Is it possible, as Ed suggests, to develop a shared understanding of the
'real' world from an ideologically uncontaminated viewpoint? Is it
possible to do so within the terms of the ideologically-saturated and
contaminated language which we have inherited?
Is it possible to talk about the 'reality', for example, of
'unemployment', as fact, without falling for the ontological and
epistemological deception inherent in the language game associated with
the prevailing 'work/non-work' dichotomy?
Perhaps it is possible, but there has been little indication on this
list of such a possibility. Ed and others on this list discuss
'realities' as if the language games they play, which they use to
discuss and understand, say, the facts of unemployment, are
ideologically neutral, let alone, non-deceptive and morality valid.
Ed Weick wrote:
>
> We cannot avoid theorizing about social issues or what is best for the
> world. However, in putting theory to practice, we should be very careful to
> get the sequence right. We must not let theory put ideological blinders on
> us. In using theory, we must recognize it for what it is. We must first try
> to understand the real world in all its complexity and only then refer to
> our theoretical tool-kit to see if it can help us. Ideologues are inclined
> to proceed the other way; to go to the tool-kit first and then limit the
> complexity of the world to fit what they have found.
What appears here not to be appreciated is that language itself, is the
primary ideological tool-kit. The (morally loaded) language games we
play are the bottom cards of our socially constructed reality.
It seems to me that we, on this list and on this planet, are not going
to reach anything like common understanding about the 'reality', let
alone common understanding over how to cooperate for world betterment,
until we scrutinise these linguistic bottom cards, to loosen their
authoritative grip on our thinking, even to let go of them all together
where they are found to be ambiguous, deceptive and hence dysfunctional
as communication tools. Arguably, the language games associated with
the family of terms around the word 'work' should be among the first
canditates for such treatment.
I think discussion on this list will be considerably enhanced, and the
communicative problem to which Charles Brass has alluded to may be
overcome, through understanding and development of the kind of
communicative competency which the notable philosopher/sociologist,
Jurgen Habermas has proposed.
I suggest, to begin, a reading of his:
* Between Facts and Norms (Polity 1996)
* Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Polity 1990)
* Legitimation crisis (Heinemann 1976)
Yours truly,
Richard Mochelle