Details
================
Software: Redirection
Version: 2.7.3
Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/redirection/
Advisory report: 
https://advisories.dxw.com/advisories/ace-file-inclusion-redirection/
CVE: Awaiting assignment
CVSS: 9 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)

Description
================
ACE via file inclusion in Redirection allows admins to execute any PHP file in 
the filesystem

Vulnerability
================



If you are logged in as an administrator on any site by using the setup page 
for the redirection plugin you can run arbitrary code and completely compromise 
the system.
This is done by writing the URL to redirect to in the format 
file://path/to/file/here. Unfortunately the plugin executes any PHP within that 
file. This means that any file with any extension on the filesystem that 
contains a small amount of user controlled data can be turned into a back door. 
The plugin also has the functionality to create files and place user controlled 
data in them. This results in attacker controlled code running and complete 
compromise of the system.
When the code for handling a redirect looks at the URL to redirect to it does 
the following:





class Pass_Action extends Red_Action {
    function process_before( $code, $target ) {
        // Determine what we are passing to: local URL, remote URL, file
        if ( substr( $target, 0, 7 ) === \'http://\' || substr( $target, 0, 8 ) 
=== \'https://\' ) {
            echo @wp_remote_fopen( $target );
            die();
        }
        else if ( substr( $target, 0, 7 ) === \'file://\' ) {
            $parts = explode( \'?\', substr( $target, 7 ) );
            if ( count( $parts ) > 1 ) {
                // Put parameters into the environment $args = explode( \'&\', 
$parts[1] );
                if ( count( $args ) > 0 ) {
                    foreach ( $args as $arg ) {
                        $tmp = explode( \'=\', $arg );
                        if ( count( $tmp ) === 1 )
                            $_GET[ $arg ] = \'\';
                        else
                            $_GET[ $tmp[0] ] = $tmp[1];
                    }
                }
            }

            include( $parts[0] );
            exit();
        }
        else {
            $_SERVER[\'REQUEST_URI\'] = $target;
            if ( strpos( $target, \'?\' ) ) {
                $_SERVER[\'QUERY_STRING\'] = substr( $target, strpos( $target, 
\'?\' ) + 1 );
                parse_str( $_SERVER[\'QUERY_STRING\'], $_GET );
            }
        }

        return true;
    }
}







The above code behaves as expected if the url to redirect to is a HTTP or HTTPS 
URL.
If the URL begins with file:// it passes the path to the include function.
Its also worth mentioning that if the URL is not http, https or file, then the 
code allows the $_GET parameter to be contaminated with unescaped values, which 
may result in SQL injections.




Proof of concept
================

echo ‘<?php phpinfo();’ > dog-meme.jpg
Visit /wp-admin/media-new.php
Upload dog-meme.jpg
Copy the URL of the file (i.e. 
http://localhost/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/dog-meme.jpg)
Visit /wp-admin/tools.php?page=redirection.php
Fill “Source URL” with “/test”
Fill “Target URL” with 
“file:///var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/dog-meme.jpg” (this will 
probably require some modification if your WP installation is at a different 
path or dog-meme.jpg is saved in a different directory)
Set “Group” to “Redirections”
Press “Add Redirect”
Press “Edit” on the newly added redirect
Press the cog icon
Set “When matched” to “Pass-through”
Press “Save”


Mitigations
================
Upgrade to version 2.8 or later.

Disclosure policy
================
dxw believes in responsible disclosure. Your attention is drawn to our 
disclosure policy: https://advisories.dxw.com/disclosure/

Please contact us on secur...@dxw.com to acknowledge this report if you 
received it via a third party (for example, plug...@wordpress.org) as they 
generally cannot communicate with us on your behalf.

This vulnerability will be published if we do not receive a response to this 
report with 14 days.

Timeline
================

2017-10-02: Discovered
2017-10-03: Reported via website contact form
2017-10-04: Response received. Plugin author reports this as intended 
behaviour, as
it is assumed that the administrator has full access to the system. However, 
also future version will include a fix.

2017-10-18: Author reported fixed in 2.8
2018-06-12: Advisory published



Discovered by dxw:
================
Glyn Wintle
Please visit advisories.dxw.com for more information.
            


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