On Mon, 12 Jul 2004, Aviv Raff wrote: > As you may already know the Mozilla's "patch" for the shell protocol > security issue is merely a global configuration change. But is it > enough?
No. As someone has already pointed out, Mozilla should whitelist safe external protocols rather than blacklist unsafe external protocols. > If an attacker has a file writing access to the user's default profile > directory, or somehow manages to update/create the file user.js (or > even worse - mozilla.cfg) he can override the patch's configuration > change, and enable the shell protocol handler again. The user has already lost. Game over. An attacker can exploit the ability to modify the user's configuration in many different ways. E.g. redirect the browser to a proxy under the attacker's control, make Mozilla use a trojanized Chrome or a trojanized Java plugin, etc. --Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak [ Boycott Microsoft--http://www.vcnet.com/bms ] "Resistance is futile. Open your source code and prepare for assimilation." _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
