I think the point he was making about you being from a vendor that offers PCI oriented solutions for a fee is that your view is somewhat tainted and not objective, not that there's anythign wrong with having a biased view, but it is what it is...
> : I'd say that PCI DSS did more to information security than *anything > : else* since Windows added automated updates. 2 years ago you might have said... > : I'd say that "Log management" did more to information security than *anything > : else* since Windows added automated updates. I can see a POV that states that PCI has helped organizations that lack even a base level of security to find a path towards a base level of things they could check for like whether or not they have updated their AV - not that it makes them more or less secure or more less prone to a breach, just a set of things they can check for, but to say that "PCI DSS did more to information security than anything else since..." is bordering on ridiculous at best . Of course no offense Anton =) Amrit On Mon, Mar 23, 2009 at 9:50 PM, Anton Chuvakin <[email protected]> wrote: > > : I'd say that PCI DSS did more to information security than *anything > > : else* since Windows added automated updates. > > > Care to back that up in any way? I think the customers of Heartland, RBS > > and other compromises would disagree. > > Sorry, but this is kinda of what I was talking about :-) What I am > hearing in the above is that PCI was somehow supposed to guarantee > their un-hackability. Is that what you are implying? What about a > simpler explanation: they were breached DESPITE PCI DSS? > > > > : Now, some might say that my argument is of the type "Why do 99% of > > : lawyers give the rest a bad name?", but it is not. I am pretty sure > that > > : even companies that "do it just the auditor" or, worse, deceive their > > : PCI assessor still gain a tiny fraction of risk reduction, both for > > : themselves - and for the rest of us. > > > > Is that "tiny fraction of risk reduction" evident in Heartland / RBS? Is > > that fraction worth the trade-off for an entirely inflated false sense of > > security? > > This supposed reduction of risk was NOT in any way evident in case of > Hland/RBS, at least not in the way it was reported publicly. In > addition, it is entirely possible that their security staff was "under > the influence" of false sense of security and, as a result, made made > decisions that lead to their compromise. > > However! > > PCI did drive many small organization to think about: a) have we > updated our AV since 2004 (BTW, their answer was 'no' and not it is > "yes' [debate about AV efficiency is a separate story]) b) what on > Earth is a firewall? c) changing password is maybe a good idea. > > That is where I think it is useful. > > > You forgot one part of your sig: > > Director of PCI Compliance Solutions at Qualys > > Was that remark intended to invalidate my arguments in any way? I hope > you are not implying they people working for vendor are not allowed - > gasp! - their own opinion... > > -- > Anton Chuvakin, Ph.D > http://www.chuvakin.org > http://chuvakin.blogspot.com > http://www.info-secure.org > _______________________________________________ > Fun and Misc security discussion for OT posts. > https://linuxbox.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/funsec > Note: funsec is a public and open mailing list. >
_______________________________________________ Fun and Misc security discussion for OT posts. https://linuxbox.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/funsec Note: funsec is a public and open mailing list.
