---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 17:14:16 -0400 (EDT)
From: Robert Weissman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Multiple recipients of list STOP-IMF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Three articles from Martin Khor

Dear Friends:  The following are three articles on the financial
crisis.  Two relate to the need for foreign exchange and capital
controls.  The other is a general article analysing recent
developments, especially in Asia.  With best regards, Martin Khor
(director, Third World Network, [EMAIL PROTECTED] or fax 60-4-
2264505).
 
 
KRUGMAN CALLS ON ASIAN COUNTRIES TO IMPOSE FOREGN EXCHANGE
CONTROLS.
 
Report by Martin Khor, Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia
([EMAIL PROTECTED] or fax 60-4-2264505).
 
Date: 30 August 1998
 
The prominent American economist Paul Krugman has launched a
high-profile campaign to get East Asian governments to introduce
foreign exchange controls as the only way to get out of their
economic crisis.  
 
Speaking last week (26 August) in Singapore at a seminar organised
by Strategic Intelligence, an exclusive business leaders group,
Krugman said foreign exchange controls of the type in place in
China could be the answer to get troubled Asian economies back on
track.
 
Such controls would break the link between domestic interest rates
and exchange rates, thus allowing governments to lower interest
rates without sending their curencies into another downward spiral.
 
Krugman is an internationally renowned mainstream economics
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a believer
in free trade, and no wild-eyed radical.  
 
So when he made what he himself called the "radical proposal" of
capital controls, he was almost apologetic and visibly pained for
doing so.  And that made his case even more persuasive.
 
Whilst in Singapore, Krugman also gave interviews on CNBC cable
television, and to a local business newspaper.  In the same week,
an article by him on the same topic was also published as a cover
story in Fortune magazine.
Krugman's advocacy of capital controls has already sparked a
discussion in Malaysia and is likely to generate wide interest and
debate in the Asian region.
 
This is because some of the region's economists and policy makers
have been attracted to the possibility of reintroducing some
regulations and controls on capital flows to reduce financial
volatility, but had been constrained from advocating it as capital
control has till now been a "taboo" subject.
 
This is the result of the dominance of the ideology of
international agencies such as the International Monetray Fund and
the Group of 7 countries that insist on free capital flows as a
prerequisite for modern and emerging economies, and also as a
condition for IMF-coordinated rescue loans.
 
Krugman is certainly not the first person to advocate capital
controls as a part of the solution to the Asian financial crisis. 
Indeed he is, as he admits, a new convert.  But he is such a
prominent part of the economics establishment that his proposal can
carry enough weight to break the taboo against considering foreign
exchange controls as a serious policy option.   
 
According to a report in the Malaysian daily, New Straits Times,
Krugman in his seminar address said that Asian economies were
reaching the end of the road and it was time to "do something
radical", including implementing foreign exchange controls since
pressures on the Asian economies were too high.
 
He said that at the initial stage of the Asian crisis he thought
the affected counties were following the right strategy, "but in
the last few months I began to wonder whether Asia is on the right
track."
 
Krugman added that after having gone to the IMF and finding that
its policies (which he called Plan A) did not work, it was time now
for Asian countries to adopt what he termed "Plan B," which
comprised foreign exchange control.
 
He noted that China, which had not been fully caught in the
regional crisis, had currency controls through the inconvertible
capital account.  "Chile too has capital inflow control and that is
a good idea," he added.
 
Krugman also said that reading articles about the inefficiencies of
Asian economies "makes my blood boil."  "The rhetoric now is
reminiscent of 1932 in the US when there were calls to liquidate
everything.  But liquidation is not going to pay off unless there
is expansion in demand."
 
During a TV interview on the CNBC programme Asia in Crisis last
Saturday (29 August), Krugman explained how he came to the "radical
proposal" of Plan B.  
 
"We tried Plan A (the IMF prescription of austerity)...but it
didn't work, then what do you do?  It's hard  for the IMF and the
US Treasury to admit it was wrong and to do something different. 
But the time has come.
 
"Why did I become a radical?  I didn't want to be.  But we are in
a trap."   
 
Krugman added: "We cannot cut interest rates because the
currency may fall and we can't get more IMF funds because the IMF
didn't have enough.
 
"The only possibility I see is imposing capital controls."  These
controls would require exporters to sell their earnings to the
Central Bank, which in turn would sell the foreign exchange.  
 
"It's a dirty word, capital controls, but we need them to get out
of the bind."
 
In his Fortune article, entitled "Saving Asia: it's time to get
RADICAL", Krugman agrees with the IMF critics that high interest
rates imposed by the IMF would cause even healthy banks and
companies to collapse.
 
Thus, there is a strong case for countries to keep interest rates
low and try to keep their real economies growing.
 
However, says Krugman, the problem is that the original objection
to interest rate reductions still stands, that the region's
currencies could again go into free fall if the interest rate is
not high enough.
 
"In short, Asia is stuck: Its economies are dead in the water, but
trying to do anything major to get them moving risks provoking
another wave of capital; flight and a worse crisis.  In effect, the
region's economic policy has become hostage to skittish investors."
 
Krugman says there is a way out, what he calls Plan B, "but it is
a solution so unfashionable, so stigmatised, that hardly anyone has
dared to suggest it..  The unsayable words are exchange controls."
 
Exchange controls, he adds, used to be the standard response of
countries with balance of payments crises.  "Exporters were
required to sell their foreign-currency earnings to the government
at a fixed exchange rate; that currency would in turn be sold at
the same rate for approved payments to foreigners, basically for
imports and debt service.
 
"Whilst some countries tried to make other foreign-exchange
transactions illegal, other countries allowed a parallel market. 
Either way, once the system was in place, a country didn't have to
worry that cutting interest rates would cause the currency to
plunge.
 
"Maybe the parallel exchange rate would sink, but that wouldn't
affect the prices of imports or the balance sheets of companies and
banks."
 
Krugman points out some problems posed by exchange controls in
practice, such as abuse by traders and distortions, so that
economists think these controls work badly.
 
"But when you face the kind of disaster now occurring in Asia, the
question has to be: badly compared to what?"
 
Asking why China hasn't been so badly hit as its neighbours,
Krugman answers that China "has been able to cut, not raise,
interest rates in this crisis, despite maintaining a fixed exchange
rate; and the reason it is able to do that is that it has an
inconvertible currency, a.k.a. exchange controls.
 
"Those controls are often evaded, and they are a source of lots of
corruption, but they still give China a degree of policy leeway
that the rest of Asia desperately wishes it had.
 
"In short, Plan B involves giving up for a time the business of
trying to regain the confidence of international investors and
forcibly breaking the link between domestic interest rates and the
exchange rate.
 
"The policy freedom Asia needs to rebuild its economies would
clearly come at a price, but as the slump gets ever deeper, that
price is starting to look more and more worth paying."
 
In a note on the cover story, Fortune editor John Huey states that
Paul Krugman has something very important and very un-economically
correct to say, and that this piece is expected to "spark debate
from Basel to Bangkok."
 
A press release by Fortune also said that Krugman warned that if
Asia did not act quickly, the crisis could worsen into a depession
similar to that experienced in the 1930s, and that IMF programmes
that required higher interest rates to stop a currency freefall had
made the matter worse.
 
The statement said that being a longtime colleague of IMF deputy
managing director Stanley Fisher and US deputy treasury secretary
Lawrence Summers, Krugman addresses the awkwardness of proposing
such an extremne measure (exchange controls).
 
Krugman discusses the implicit "gag rule" that prevents not only
officials but anyone asociated with the current strategy (bankers,
major institutional investors) from being too vocal about an
alternative strategy.
 
The Krugman campaign has already sparked public interest. Over the
weekend, journalists referred to the Krugman proposal and asked
Malaysia's political leaders whether the government intended to
impose restrictions on capital movements.  Malaysian premier Dr
Mahathir Mohamad replied the country had no such intention.
 
For many economists and serious analysts observing the Asian
economic crisis, it has become obvious that the problem began with
the free flows of funds moving in and out of the affected
countries.
 
Those countries had recently liberalised their financial systems,
extending the convertibility of their currencies from the current
account to the capital account.
 
Many observers point to China and India as examples of countries
that have not been subjected to volatile capital flows and currency
instability or speculation, because the two countries do not allow
full convertibility of their currencies. 
 
The lesson is that developing countries that want shield themselves
for externally-generated financial crises should retain (or regain)
some controls over the convertibility of their currency.
 
This could reduce the conditions in which currency speculators can
profitably operate.  It could also reduce the exit of funds and
discourage the inflows of undesirable forms of short-term capital.
 
However, the option of reintroducing some capital controls has till
recently not been openly discussed, because it is considered a
"taboo" subject.  
 
The prevailing ideology held and spread by the International
Monetary Fund and the Group of Seven rich countries is that
countries should liberalise their capital account, and those that
have already done so will suffer damage if they reimpose controls.
 
Policy makers in the affected countries are worried that if they
were to even discuss the advantages of capital control, their
country would be black-listed by the IMF, the rich countries and
financial speculators. 
 
But by keeping silent, their countries will continue to be
subjected to the views and interests of "market players", suffer
the consequences of a relatively high interest rate policy, and be
prevented from speedy recovery.
 
Krugman's open advocacy may help make capital controls a more
acceptable option for governments wanting an effective policy
instrument to prevent further financial turbulence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BREAKING THE TABOO ON CAPITAL CONTROLS
 
Analysis by Martin Khor, Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia
([EMAIL PROTECTED] or fax 60-4-2264505).
 
Date: 30 August 1998
 
SUMMARY:    There is a growing belief that the East Asian
countries' crisis started with their rapid relaxation of previous
rules regulating their local currency and foreign exchange as it
allowed the volatile flows of speculative funds.  If this is true,
then one policy option should be the reimposition of capital
controls.  Until recently this was a taboo subject.  Last week,
however, the taboo was broken by establishment economist Paul
Krugman.  This article gives a background to the rationale for
capital controls. 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
For many economists and serious analysts observing the Asian
economic crisis, it has become obvious that the problem began with
the free flows of funds moving in and out of the affected
countries.
 
Those countries had recently liberalised their financial systems,
allowing locals and foreigners alike to freely convert foreign
exchange into local currency, and local currency into foreign
exchange.
 
This currency convertibility has been allowed not only to finance
current transactions of trade and direct investment (which in the
past had also been permitted), but also for other transactions and
short-term flows such as investment in the stock markets; loans
from and to abroad; remittances to abroad by individuals and
companies for savings or property purchases overseas.
 
Since these short-term flows are not recorded in the current
account of the balance of payments, the ability to convert local
into foreign currency for these purposes is termed "capital account
convertibility." 
 
Many economists have concluded that when countries introduce
capital account convertibility, they expose themselves to
autonomous inflows and outflows of funds by foreigners and locals,
subjecting their local currency to speculation as well as exchange-
rate volatility.
 
The Asian crisis was sparked by speculation and a stampede of
foreign funds moving out, followed shortly by locals also sending
their money abroad, whilst the local currencies fell sharply.
 
Now that the countries are in deep recession, capital account
convertibility is now causing another equally vexing problem.  It
is preventing or discouraging the countries from taking the
policies they urgently need to get the recovery process moving.
To counter the recession, the government needs to lower interest
rates (to relieve consumers and companies from their heavy debt
service burden) and increase its spending (so that there is more
demand for businesses and incomes for workers).
 
However they are constrained from this line of action because of
fears that managers of investment funds and currency speculators
(known as "market players") will attack the local currency because
a lower interest rate makes it less attractive for people to park
their money in the country.
 
Also, there is fear of local capital flight, as some residents may
be tempted to send more of their savings abroad in search of higher
interest rates.
 
The possibility of funds exiting in an environment of free capital
account convertibility of the local currency thus puts a dampener
or even a stop to measures that are needed for a recovery.
 
Therefore, one logical move would be for the affected countries to
consider partly re-regulating their financial system, and re-
imposing some forms of control over the convertibility of the local
currency.
 
This could reduce the conditions in which currency speculators can
profitably operate.  It could also reduce the exit of funds and
discourage the inflows of undesirable forms of short-term capital.
 
Many observers point to China and India as examples of countries
that have not been subjected to volatile capital flows and currency
instability or speculation, because the two countries do not allow
full convertibility of their currencies. 
 
Although the local currency can be converted for trade and direct
investment purposes, there are restrictions and regulations for
changing local currency to foreign exchange (and vice versa) for
other purposes.
 
The lesson is that developing countries that want shield themselves
for externally-generated financial crises should retain (or regain)
some controls over the convertibility of their currency.
 
However, the option of reintroducing some capital controls has till
recently not been openly discussed, because it is considered a
"taboo" subject.  
 
The prevailing ideology held and spread by the International
Monetary Fund and the Group of Seven rich countries is that
countries should liberalise their capital account, and those that
have done so will suffer damage if they reimpose controls.
 
Policy makers in the affected countries are worried that if they
were to even discuss the advantages of capital control, their
country would be black-listed by the IMF, the rich countries and
financial speculators. 
 
By keeping silent, their countries will continue to be subjected to
the views and interests of "market players", suffer the
consequences of a relatively high interest rate policy, and be
prevented from speedy recovery.
 
Recently there was a major breakthrough against the taboo when the
prominent economist Paul Krugman of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology launched a personal campaign to persuade Asian
governments to reimpose capital controls as the only way out of
their crisis.
 
To be fair, it must be noted that Krugman is not the first person
to advocate capital controls as a way out of the Asian crisis. 
Indeed he is, as he admits, a new convert.
 
But as he is so much a part of the economics establishment, his
radical proposal will carry more weight.  Now that the taboo is
broken, capital controls could become a respectable option for
governments wanting an effective policy instrument to prevent
further financial turbulence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON THE BRINK OF GLOBAL RECESSION
 
by Martin Khor, Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia
([EMAIL PROTECTED] or fax 604-2264505)
 
Date: 31 August 1998
 
 
The world economy has entered a tumultuous period, with many Asian
countries announcing latest reports of even deeper declines in
economic output, Russia plunging into chaos, Hongkong fighting a
deadly and expensive battle with speculators, Japan's stocks taking
another battering and Latin American share markets catching the
finacial flu.
 
The crisis that originated just over a year ago in Asia also
appears to have finally hit the American and European stock
markets, which were also badly hit at the end of last week,
sparking predictions of more significant declines there in the days
ahead.
 
The deep plunge of the Dow Jones index by over 500 points on 31
August has generated a panic-like situation in the US, which could
now well spread to industrial-country markets and thus mark the
arrival of a global-level crisis.
 
Suddenly this financial crisis no longer belongs only to the Asian
region, or even only to the "emerging markets."  The world economy
is quickly unravelling, in new and unexpected ways. We are looking
down the cliff at a global recession. 
 
The new depths of the recession in Asia were revealed last week by
the latest reports on Gross Domestic Product data showing declines
that were steeper than expected.
 
In Malaysia, the GDP fell by a steep 6.8 percent in the second
quarter of this year, coming after a revised 2.8 percent drop in
the first quarter.  
 
The South Korean GDP fell by 6.6 percent in April-June, following
a 3.9 percent drop the previous quarter.
 
Also in the second quarter, Hongkong's GDP dropped by 5 percent
whilst in the Philippines the GDP contracted 1.2 percent.
 
Most stock markets in the region recorded sharp falls to new lows,
some to levels that had not been seen for a decade.
 
An exception was Hong Kong, where the financial authorities pumped
an estimated US$10 billion into the stock market in an
unprecedented battle against speculators.
 
Hong Kong had been proud of its "free market, hands off" policy but
decided to abandon this when it came under massive attack by
speculators who had devised a "double play" on the currency and
stock markets.
 
The speculators' tactic was to sell Hong Kong dollars, knowing that
this would drive interest rates up as the authorities protect the
currency's peg to the US dollar.  
 
At the same time, they bought futures contracts short on the Hang
Seng stock-market index, in the expectation that the rise in
interest rates would cause share prices (and thus the index) to
fall significantly.
 
If that happened, the speculators would make spectacular profits at
Hong Kong's expense.  The authorities thus spent massively to prop
up shares and the Hang Seng index to force losses on the
speculators.  
 
The biggest battle was on Friday, when the Hang Seng futures
contracts for August fell due.  As a result of the intervention,
the Hang Seng index ended only slightly lower, and the authorities
declared victory.
 
But according to reports in the Hong Kong's South China Morning
Post, some speculators have rolled over their contracts to
September, and thus further battles between speculators and the
authorities can be expected.  
 
The South China Morning Post last Friday also reported that George
Soros' Quantum Fund had mobilised funds against Hongkong, thus
naming one of the major speculators.  It quoted Quantum Fund
manager Stanley Druckenmiller as saying the Fund had mobilised
funds against Hongkong as the currency and stock markets were
"overvalued."  
 
He said the Hongkong government's intervention would fail as basic
economic fundamentals imply either higher interest rates or a lower
valuation for the currency.       
 
Two weeks ago, the Financial Times published a controversial letter
by Soros, stating that Russia's financial system was at a terminal
stage, and that the rouble should be devalued by 20 percent.
 
The Financial Times itself later admitted in an editorial that it
was this letter that sparked a massive selling off, forcing
President Yeltsin to take extreme measures such as declaring a
moratorium on Russia's foreign debt as well as on the government's
domestic debt.
 
Last week the Russian financial system exploded as the rouble
threatend to go into a free fall, Indonesian style.  
 
The monetary authorities suspended all foreign exchange trade in
the second half of the week.  Many banks have been unable to meet
depositors' demands as customers queue up for panic withdrawals.
 
Forced to sack the government again and replace the Prime Minister,
Yeltsin's own position is under threat as angry members of the
Russian parliament or Duma call for his resignation.
 
It is likely that forces within Parliament and Russian society will
pressure the new government to turn back from its policy of extreme
financial openness to the outside world that had exposed the
country to such heavy dependence on foreign funds, and the currency
and stock market to the risks of speculation and volatility.
 
Russia thus became the latest case of an IMF-inspired and IMF-
funded model that ended up as a massive failure, and in this case
a catastrophe.
 
The Russian economic crisis is likely to be as severe as
Indonesia's, but because of its political significance, it has
greater global ramifications.  As a commentator put it crudely,
Russia is Indonesia plus nuclear weapons.
 
Russia also has strong connections to the West.  For example,
German banks have lent US$30 billion to Russia and are thus hit
with potentially big losses.
 
Last Thursday (27 Aug) and Friday (28 Aug) the European and US
stock markets fell sharply as the so-called "contagion effect" hit
them.  The Dow Jones index fell 4.2 percent or 357 points to 8166
on Thursday and dropped another 114 points to 8051 on Friday.  
 
(On Monday 31 August it again plunged, by over 500 points, thus
marking the arrival of a real crisis in the US and global markets). 
 
 
European stock market indices also declined on Thursday (27 Aug),
including in London (by 3.2 percent), Frankfurt (3.2 percent),
Zurich (5.1 percent), Athens (7.7 percent) and Madrid (5.8 per
cent). 
 
In Japan the Nikkei index fell 3 percent to 14413 on Thursday and
dropped another 500 points to 13915 on Friday.  
 
Japan is the first industrial nation that has entered recession,
but the widening consequences of the Asian and Russian crises may
well pull Europe and the United States into the path of the
financial cyclone.
 
Economists and the public across the world are becoming
increasingly aware that over-exposure of countries' financial
systems to global market forces can be dangerous and in fact has
become a threat to the global economy.
 
The myth that the financial markets know best and increase
efficiency in allocating financial resources to different countries
has been exploded by the spreading crisis and its damage to the
real economy.
 
Even die-hard believers and practitioners of the "free market" are
now blaming financial speculators for having been given too much
freedom, and are acting to curb or calling for curbs on their
activities.
 
Hong Kong is of course the latest example of a free-market advocate
that has been bitten by the speculators and has now, in an about-
turn, committed its reputation and its many billions of dollars to
a do-or-die battle with hedge funds and other speculators. 
 
The respected trade economist Paul Krugman of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology is now advocating the abandonment of free
capital flows and the imposition of capital controls by the
affected Asian countries as the only way out of the crisis.
 
At present many Asian countries and Russia are already in the midst
of a depression, whilst the rest of the world is standing on the
edge of a recession. It is the most dangerous situation since the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
 
The coming two weeks will be crucial in determining whether the
global economy can withstand the shocks or if instead it will roll
off that edge into recession.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 




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