Very good points and references. I'll reply later today.
MSIE vulnerability is Extremely Critical SA38209 now:
http://secunia.com/advisories/38209/2/

Juha-Matti

Paul Ferguson [[email protected]] kirjoitti: 
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> On Fri, Jan 15, 2010 at 12:51 AM, Juha-Matti Laurio
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx
> >
> > This is the 0-day vulnerability used in Google China attack.
> >
> 
> Minor Correction: This is the 0-Day used in *some* of the Chinese targeted
> attacks.
> 
> This appears to be a multi-pronged attack -- other organizations in the
> past week or so have also been targeted via e-mail with malicious
> attachments.
> 
> I would be hard-pressed to say that *all* of the targeted attacks *only*
> employed the IE heap-spray 0-Day vulnerability/exploit, since it appears
> that some of the other targeted organizations were targeted with e-mail
> containing malicious attachments, e.g. the law firm (Gipson Hoffman &
> Pancione) that is suing China over the CyberSitter code theft being used in
> Green Dam:
> 
> http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=29533
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/15/cybersitter_law_firm_attack/
> 
> Also, we have seen these same tactics used (malicious attachments in e-mail
> disguised as legitimate communiqués) before when targeting Tibetan support
> groups. It is quite possible (although not all the details are yet known)
> that this was also recently used against a local (to me) Stanford student
> is a regional coordinator of Students for a Free Tibet:
> 
> http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_14195105
> 
> So, it is *quite possible* that this was a series of attacks, where the IE
> 0-Day discovered by McAfee was used on *some* of the targeted victims and
> others were compromised by malicious e-mail attachments  we have seen
> several undetected, booby-trapped .PDF exploits in the past week, including
> this one described this morning over at the SANS Internet Storm Center:
> 
> http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7984
> 
> And also Julia @ FireEye has this excellent post up tonight:
> 
> http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2010/01/pdf-obfuscation.html
> 
> I think it is dangerous, from a defense perspective, to say "This is
> responsible for that" when there are clearly several different things
> happening here -- instead of looking for quick explanation, everyone should
> step back and observe that there are several critical paths to compromise
> at work here.
> 
> $.02,
> 
> - - ferg
> 
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> 
> -- 
> "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
>  Engineering Architecture for the Internet
>  fergdawgster(at)gmail.com
>  ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


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