That's great for EXE files.

But how would you handle DOC files (and similar things that include 
executable macros)?

On Wed, 16 Jul 2008, Richard M. Smith wrote:

> Another option is to have .EXE files digitally signed and the whitelist work
> off vendor names in digital certs and not .EXE MD5 file hashes.  This
> stratergy would cut down a great deal keeping a whitelist up to date for
> software updates.
> 
> Richard 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
> Behalf Of David Harley
> Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2008 8:15 AM
> To: 'Drsolly'; 'Nick FitzGerald'
> Cc: 'funsec'
> Subject: Re: [funsec] Texas Bank Dumps Antivirus for Whitelisting
> 
> > > > You're showing your age. ;-)  Word macro viruses haven't
> > been much
> > > > of a problem for 6 or 7 years ever since Microsoft went to signed 
> > > > VBA code in Office.
> 
> To be fair, the issue isn't really Word macro viruses: it's the fact that
> they represent a class of objects where executable code is found in places
> less obvious than a .EXE. A whitelisting solution that doesn't take them
> into account is obviously less effective. 
> 
> > > Breaking down the hoary old mindset that has allowed the patently 
> > > stupid blacklisting approach to initially thrive, then survive for 
> > > so long, will be whitelisting's biggest challenge to broader 
> > > acceptability (and likely prevent it ever becoming
> > widely used
> > > in the least IT-literate parts of the market such as the
> > SOHO and individual user segment).
> 
> Stop me if you've heard this before. Irrespective of the prejudices of the
> AV industry, the real problem is the sizeable market sector that thinks we
> should be able to detect every malicious program by name, and is enraged
> when we fail to do so. A sizeable subset of that group mistrusts any form of
> behaviour analysis because they believe in the magic power of names (which
> is why the industry continues to use reassuring names that sound specific
> but are actually generic...) Whitelisting doesn't have to be technically
> better: it just needs to be presented as a superior form of sympathetic
> magic.
> 
> > The main problem with whitelisting, is the high cost of maintenance.
> 
> As opposed to blacklisting, which is... oh, wait a minute. ;-)
> 
> --
> David Harley, ESET Research Author
> AVIEN COO: http://www.avien.org 
> http://www.smallblue-greenworld.co.uk  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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