Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in GLPI
1/ Arbitrary file upload
All versions between 0.85 and 0.85.2
When an user wants to create a new ticket, he has the possibility to add
an attachment. If for example he wants to add a file named "test.php"
with or without adding the ticket, the file will be temporary uploaded
to GLPI_ROOT/files/_tmp/test.php. We can then directly access this file
through http://host/GLPI_ROOT/files/_tmp/test.php and by default the php
code will be interpreted.
To trigger this vulnerability we need an account that disposes of the
rights to create a ticket.
This vulnerability is a combination of three issues:
- predictable uploaded file names (not randomized)
- upload of unauthorized file extensions
- temporary uploaded files not deleted if using an unauthorized file
By uploading a php file that will be interpreted a malicious user would
be able to execute arbitrary code on the server.
Upgrade to GLPI 0.85.3 (https://forge.indepnet.net/issues/5217)
2/ Privilege escalation
All versions <= 0.85.2
Taking the default account tech, he is only allowed to add users in the
following groups: Self-Service, Technician. He has not the right over,
for example, the super-admin group. So he cannot add the super-admin
privileges to an existing user.
The problem is when creating a new user. When intercepting the POST
request (GLPI_ROOT/front/user.form.php) of a user creation and modifying
the _profiles_id parameter (corresponding to the group attached to the
user) to 4, the new user will have the super-admin privileges.
Any user who has the rights to create a new user can create a
Upgrade to GLPI 0.85.3 (https://forge.indepnet.net/issues/5218)
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