But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/
On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. < lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote: > Thanks Michal, > > We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the > research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout > some time. > > We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, > Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also > strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. > > Regards, > Nicholas Lemonias. > AISec > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. < > lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote: > >> Hi Jerome, >> >> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. >> >> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of >> choice. >> >> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits >> multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels >> that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on >> that job. >> >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias <athiasjer...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> Hi >>> >>> I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. >>> >>> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. >>> Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. >>> >>> As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a >>> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or >>> Requirements[1]) >>> * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + >>> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business >>> Impact and Risk Analysis >>> >>> So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not >>> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not >>> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if >>> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book), security >>> controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also >>> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper >>> SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security principles >>> and 2) used and implemented correctly. >>> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid >>> support to your report >>> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS). >>> Helping the decision/actions around this risk >>> >>> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation of >>> Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term of >>> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding) >>> >>> So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say >>> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID >>> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616) >>> >>> My 2 bitcents >>> Sorry if it is not edible :) >>> Happy Hacking! >>> >>> /JA >>> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM >>> >>> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski <lcam...@coredump.cx>: >>> > Nicholas, >>> > >>> > I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly, so do >>> > some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I >>> > thought that the only thing that mattered is the ability to find bugs. >>> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now know that there's an >>> > even more important and elusive skill. >>> > >>> > That skill boils down to having a robust mental model of what >>> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to explain your thinking >>> > to others in a precise and internally consistent manner that convinces >>> > others to act. We need this because the security of a system can't be >>> > usefully described using abstract terms: even the academic definitions >>> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is secure if it doesn't do >>> > the things we *really* don't want it to do". >>> > >>> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is generally reserved for >>> > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria: >>> > >>> > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences for at least one of >>> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service owners, etc), >>> > >>> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as unexpected and unacceptable, >>> > >>> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a negative outcome, >>> > >>> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new risks that go beyond >>> > the previously accepted trade-offs. >>> > >>> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a case, no matter how >>> > clever the bug is. >>> > >>> > Cheers (and happy hunting!), >>> > /mz >>> > >>> > _______________________________________________ >>> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >>> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >>> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >>> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ > -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”
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