Git-Url: http://git.frugalware.org/gitweb/gitweb.cgi?p=frugalware-0.9.git;a=commitdiff;h=25583816f4f2502fbd01450bad1f5f095da5fece
commit 25583816f4f2502fbd01450bad1f5f095da5fece Author: Miklos Vajna <vmik...@frugalware.org> Date: Tue Jan 13 16:27:34 2009 +0100 openssl-0.9.8-15solaria1-i686 - add CVE-2008-5077.patch - closes #3557 diff --git a/source/lib/openssl/CVE-2008-5077.patch b/source/lib/openssl/CVE-2008-5077.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2816c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/lib/openssl/CVE-2008-5077.patch @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +OpenSSL Security Advisory [07-Jan-2009] + +Incorrect checks for malformed signatures +=========================================== + +Several functions inside OpenSSL incorrectly checked the result after +calling the EVP_VerifyFinal function, allowing a malformed signature +to be treated as a good signature rather than as an error. This issue +affected the signature checks on DSA and ECDSA keys used with +SSL/TLS. + +One way to exploit this flaw would be for a remote attacker who is in +control of a malicious server or who can use a 'man in the middle' +attack to present a malformed SSL/TLS signature from a certificate chain +to a vulnerable client, bypassing validation. + +This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2008-5077. + +The OpenSSL security team would like to thank the Google Security Team +for reporting this issue. + +Who is affected? +================= + +Everyone using OpenSSL releases prior to 0.9.8j as an SSL/TLS client +when connecting to a server whose certificate contains a DSA or ECDSA key. + +Use of OpenSSL as an SSL/TLS client when connecting to a server whose +certificate uses an RSA key is NOT affected. + +Verification of client certificates by OpenSSL servers for any key type +is NOT affected. + +Recommendations for users of OpenSSL +===================================== + +Users of OpenSSL 0.9.8 should update to the OpenSSL 0.9.8j release +which contains a patch to correct this issue. + +The patch used is also appended to this advisory for users or +distributions who wish to backport this patch to versions they build +from source. + +Recommendations for projects using OpenSSL +=========================================== + +Projects and products using OpenSSL should audit any use of the +routine EVP_VerifyFinal() to ensure that the return code is being +correctly handled. As documented, this function returns 1 for a +successful verification, 0 for failure, and -1 for an error. + +General recommendations +======================== + +Any server that has clients using OpenSSL verifying DSA or ECDSA +certificates, regardless of the software used by the server, should +either ensure that all clients are upgraded or stop using DSA/ECDSA +certificates. Note that unless certificates are revoked (and clients +check for revocation) impersonation will still be possible until the +certificate expires. + +References +=========== + +URL for this Security Advisory: +http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090107.txt + + +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/speed.c openssl-0.9.8i/apps/speed.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i/apps/speed.c 2007-11-15 13:33:47.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/apps/speed-new.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ + { + ret=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf,36, buf2, + rsa_num, rsa_key[j]); +- if (ret == 0) ++ if (ret <= 0) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "RSA verify failure\n"); +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/spkac.c openssl-0.9.8i/apps/spkac.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/spkac.c 2005-04-05 19:11:18.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/apps/spkac.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ + pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki); + if(verify) { + i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey); +- if(i) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n"); ++ if (i > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n"); + else { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/verify.c openssl-0.9.8i/apps/verify.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/verify.c 2004-11-29 11:28:07.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/apps/verify.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.600000000 +0000 +@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ + + ret=0; + end: +- if (i) ++ if (i > 0) + { + fprintf(stdout,"OK\n"); + ret=1; +@@ -367,4 +367,3 @@ + ERR_clear_error(); + return(ok); + } +- +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/x509.c openssl-0.9.8i/apps/x509.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/x509.c 2007-10-12 00:00:10.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/apps/x509.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.400000000 +0000 +@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ + /* NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was + * a certificate request in which case it is not. */ + X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(&xsc,x); +- if (!reqfile && !X509_verify_cert(&xsc)) ++ if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(&xsc) <= 0) + goto end; + + if (!X509_check_private_key(xca,pkey)) +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c openssl-0.9.8i/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c 2008-04-06 16:30:38.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.400000000 +0000 +@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ + cms_fixup_mctx(&mctx, si->pkey); + r = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, + si->signature->data, si->signature->length, si->pkey); +- if (!r) ++ if (r <= 0) + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_clnt.c openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s2_clnt.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_clnt.c 2007-09-06 12:43:53.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s2_clnt.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000 +@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ + + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); + +- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)) ++ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto err; +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_srvr.c openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s2_srvr.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_srvr.c 2007-09-06 12:43:53.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s2_srvr.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.900000000 +0000 +@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ + + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); + +- if (i) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */ ++ if (i > 0) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */ + { + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; +@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + +- if (i) ++ if (i > 0) + { + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_clnt.c openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s3_clnt.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2008-06-16 16:56:41.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000 +@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ + } + + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); +- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i) ++ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) + != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5) +@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); +- if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey)) ++ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; +@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); +- if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey)) ++ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_srvr.c openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s3_srvr.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2008-09-14 18:16:09.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000 +@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ + else + { + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); +- if (!i) ++ if (i <= 0) + { + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); +diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/ssltest.c openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/ssltest.c +--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/ssltest.c 2008-06-16 16:56:42.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-0.9.8i/ssl/ssltest.c 2008-12-04 00:00:00.900000000 +0000 +@@ -2093,7 +2093,7 @@ + + if (cb_arg->proxy_auth) + { +- if (ok) ++ if (ok > 0) + { + const char *cond_end = NULL; + + diff --git a/source/lib/openssl/FrugalBuild b/source/lib/openssl/FrugalBuild index 7503e50..68e5179 100644 --- a/source/lib/openssl/FrugalBuild +++ b/source/lib/openssl/FrugalBuild @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ pkgname=openssl pkgver=0.9.8 pkgextraver=h -pkgrel=14 +pkgrel=15solaria1 pkgdesc="The Open Source toolkit for Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security" url="http://www.openssl.org/source/"; groups=('lib' 'chroot-core') @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ archs=('i686' 'x86_64' 'ppc') depends=('glibc>=2.8-3') makedepends=('util-linux-ng>=2.14-2') up2date="lynx -source http://www.openssl.org/source/ |grep LATEST|sed -n 's/.*-\(.*\)\.t.*/\1/;s/$pkgextraver//;1 p'" -source=($url$pkgname-$pkgver$pkgextraver.tar.gz man_symlinks.diff) -signatures=("$source.asc" '') +source=($url$pkgname-$pkgver$pkgextraver.tar.gz man_symlinks.diff CVE-2008-5077.patch) +signatures=("$source.asc" '' '') build() { _______________________________________________ Frugalware-git mailing list Frugalware-git@frugalware.org http://frugalware.org/mailman/listinfo/frugalware-git
