OCSP is not per cert, you can request cert status of multiple certificates in one request. You would have more connections with OCSP than with checking a CRL, there is no question. With OCSP you get near real time validation status. In a CRL model you are only as accurate as your last CRL. Some CA's issue delta CRLS, but that gets resource intensive. If Verisign publishes a CRL every Monday and I revoked my cert today, you would not know about it until the next CRL is published. As far as financial transactions go, OCSP is definitely the standard. IDENTRUS, Swift, GTA, SET, Certeca, all use OCSP as their method of cert status checking..none rely on CRL's for time sensitive financial transactions.
I use Verisign Class 1 because that's all I need. I don�t care that Verisign does not have enough info on me to grant a Class2 or Class3 or that the recipients of my email cant verify my cert via OCSP. I only care that the emails I send are not tampered with and that I can sign / encrypt email in an MS environment (my workplace) with minimal difficulty. Even if I did have a Class 2 or Class 3 the percentage of people who could check my cert via OCSP is very small ( I know because I was Technology Director at a now defunct company that developed and sold OCSP software / plugins ) --Chris -----Original Message----- From: yossarian [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 6:47 PM To: Christopher Harrington; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof MessageMaybe for use in e-mail - OCSP is per cert, which means that every transaction will lead to a separate connect. Maybe good enough for e-mail, certainly not for say money transactions - you rather update once in a while, on quiet hours on your internet connection - not as a home user, but as a corporate admin. Yes with OCSP you have less data per connection, but you would have far more connections - if people were to use whatever subtype of PKI in any significant numbers - which fortunately they don't. In networking it is not just size that matters, also the number of requests. If you prefer OCSP - why do you use Verisign Class I - not validated? Then I noticed something not working in my Outlook E Sp1 on win2k: I said to explicitily NOT trust this certificate and the darn thing refuses to save this setting. Am Ioverlooking something or did I stumble into another minor MS Cockup Experience and have disclosed something? BTW - Thawte is most commonly used to push dialers onto innocent p0rnsurfers.... Hey, it trusted and safe software, so you really should install it .... Lets' associate this great product with connection stealers and p0rnpeddlers of the worst kind. It will really help get it accepted by the general public, i guess. Yossarian ----- Original Message ----- From: Christopher Harrington To: Steve Poirot ; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 10:23 PM Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof If more clients had embraced OCSP, SCVP, CAM or some other form of certificate validation, the size of the CRL would be irrelevant. An OCSP request is only 2kb for example. --Chris -----Original Message----- From: Steve Poirot [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 1:45 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof I don't know about IE, but with Netscape you can import the CRLs and arrange for automatic updates with the maximum frequency being once per day. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Because Thawte don't have the hardware capabilities to do this. I'd asked them this before and they told me it would be too difficult to set this up. Even if they did, imagine how much network traffic would be required for verifying every certificate worldwide? PKI as it is set up at the moment is as useful as the British MOT test. All it says is that on a given day your identity (or car) was satisfactorily inspected. The other 364 (or 365) days anything could happen. - John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNA, RHCE Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the Blind, Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU, Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Appeasement is the policy of being nice to a crocodile in the hope that he will eat you last. (Winston Churchill) -----Original Message----- From: Richard M. Smith [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 12 May 2003 18:09 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof The other problem with Authenticode is that certifcates aren't revokable. Why doesn't IE go back to Thawte to see if the "Browser Plugin" certificate is still valid? Richard -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Daniel Docekal Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 11:38 AM To: 'Richard M. Smith'; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof Sure Richard it is actually loader of dialer program itself - it even updates itself any time it wants and it does anything it wants. And there thousands of people who had this bad luck to "use" that kind of software without properly realising what they are doing. Concerning that certifitace - stop trusting things which cannot be trusted. Would be any COmpany/Street text something you can trust? Would it change any time that company relocates? It's problem of Microsoft who made this "authenticode" verification so misguided and people that they even trust to that. Actually one should not trust to anything that is not personally known to him... -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Richard M. Smith Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 4:10 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof The downloaded ActiveX file can be found at this URL: http://80.96.118.2/ac/mw/MSN_QTPieJess1.exe I ran a strings on the file and the control is called: TIBS Loader module and the ProgID is LoaderCon.LoaderCon. I can't find anything on the Web about this particular ActiveX control, but it wouldn't surprise me that it is part of some sort adult dialer scheme. The control appears to be more of a downloader program and not the adult dialer itself. My question: Why can't an Authenticode certificate present the following information to a user: - Company name - Street address - Phone number - Web site URL - Contact Email address - Company logo - Link to a product description page All this information can be verified when a company applies for a Authenticode signing tool. The current scheme is just plain silly as this MSN scam illustrates. There is simply no way to verify where a piece of software is really coming from. Richard -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Daniel Do�ekal Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 2:08 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof Browser Plugin is ADULT DIALER - it connects via modem to telephone service and you pay your sexy adventure through your telephone bill. In many cases, there are adult dialers committing fraud - they redirect your dial-up internet connection to very expensive number without your knowledge. -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Richard M. Smith Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 3:40 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof You missed the good part. If you actually go to the "MSN" Web site and press the "Connect Now" button, the site tries to download some questionable ActiveX control. Not to worry however: Just press YES in the dialog box when it appears. This operation is totally safe and certified by Microsoft Authenticode(tm) The control is signed by "Browser Plugin". I guess Thawte will give anyone an Authenticode certificate nowadays. I wonder who "Browser Plugin" really is? - NOTICE: The information contained in this email and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged. 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