[Original post here:
Content Injection in Samsung Display Solutions Application for Android
Samsung Display Solutions App for Android did not use encryption (SSL)
for information transmission, thus allowing an MITM attacker to inject
their own content into the app. The vendor fixed this issue and users
should install the latest version (3.02 or above). MITRE has assigned
CVE-2018-6019 to track this issue.
Samsung makes an Android application that allows users to browse B2B
content related to Samsung’s display products. While performing
network level testing, we discovered that the content shown in the app
was loaded via server calls made by the application without any kind
of encryption (SSL). This allowed an MITM attacker to inject their own
content into the app.
To observe the issue on v3.01:
1. Install the application on the device.
2. Setup an MITM proxy but do not install the SSL certificate on the
device (we used PacketCapture).
3. Start the proxy. At this point all network traffic will be going
through the proxy with the SSL traffic being encrypted by a
self-signed certificate which is not trusted by the device.
4. Open the app.
5. Go back to the proxy and observe captured traffic.
All testing was done on Android 7 and application version 3.01.
Network captures were performed using an on-device proxy
(PacketCapture) without a trusted SSL certificate.
The vendor fixed this issue and users should install the latest
version (3.02 or above).
CVE ID: CVE-2018-6019
Google Play Link:
This issue was originally reported to the Samsung Mobile Security
Bounty Program but was deemed to be out of scope. However, after being
transferred to the Display Solutions team, this issue qualified for
the Samsung TV Bounty Program.
Advisory written by Yakov Shafranovich.
2017-09-09: Reported to Samsung Mobile Security bounty program
2017-09-09: Automated response from the vendor received
2017-10-18: Engineer assigned to the issue
2017-11-19: Deemed out of scope; reply sent
2017-11-25: Vendor requests additional information; reply sent
2017-11-27: Issue rejected, public disclosure requested
2017-12-06: Reply from vendor received, additional information
requested; reply sent
2017-12-07: Additional information requested by the vendor
2017-12-09: Reply sent with screenshots
2018-01-08: Vendor accepts the issue as in scope, and plans remediation
2018-01-11: Issue transferred to the Samsung TV bounty program
2018-01-14: Fixed version released
2018-01-22: CVE requested and received from MITRE
2018-02-14: Vendor requests confirmation of the fix, fix confirmed and
2018-03-25: Draft advisory sent to vendor for review; bounty payment received
2018-03-01: Public disclosure
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