Dear list members,

My colleagues and I have been doing some research into a mail-related vulnerabilities 
over the last month or two.  We discovered that a problem exists within the way 
non-delivery notifications are sent from many SMTP mail servers.  This problem can be 
successfully (and rather easily) turned into an effective denial of service (DoS).  
The vulnerability affects many of the popular SMTP commercial offerings, but is 
dependant upon their configuration.  In general, larger organisations tend to be more 
vulnerable.

The authors had planned on releasing this analysis after the Easter break.  
Unfortunately we have noticed that a popular vulnerability discussion forum has 
already begun discussing the vulnerability in a such a fashion which may lead to 
attacks over the long weekend.  Therefore we have found it necessary to release the 
paper sooner in an effort to allow developer and administrators to secure their SMTP 
mail services in time.

This vulnerability appears to affect around 30% of our main study group (the Fortune 
500), and has significance to all essential e-mail communications.  The authors have 
proved that this vulnerability can be easily exploited and can be used to DoS almost 
any SMTP service on the Internet.  By utilising multiple vulnerable STMP servers, a 
distributed DoS is possible, and can be used to cause the loss of mail services (and 
in extreme cases all Internet connectivity) to any organisation.

Paper Abstract:
Analysis of e-mail non-delivery receipt handling by live Internet-bound e-mail servers 
has revealed a common implementation fault that could form the basis of a new range of 
DoS attacks.  Our research in the field of e-mail delivery revealed that mail servers 
may respond to mail delivery failure with as many non-delivery reports as there are 
undeliverable Cc: and Bcc: addresses contained in the original e-mail. Non-delivery 
notification e-mails generated by these systems often include a full copy of the 
original e-mail sent in addition to any original file attachments. This behaviour 
allows malicious users to leverage these mail server implementations as force 
multipliers and flood any target e-mail system or account.

The paper is available from:

http://www.techzoom.net/mailbomb























































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best regards 

Stefan Frei
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] [techzoom.net]
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