >>> Hamilton sweeps those limitations away by making momentum an > independent > >>> coordinate in a phase space, and in that way granting it status as an > >>> independent property of objects from their positions (in classical > >>> mechanics). All the consequences of Noether’s theorem, conservations, > >>> restoring forces, etc., are formulated in terms of these independent > and > >>> dual properties. With the advent of quantum mechanics, their > independence > >>> becomes even more foundational to the picture of what exists, as a > system > >>> in a momentum eigenstate is really in a completely distinct state from > one > >>> in a position eigenstate. The two are differentiated in something > like the > >>> way traveling waves and standing waves are differentiated in various > wave > >>> mechanicses. > >>> > >>> > Similarly, if the paddle+solid could only be in 1 of 2 states, > rotation > >>> 0° and rotation 180°, and would move instantly (1/∞) from one to the > other, > >>> with `NaN` force at every other angle and 100% force at the 2 angles. > This > >>> seems like symmetry as well, but not degenerative. And we could go on > to > >>> add more states to the symmetry (3, 4, ...) to get groups all the way > up to > >>> ∞, somewhere in between where the embedding material becomes liquid, > then > >>> gas, etc. and the "symmetry" is better expressed as a cycle/circle. > But I'm > >>> not actually asking questions about 1D symmetry groups. My question is > more > >>> banal, or tacit, or targeted to those who think with their bodies. > When all > >>> the other non-Arthur peasants try to pull Excalibur out of the stone, > my > >>> guess is they're not thinking it exhibits degenerative symmetry. And > that > >>> implies that normal language is not possible. It's impoverished, for > this > >>> concept. Math-like languages are necessary in the sea of all possible > >>> languages. The would-be King *must* use math to describe the > degenerative > >>> symmetry. (Missed opportunity in Python's Holy Grail, if you ask me. "I > >>> didn't vote for you!”) > >>> > >>> Here I end with the same one I ended the reply to Jon: I strongly bet > >>> that much of what people think they believe for “Natural” reasons are > >>> actually learned beliefs through formal systems. I don’t think farmers > >>> before Newton had a Cartesian and Newtonian concept of space x time, or > >>> that they would have been bothered by Einstein. I don’t think they > would > >>> have cared about Einstein any more than they cared about Newton. They > had > >>> some ontology of “things", and the “places” that things *occupy*. And > >>> probably an ontology of keeping appointments, which in a more formal > world > >>> might entail something analogous to a “theory of mind” construction > about > >>> what other people are doing somewhere else “at the same time” as you > are > >>> doing your thing here. But my default assumption would be that any of > this > >>> only ever took on the rigidities of a Cartesian system after the lived > >>> practice of Newtonian mechanics had started to make some of its rigid > >>> entailments part of routine experience. Then it became a struggle to > let > >>> that go when Minkowskian geometry required something different. > >>> > >>> I don’t mean to be perverse and excessive in denying the implications > of > >>> folk physics: Probably, had farmers been dragged through it (strongly > >>> against their will), they would have found QM’s notion that what we > >>> _should_ call a _thing_ can be characterized by “being at” multiple > >>> “places” more difficult than Newton’s “thing at a single place”. But > I’m > >>> not sure how much trouble it would have been. Considering the > worldviews > >>> people are proud to claim they hold in various religious and > superstitious > >>> traditions, the things asked from modern physics seem relatively > benign as > >>> imaginative lifts. > >>> > >>> Would be nice to have something substantive to say about any of this, > >>> that would deserve to last. But I don’t think I do. > >>> > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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