Yes, good point. You are right, the proof is not completely waterproof yet. It 
is based on the assumption that each of us is wired in a unique way. 

Just as no two fermions can occupy the exact same quantum state or location 
(the Pauli exclusion principle), no two persons can be in the same location or 
follow the exact same path in their lives. The "slice of the world" we 
experience (how Nick used to call it) is different for each of us. Because we 
are adaptive and learn from experience, the unique paths we take and slices we 
experience lead to different, unique results. But you are right, even if two 
path-dependent processes are unlikely to generate the same graph, it is not the 
same as proving they cannot.

I have asked Gemini, and it says the proof can be made more waterproof by 
arguing the fact that no two persons can be in the same location at the same 
time is enough to guarantee unique subjective experience. It argues as long as 
you have two separate people in two separate places, the two first-person views 
can never become identical. To be 100% identical, every single detail of the 
inner experiences must match — including where you feel you are in space. Your 
mind knows where you are: a part of your subjective experience is the feeling: 
"I am standing over here. The other person knows where it is: a part of its 
subjective experience includes the feeling: "I am standing over here." The 
Contradiction: because the two are standing in different spots, the inner 
experiences must be slightly different. The only way two minds could ever be 
100% identical is if they were standing in the exact same space at the exact 
same time — which means they wouldn't be two different people anymore.
  They would be the exact same physical person.

Gemini mentioned two other ways to make it waterproof, but I liked this one 
most. These AI models are becoming better in programming, coding and now even 
in mathematics than we are. It is a little bit frightening.

-J.

On 2026-09-26 19:20, Jon Zingale wrote:
> While I can appreciate the sentiment regarding Abel and Galois, the
> impossibility of solving the general quintic by radicals has a
> strikingly different form. Its Galois group is not solvable, giving a
> precise obstruction to a solution by radicals. In your case, it seems
> less like an impossibility that two graphs could be the same and more
> like a claim that they are unlikely to be the same. Perhaps two
> path-dependent processes are unlikely to generate the same graph, but
> that is not the same as proving they cannot.
> 
> My own tendency is to think that a graph generated by material
> processes over a finite life may have only finitely many
> distinguishable configurations. That leaves open the possibility of
> collisions. The birthday problem or hash collisions seem like closer
> analogies to me.
> 
> There also seems to be more work to do in showing why *consciousness*
> (whatever is meant by the word) should be modeled by an adjacency
> graph, and why a theorem about such graphs would resolve the hard
> problem.
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