Date: Sun, 01 Mar 1998 14:12:53 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Bob Olsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Canadian Cyber Censorship



        Canadian gov't seeks public input on new crypto policy.

        "...such a requirement would give them unprecedented powers
        of censorship."  Andrew Oram   [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 05:38:59 -0800 (PST)
From: MichaelP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: cr> Canadian gov't seeks public input on new crypto policy (fwd)

---------- Forwarded message ----------

Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 01:00:20 -0800 (PST)
From: Cyber Rights <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

(Introduction from moderator: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/crypto
contains the new cryptography policy recommended by the Canadian
government. The author also points interested readers to
http://www.newsguy.com/~mayday/--Andy)

From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Canadian gov't seeks public input on new crypto policy
Newsgroups: can.legal,can.infohighway,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.org.cpsr.talk,
talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy
Date: 25 Feb 1998 10:45:42 GMT

Here's the text of one reply that has been made to the guidelines
(from a U.S. citizen):

To: Helen McDonald
    Task Force on Electronic Commerce
    Industry Canada

February 1998

As a citizen of the U.S., I am writing in response to the Industry 
Canada discussion paper on cryptography because I feel that the U.S. 
government is attempting to coerce Canada into accepting oppressive 
measures which lack the support of the American people.  Citing 
"international commitments", your report states that "The policy 
challenge is to find solutions that will limit criminal misuse without 
interfering with legitimate business, institutional or individual 
interests".  Less diplomatically, the policy challenge is for Canadian 
legislators to do what they are told by the NSA and GCHQ, while arousing 
as little public protest as possible.  My goal is to persuade you that 
the people of the U.S. should be your allies for the freedom of speech, 
rather than your tormentors, and that together, we must hold a line 
against spies who are greedy to intercept and control our communications 
for the basest motives.

The "criminal misuse" cited by law enforcement consists of a series of 
bogeymen who will not be deterred by surveillance of communications.  
Pedophiles will not be prevented from preying upon children simply 
through the knowledge that it is unsafe to send digital pictures over 
the Internet; terrorists have little need for communications on-line, 
and could readily prearrange signals or use obfuscating terms.  If 
anything, surveillance will embolden the criminals, by convincing 
pedophiles that they need to make their own pictures instead of 
downloading them; and by convincing terrorists that no peaceful 
alternative to violence can escape the censors' prosecutions.  What is 
certain is that any infringement upon encryption, even that which 
currently exists, will provide opportunities for real criminals to wreak 
havoc on and off line.

What we can predict with great certainty is that the "ECHELON" grouping 
of surveillance agencies from mostly English-speaking countries will 
continue to use any surveillance tool available to them for their own 
political ends; and that criminals from those agencies will continue to 
sell information to the highest bidder or use it for their own business 
purposes.  If a system prevails where any corporation is at risk of 
having all of its confidential dealings given to a competitor, it will 
become impossible for any company to compete without some informal 
association with an espionage agency.  The situation in the U.S., 
Canada, England, and Australia will be no better than it is in Indonesia 
today!  Nor will the position of political organizations be any better, 
especially considering how frequently charges of spies meddling in the 
affairs of "allied" countries have already become.

As bad as "mandatory key escrow" is, it is as nothing beside the policy 
that will certainly follow after:  MANDATORY mandatory key escrow.  
Citing the risks of hackers and (unaffiliated) snoops, we can expect the 
U.S. and Chinese governments to initiate a call for such a requirement 
as soon as they have consolidated the key escrow infrastructure, because 
such a requirement would give them unprecedented powers of censorship.  
If the technical specifications of the network demand that every packet 
be encrypted with a government-issued key, a person who does not have 
such a key will not be allowed to use the on-line networks at all!  This 
would cut him off from friends, political allies, media, and more, as 
on-line communications become ever more essential, and would serve as a 
severe method of punishment; but worse, the possibility would also exist 
for intermediate degrees of stigmatization.  Persons from somewhat more 
repressive countries would be denied classes of content otherwise 
available on the Internet under the "PICSRules" ratings structure.  
Children would be walled off, not only from the usual bugaboos, but any 
material which would break their indoctrination.  Convicts would be 
granted only very limited forms of communication, thus preventing them 
from telling horror stories from the gulags that will surely accompany 
such a regime.  The unique power of the Internet to serve as a method of 
multilateral communication between groups of creative and honest people 
would be broken.  And once political censorship became the international 
norm, the "terrorists" cited as the excuse for the initial policy would 
become not our enemies, but our last hope for the salvation of mankind.

I ask the people of Canada, and the Industry Canada task force, to hold 
a strong line for the right of uncensored communication now, while it is 
still permissible to do so.  When foreign governments pressure you to 
change your policy, I ask you to reprint the entire detail of their 
threats and inducements to Internet and off-line forums accessible by 
the people of the countries which those governments claim to represent.  
We have already seen the shameful precedent of British Labour, which has 
betrayed its election promise and adopted its opponents' anti-encryption 
policies exactly as dictated by undemocratic forces.  I hope that your 
call for discussion here will be more honest than that.

 ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~
  Posted by Andrew Oram  - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Moderator: CYBER-RIGHTS
   A CPSR Project -- http://www.cpsr.org -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]
          http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/
          ftp://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/Library/
 Materials may be reposted in their _entirety_ for non-commercial use.
 ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~

 Bob Olsen      Toronto         [EMAIL PROTECTED]   (:-)

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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