An article for my friend Jeff.

Cheers,

Noah

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Subject: Chomsky / A Just War? Hardly / May 20

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Today's commentary:
http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2006-05/20chomsky.cfm

==================================

ZNet Commentary
A Just War? Hardly May 20, 2006
By Noam Chomsky

Spurred by these times of invasions and evasions, discussion of "just war" has
had a renaissance among scholars and even among policy-makers.

Concepts aside, actions in the real world all too often reinforce the maxim of
Thucydides that "The strong do as they can, while the weak suffer what they
must" — which is not only indisputably unjust, but at the present stage of
human civilisation, a literal threat to the survival of the species.

In his highly praised reflections on just war, Michael Walzer describes the
invasion of Afghanistan as "a triumph of just war theory," standing alongside
Kosovo as a "just war." Unfortunately, in these two cases, as throughout, his
arguments rely crucially on premises like "seems to me entirely justified," or
"I believe" or "no doubt."

Facts are ignored, even the most obvious ones. Consider Afghanistan. As the
bombing began in October 2001, President Bush warned Afghans that it would
continue until they handed over people that the US suspected of terrorism.

The word "suspected" is important. Eight months later, FBI head Robert S.
Mueller III told editors at The Washington Post that after what must have been
the most intense manhunt in history, "We think the masterminds of (the Sept.
11 attacks) were in Afghanistan, high in the al-Qaida leadership. Plotters and
others — the principals — came together in Germany and perhaps elsewhere."

What was still unclear in June 2002 could not have been known definitively the
preceding October, though few doubted at once that it was true. Nor did I, for
what it’s worth, but surmise and evidence are two different things. At least
it seems fair to say that the circumstances raise a question about whether
bombing Afghans was a transparent example of "just war."

Walzer’s arguments are directed to unnamed targets — for example, campus
opponents who are "pacifists." He adds that their "pacifism" is a "bad
argument," because he thinks violence is sometimes legitimate. We may well
agree that violence is sometimes legitimate (I do), but "I think" is hardly an
overwhelming argument in the real-world cases that he discusses.

By "just war," counterterrorism or some other rationale, the US exempts itself
from the fundamental principles of world order that it played the primary role
in formulating and enacting.

After World War II, a new regime of international law was instituted. Its
provisions on laws of war are codified in the UN Charter, the Geneva
Conventions and the Nuremberg principles, adopted by the General Assembly. The
Charter bars the threat or use of force unless authorized by the Security
Council or, under Article 51, in self-defense against armed attack until the
Security Council acts.

In 2004, a high level UN panel, including, among others, former National
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, concluded that "Article 51 needs neither
extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope ... In a world full of
perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of
nonintervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the
legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively
endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all."

The National Security Strategy of September 2002, just largely reiterated in
March, grants the US the right to carry out what it calls "pre-emptive war,"
which means not pre-emptive, but "preventive war." That’s the right to commit
aggression, plain and simple.

In the wording of the Nuremberg Tribunal, aggression is "the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole" — all the evil in the
tortured land of Iraq that flowed from the US-UK invasion, for example.

The concept of aggression was defined clearly enough by US Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson, who was chief prosecutor for the United States at
Nuremberg. The concept was restated in an authoritative General Assembly
resolution. An "aggressor," Jackson proposed to the tribunal, is a state that
is the first to commit such actions as "invasion of its armed forces, with or
without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State."

That applies to the invasion of Iraq. Also relevant are Justice Jackson’s
eloquent words at Nuremberg: "If certain acts of violation of treaties are
crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany
does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct
against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us." And
elsewhere: "We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass
these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well."

For the political leadership, the threat of adherence to these principles —
and to the rule of law in general — is serious indeed. Or it would be, if
anyone dared to defy "the single ruthless superpower whose leadership intends
to shape the world according to its own forceful world view," as Reuven
Pedatzur wrote in Haaretz last May.

Let me state a couple of simple truths. The first is that actions are
evaluated in terms of the range of likely consequences. A second is the
principle of universality; we apply to ourselves the same standards we apply
to others, if not more stringent ones.

Apart from being the merest truisms, these principles are also the foundation
of just war theory, at least any version of it that deserves to be taken
seriously.
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---
TCB'n,
Noah

"The foundation of all mental illness is the unwillingness to experience
legitimate suffering."
        - Carl Jung

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