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Subject: Brutus-Bond / A Bantustan View of Global Financial Apartheid / 
Aug 30
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2007 15:12:21 -0700 (PDT)
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Today's commentary:
http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2007-08/30brutus-bond.cfm

==================================

ZNet Commentary
A Bantustan View of Global Financial Apartheid August 30, 2007
By Dennis Brutus and Patrick Bond

In three months, the G20 group of major financial powers will join us in 
South Africa, hosted near Cape Town by the gregarious finance minister 
Trevor Manuel. As usual the ministers will wine and dine, and protesters 
will suck teargas.

But elite self-congratulation will be muted, for the economic officials 
were reminded during the recent financial meltdowns that when Wall 
Street has a cold, others get pneumonia.

Or consider a metaphor that better spreads the blame: what president 
Thabo Mbeki terms Global Apartheid, like Apartheid itself during the bad 
old days, apparently needs a few Bantustans to kick around.

We are witnessing a boot to the bum of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
which lost nearly US$100 billion (17% of its value) between July 23rd 
and last Friday, a sum equivalent to half the size of the national 
economy's annual output.

Yet SA Treasury director-general Lesetja Kganyago is in an emollient, 
even denialist mood: 'We should not be too worried about further 
volatility' (he wrote last week). 'We must continue to strengthen our 
shock absorbers', which include 'a floating exchange rate'.

Did the relaxation of exchange controls represent a shock absorber or 
volatility-amplifier? Since dropping the 'financial rand' dual exchange 
rate system in 1995, the SA Treasury has suffered four intensive 
speculative attacks on the currency (the most of any substantial 
country) and last year managed the world's worst-performing major 
currency. The country's vulnerability also stems from Treasury's 
decisions to happily repay $25 billion worth of apartheid-era debt 
(which should have been labeled 'Odious' under international law), and 
then permit the largest SA firms' financial headquarters to escape to 
London starting in 1999.

Because of periodic currency crashes and Mbeki's refusal to reimpose 
currency controls, the last dozen years witnessed record-high real 
interest rates. As a result, domestic private fixed investment has been 
extremely weak and inflows of 'hot money' - portfolio investments - 
destabilised the economy. So real estate and the stock market have 
boomed while manufacturing withered, leaving us with a trade and 
payments deficit exceeding 7% of GDP this year, in the high danger zone.

Last month, even the IMF's annual Article IV Consultation report 
admonished Manuel's team for the enormous current account deficit, far 
higher than even the USA's (and than Thailand when it melted down a 
decade ago). According to the IMF, South Africa 'could be adversely 
affected by weaker appetite for emerging market assets, a global 
slowdown, or a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade.'

But both the IMF officials and Pretoria's two respondents - Peter Gakunu 
and Goolam Aboobaker - argue that 'sound macro-economic fundamentals, 
particularly the low external debt together with a well managed and 
stable financial sector and a flexible exchange rate regime would assist 
in mitigating this risk.'

As a result of this myopic approach - so similar to the IMF's 
soft-peddling of East Asia's problems just prior to its 1997-98 crashes 
- South African financial analysts have taken to blaming the victim: the 
USA's vast network of 'Ninja' borrowers (No Income, No Job or Assets).

Yet as consumer advocate Ralph Nader argues, 'The corporate capitalists' 
knees are shaking a bit. Their manipulation of the sub-prime housing 
market has led to a spreading credit crunch and liquidity crisis.'

South African financiers have experimented just a little with crazy 
schemes, but even without a derivatives culture in mortgage bonds, 
enough liquidity was pumped into local real estate to drive average 
prices up 200% between 1997-2004, compared to just 60% in the US.

This leaves South Africa at risk of becoming a new Bantustan within 
Global Financial Apartheid. Consider Apartheid's three minimum 
requirements for the homelands, in which roughly half of black South 
Africans were segregated:

-- politicians allied to Pretoria repeatedly gave it legitimacy when 
under pressure (today, witness how South African officials laud the 
'international community' and 'multilateralism': synonyms in the same 
tradition of 'separate development');

-- these agents expressed a willingness to put down local demonstrations 
using repressive means (and witness regular police brutality against 
widespread contemporary municipal protests); and

-- the old Bantustans also had the responsibility to supply cheap 
migrant workers to the outside world as labour reserves (witness SA's 
post-1994 doubling of unemployment along with its new commitment to 
export-orientation).

The Bantustan capitals were equipped with 'toy telephones' which the old 
rulers could always play with, but which had no connection to power. 
Pretoria's racist regime simply imposed its will, occasionally allowing 
the local tyrant to serve as 'point man' for whatever relatively 
harmless local crisis bubbled up (as George W. Bush termed Mbeki when it 
comes to Zimbabwe).

Given these power relations, the challenge faced by the infamous 
Bantustan dictators - Buthelezi, Matanzima, Mangope, Cebe and the rest - 
was to disguise the faulty line to their constituents and pretend they 
had the ear of the powerful. They needed continual reaffirmation that 
there was dignity and upward mobility associated with their sleazy jobs.

Today the sleazy work entails proclaiming never-ending reforms to Global 
Financial Apartheid. When US war criminal Paul Wolfowitz was appointed 
by Washington as World Bank president in April 2005, Manuel - then chair 
of the Bank's Development Committee - welcomed him as a 'wonderful 
individual… perfectly capable.'

Flash forward two years, past one fatal nepotism scandal and another 
rigged appointment process controlled entirely by George W. Bush, and 
again Manuel welcomes Wolfowitz's successor, Robert Zoellick (a fellow 
member of the Project for a New American Century, that notorious pro-war 
thinktank): 'We consider Zoellick to be very competent and hope he will 
be able to operate in the same manner as he demonstrated in the World 
Trade Organisation negotiations when he served as the US trade 
representative.'

Manuel's five-year fuss about 'voice' and 'democracy deficits' and 
'global governance' - and mild-mannered toy-telephone conversations - 
have generated exactly naught. There was not even the decency of a 
European Union call to consult Mbeki or Manuel last month when another 
neoconservative, Rodrigo de Rato, stepped down as International Monetary 
Fund managing director and was replaced, minus any Third World 
consultation, by French ex-finance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

After Strauss-Kahn's visit to Pretoria, Mbeki meekly remarked, 'He is a 
very competent person and we think he would add enormously to the work 
of the IMF - including improving the system of governance of the IMF, 
making it more representative of the developing world.'

Reflecting the same subservience at a Maputo meeting last week with de 
Rato, Manuel and seven other African finance ministers announced: 'The 
African Governors stressed the need to protect and even increase the 
voting share of low-income countries as a group.'

The obvious mismanagement of global financial markets means this is the 
perfect moment for a latter-day Bantu Holomisa - former Transkei 
Bantustan military official who turned anti-apartheid and hosted the 
African National Congress during the late 1980s - to rise up, tell it 
like it is, and foment serious protest.

Indeed there is such a figure, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who on 
his last trip to South Africa - for the Joburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002 - made this very point: 'We have to have 
a radical change in the formats of these summits... We just read a 
speech… There is no proper dialogue, it seems to be a dialogue of the 
deaf. Some people go from summit to summit. Our people go from abyss to 
abyss.'

Around 30,000 people marched that week from the abyss of Alexandra to 
the elite abyss of Sandton, decrying Mbeki's role in water 
privatisation, climate change and rising poverty.

The same happened a year earlier, at the World Conference Against Racism 
here in Durban, where Mbeki removed from the summit agenda two central 
issues - Zionism and reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid 
- and received a 10,000-strong protest in response.

These are the kinds of precedents which make the G20 summit of finance 
ministers scheduled for mid-November such an interesting moment. South 
Africa's independent left, which most vigorously contests the corporate 
globalization agenda, is licking various wounds, including several that 
are self-inflicted. And there will be far too much dust in the air 
concerning the ANC's post-Mbeki leadership succession race - which 
culminates in December - to justify the attention of trade unions and 
Communist Party attention to one more elite talkshop.

Like Buthelezi decrying 1980s apartheid (while killing its genuine Zulu 
opponents), Manuel has already given the game away. Last year, upon his 
return from the G20 summit in Melbourne where 10,000 protesters demanded 
an end to Global Apartheid, Manuel told reporters, 'There is still a 
case to be made for the IMF and World Bank to exist... but they have to 
become more relevant than they are'.

(If he desires an argument to the contrary, Manuel should read the new 
collection of seminal critiques from across the world edited by our 
colleague David Moore, The World Bank, published by UKZN Press: 
http://www.unpress.co.za/book.php?action=displaybook&conf[bookid]=299&PHPSESSID=52c72361293c9c6f0aa3e21c3fc3aa7b)

The G20 attendees will be: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, and the European Union. Of these, the only even mildly 
progressive governments are Argentina's and Italy's, and the world's 
most serious reformers - the Norwegians - won't be there.

What is required, as ever, is for progressive civil society to do the 
serious anti-Apartheid organising, both within the Bantustans with their 
unemployment, inequality, disease, squalor, obsequious leaders and 
intensifying social protest, and far beyond.

(Dennis Brutus is honorary professor and Patrick Bond director of the 
UKZN Centre for Civil Society: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs.)



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