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GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #86
---15 June, 1999--- ISSN
1328-5157
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Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).
P.O. Box 263E, Earlville, QLD 4870, Australia.
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This bulletin is for the use of IGFR members and GFB subscribers
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*
*
INDEX
.
. Economic refugees /illegal immigrants
. Migrant flows, limits to growth, and equity
. Types of migrant flows (Migrant flows - Part 1)
. Drivers and attractors of migrant flows
. Environmental refugees
. CO2 emissions trading
. NATO and possible war crimes
*
*
ECONOMIC REFUGEES / ILLEGAL MIGRANTS
Laurence Knight [1]
With regard to the potential for armed conflict as a result of global
inequity and overconsumption of resources ('Overconsumption,
Realpolitik and peace' and 'Prospect of war over resources' GFB #85
[2] ): My reading of the situation is not so much international
warfare over resources. In a globalised world with free trade run by
the WTO, TNCs have fairly unfettered access to resources, and access
to resources becomes more a matter of ability to pay rather than
national borders. (Of course the situation is a bit different with
resources like water). That does not mean there will not be conflict,
just not necessarily the traditional warfare type involving standing
armies.
Another trend, which has been developing for a decade now, is illegal
migration. People from disadvantaged regions are increasingly
moving to countries of higher affluence. This is quite logical from
their perspective, and until recently they received a reasonable
welcome from countries that considered themselves underpopulated.
Fewer and fewer of the wealthy nations now want additional
population, so the welcome mat is disappearing. There may soon
come a time when wealthy nation states will be defending their
borders from floods of refugees much more so than armed forces.
*
[1] Dr Laurence Knight, Queensland Environmental Protection
Agency
[2] 'Overconsumption, Realpolitik and peace' and 'Prospect of war
over resources' Global Futures Bulletin #85 01 June 1999.
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 38. equity}
*
*
*
MIGRANT FLOWS, LIMITS TO GROWTH, AND EQUITY
Ted Trainer suggested that warfare is largely due to the high priority
ascribed by people and governments to achieving greater wealth and
power (GFB #85 [1] ). The alternative is to learn to live within our
means, within environmental limits, and to learn to share resources
and wealth equitably.
Lawrence Knight suggests above that a major destabilising factor
which could lead to armed conflict may be a surge in the levels of
illegal international economic migrants (both opportunity-seeking
migrants and refugees of poverty).
Pro-growth advocates might argue that possible surges in migrant
flows is an issue which has little relevance to the debate on whether
there are limits to growth, because it is an equity issue (opportunity-
seeking migrants), and a basic development issue (refugees of
extreme poverty). For limits-to-growth advocates, the question of
production levels and resource use cannot be separated from the issue
of equity.
Here, in a 3-part series, we look at some drivers and current
parameters relating to migrant flows, to assess the likelihood of
surges contributing to armed conflict.
*
[1] Trainer, Ted 'Overconsumption, Realpolitik and peace' Global
Futures Bulletin #85, 01 June 1999.
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 38. equity}
*
*
*
MIGRANT FLOWS (PART 1)
TYPES OF MIGRANT FLOWS
Distinction is often made between war, political, economic and
environmental refugees. In reality, these categories often overlap.
Environmental refugees are often also economic refugees. In 1998
there were an estimated 300m environmental refugees [1] (of these
223m were displaced by flooding in the Yangze Basin, China) [2].
The majority of these can be regarded as short term internal refugees.
Some basic distinctions are:
- refugees : voluntary migrants
- internal : international migrants
- short term : longterm migrants
Two standard typologies for international migrants are:
I ) [3]
- permanent settlers
- documented labour migrants (temporary migrant workers and
temporary professional transients)
- undocumented (clandestine, illegal, irregular) migrants
- asylum seekers - intend to apply for refugee status under 1951 UN
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, who may or may not
be granted such status
- recognised refugees
- de facto refugees (externally displaced persons not recognised as
refugees under 1951 UN Convention but who are often given
temporary asylum due to circumstances)
II ) [4]
- migrants escaping extreme poverty, unemployment (survival
migrants)
- opportunity-seeking migrants
- migrants fleeing persecution, conflict, war
- migrants escaping ecological crisis or progressive environmental
degradation
*
[1] Vital Signs 1999 Worldwatch Institute 1999
[2] Dunn, Seth; Christopher Flavin, 'Destructive storms drive
insurance losses up' Worldwatch Institute Mar 1999
http://www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990325.html
[3] eg Appleyard, Reginald 'International Migration: Challenge for
the Nineties' IOM Geneva 1991,
[4] eg Ghosh, Bimal 'Migration trade and international economic
cooperation' 10th IOM Seminar on Migration, Geneva Sept 1992,
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 38. equity}
*
*
*
DRIVERS AND ATTRACTORS OF MIGRANT FLOWS
We could consider that the flow of economic refugees / illegal
migrants [1] will be influenced by
i) poverty and population growth pressures in poorer developing
countries - eg in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
ii) perception of relative opportunity in destination country as a result
of disparity of income and wealth between source and target countries
(ie perceived and real levels of inequity).
iii) the difficulty and risk involved in illegally entering target
countries.
iv) the rise of individualism and individual mobility and the
willingness to break away from family ties; the diffusion of the myth
(belief) that illegal migration is a viable option; rise of the perception
of the 'global village'.
v) whether legal migration intake levels are rising or decreasing and
whether criteria are increasingly in favor of the privileged applicants.
vi) expansion of organised crime into the emerging black market of
trafficking illegal migrants.
vii) growth of the informal sector and increased competition in
developed countries.
i) Poverty is regarded as the main cause of migration flows at present
[2]. Most (98%) of the expected 3 billion increase in global
population by 2050 [3] is expected to occur in developing countries
particularly in regions least able to manage population growth such
as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
ii) Inequity between nations and within nations is generally
increasing, (some exceptions). If this trend continues it could
exacerbate the economic refugee / illegal migrant problem.
It is likely that the perception of inequity will continue to intensify
due to the increased exposure to Western media and cultural products
in developing countries, influence of consumer culture, and
increasing desires to achieve higher levels of affluence. Actual
inequity is also likely to rise if the current global neoliberal capitalist
regime persists.
iii) Despite the rhetoric, a number of developed countries, most
notably the US, have tolerated illegal (undocumented) migrants to a
degree over the past few decades, as they have provided a cheap
supply of labour, and tracking them down and deporting them is
expensive. However, if illegal migration becomes a more critical
political issue (need for a scapegoat, competition for jobs, perceived
threat to cultural values etc), or if there is a perception that the trickle
needs to be halted before it becomes a flood, there are many strategies
available to make it very difficult for illegal immigrants to succeed in
entering the target country and sustaining a worthwhile lifestyle,
particularly strategies using data surveillance technology.
iv) It is likely that the general trend toward individualism and greater
mobility will continue, thus constituting a driver for increasing illegal
migration.
v) Generally migrant intake quotas are decreasing in OECD
countries, and criteria are more selective to favor wealthier applicants
with skills and qualifications that are in demand in the host country.
An exception is the lottery held each year by the US as a gesture to
the principles of equity and non-discrimination.
vi) Statistics on the lucrative trafficking of migrants by organised
crime syndicates are sketchy but is thought to be an increasing
percentage of an estimated 750,000 annual undocumented migrants
to developed countries.
vii) The informal sector in Europe has increased from 5% to 17%
1970-98 [4]. Rising business competition creates a pull factor for
low-paid illegal workers. Penalties for employers of such workers are
also increasing, and has become a major strategy for deterrence.
Another analysis, (drawn from the International Conference on
Population and Development, Cairo Programme for Action) suggests
the main roots causes of migration are [5] :
- abject poverty
- environmental degradation and natural disasters, possibly
attributable to global warming
- insecurity based on internal conflict, political strife and war
- separation of family members
- violations of human rights
- corruption and bad governance
*
[1] Sarah Stephens points out that the use of the term 'illegal migrant'
is challenged in UN circles by NGOs. They encourage the term
'undocumented migrant' instead. This tends to shift the perception of
the migrant from that of a law-breaker (ie. a criminal) to being
someone who is unable/has not sought to regularize their situation. It
turns the focus to the nature of governmental regulations rather than
implying blame of the individual.
[2] Oberg S, 'The Future Population of the World' Earthscan,
pp361-365 1994, cited in 'Environmental Refugee Assessment'
Global Futures Bulletin #33 01 Apr 1997
[3] 'Population and development' Global Futures Bulletin #63, 01
July 1998
[4] Schatzer, Peter 'International migration: issues and policies' UN
Economic Commission for Europe, Budapest 1998
[5] Schatzer, Peter op cit - drawn from the ICPD Plan of Action.
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 38. equity}
*
*
*
ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES
Estimates of the current number of environmental refugees vary from
10 million [1] to 25 million [2]. Most of these would be mis-
classified under the 1 billion 'internal migrants', and many would be
in Africa fleeing the effects of chronic drought and desertification.
Estimates suggest 100-400 million environmental refugees could
result from global-warming induced rising seas and resultant
permanent flooding (eg from coastal megacities such as Calcutta,
Lagos, London, New York, Rotterdam, Shanghai, Tokyo) by mid to
late 21st C [3]. Myers and Kent estimated 200m refugees from rising
seas by 2010 ! [4].
Factors to consider here:
-some cities may be able to construct barrages as in London, or dykes
as in the Netherlands, to protect against rising sea levels.
- an exodus of 250 million people over 50 years represents an average
of 5 million a year, or perhaps 20m/an in peak periods.
- one would expect adequate planning time for local relocation, although
flooding could occur suddenly following a storm surge.
- most such refugees may resettle locally even though amongst Island
States, some entire atolls and islands may disappear. A 10%
migration rate could increase current 7m migrants (labour, official,
undocumented) and asylum seekers by a further 2m, similar to total
levels of migrants and asylum seekers in 1992 (?).
Myers tentatively suggests that the number of environmental refugees
caused by enhanced greenhouse effects by 2050 could total 150m [5].
Myers and Kent estimate a possible 50m refugees by 2050 as a result
of climate change-induced famine. Water shortages could also force
large numbers to migrate. 550m people already suffer chronic water
shortage, and 3 billion people are expected to live in countries with
water shortages by 2025 [6]. Unlike flooding, prolonged famine and
water shortages are more likely to induce international migration
since local resettlement may not be a solution.
Note the apparent discrepancy of Myers' tentative projections - 200m
from rising seas by 2010, and 150m total environmental refugees by
2050.
*
[1] Doos B, Global Environmental Change v7 no1 p41 1997 cited in
Global Futures Bulletin #33 01 Apr 1997 'Env. refugee assessment'
[2] Myers N, Kent J, 1995 op cit cited in Global Futures Bulletin #33
01 Apr 1997 'Environmental refugee assessment'.
[3] 'Global warming and energy' Global Futures Bulletin #3, Jan 01,
1996 citing New Internationalist No. 269.
[4] Myers, Norman; Jennifer Kent 1995 op cit.
[5] Myers, Norman Bioscience no43 pp752-761 1993 cited in
'Environmental refugee assessment' Global Futures Bulletin #33 01
Apr, 1997.
[6] Myers, Norman; Jennifer Kent 1995 op cit.
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 24. disaster}
*
*
*
CO2 EMISSIONS TRADING
Emissions trading is one of three related 'flexible mechanisms' agreed
to under the Kyoto Protocol. They are
- international emissions trading
- clean development mechanism - (CDM) eg involving technology
transfer from developed to developing countries.
- joint implementation - investment and initiatives between developed
countries.
The EU proposes that CO2 emissions trading be capped. The US is
against this proposal because, according to at least one report [1], the
amount the US could trade annually would be reduced from approx 2
million tonnes CO2 to 0.67 million tonnes, thus obligating the US to
make more substantial reductions in US CO2 emissions.
The US argues that the EU proposal is unfair because it would still
allow unlimited emissions trading within the 15 nation EU.
One critic of the international emissions trading proposal is John
Henry, a Washington-based entrepreneur who is a successful broker
of the US domestic sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions trading
program. He argues that the SO2 emissions trading program worked
in the US because emissions came from a manageable 2,000
smokestacks which could be successfully monitored such that
regulations could be enforced. It would be virtually impossible to
monitor for compliance of CO2 emissions [2].
One could argue that CO2 emissions (and reductions) can be assessed
the same way they are today, although direct cash payments
associated with emissions trading could provide a strong incentive to
'cook the books' and distort that assessment procedure.
Anil Agarwal argues that emissions trading is likely to result in
OECD countries buying up the least expensive opportunities in
developing countries such that when developing countries are later
called upon to reduce emissions, only the more expensive options will
remain [3].
NGOs and Island States also argue against awarding carbon credits
(eg via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) ) for 'clean coal'
since such projects in developing countries would lock them into a
coal-based technology making it more difficult to switch to
renewables in the future.
This problem points to another more complex problem that will
surface in the next phase of the Kyoto negotiations when developing
countries are expected to make commitments to restraining their CO2
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol is not based on per capita emissions,
but national emission levels with a 1990 baseline.
Developing countries with low per capita emissions will
understandably not accept a 1990 baseline system. OECD countries
will also reject a system based on per capita emissions, even though
this could be argued as the most equitable and democratic formula.
The US Congress has still failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, with the
Republican majority insisting that it should also include emissions
restraints by major developing nations.
US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (CO2, methane etc) currently
account for over 20% of global GHG emissions [4]. Subsidies to the
fossil fuel industry are approx US$20b/an for the US and US$300b
worldwide [5].
The question must be asked:
Which CO2 global emission projection is Kyoto Protocol based on (if
any), with CO2 emissions to be stabilised at what level and by when ?
The answer appears to be that it is that calculations were not based on
a particular projection of a favored model of CO2 emissions /
atmospheric concentration. The Kyoto Protocol can be seen as a first
step in a process of political wrangling and bargaining which
presumably, eventually, and once all countries are involved, will aim
for a particular projection (ie set emissions at a level that will
stabilise CO2 concentrations at a particular level - 450ppm ? - by a
particular year - 2075 ?).
The IPCC recommends reducing emissions from the current 6b
tonnes of carbon/an to 4b tonnes in 2050, to 2b tonnes in 2100 [6].
The possibility that (conventional) oil supplies will peak around 2010
[7] and become exhausted by 2035 [8] with (conventional) gas
supplies peaking around 2020 and becoming exhausted around 2055
[9], should not affect the rationale of GHG emissions reductions.
*
[1] study was conducted by the International Energy Agency (Paris)
[2] Gelbspan, Ross 'Trading away our chances to end global
warming' Sunday Boston Globe (Focus Section) 16 May 1999
[3] Agarwal, Anil Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi,
cited in Gelbspan op cit
[4] Mount, Tim - paper 'Redirecting Energy Policy in the U.S.A. to
Address Global Warming', (1998).
[5] Gelbspan op cit.
[6] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2nd
Assessment Report, cited in 'Global warming and energy' Global
Futures Bulletin #3 01 Jan 1996
[7] Mackenzie, James 'Oil as a Finite Resource: When is Global
Production Likely to Peak?' World Resources Institute, Washington
DC, (1996) cited in Global Futures Bulletin #49 01 Dec 1997
'Energy perspectives'
[8] WEC/IIASA (World Energy Council, International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis). (1995). 'Global Energy Perspectives to
2050 and Beyond'. London: WEC cited in Global Futures Bulletin
#77 01 Feb, 1999 'Non-renewable energy and CO2 emissions.'
[9] WEC/IIASA op cit
*
{3. climate change}
*
*
*
NATO AND POSSIBLE WAR CRIMES
Former US Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, has initiated a
Commission of Inquiry for an International War Crimes Tribunal to
begin hearings 31 July 1999 in New York.
The Commission of Inquiry will hold hearings to collect eyewitness,
direct, and expert testimony, video footage, photographs, documents,
and other evidence as part of an investigation into crimes against
peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed during
the US/NATO bombing war against Yugoslavia.
The Commission of Inquiry will include international jurists, human
rights activists, trade unionists, medical personnel, environmental
experts, rank-and-file soldiers from NATO countries, and people who
were in Yugoslavia during the NATO bombing campaign.
Clark is currently in the process of outlining a multi-point indictment
of the US government's conduct in the war against Yugoslavia.
The NGO International Action Center (IAC) [1], of which Clark is
chairperson, is currently in the process of organizing similar hearings
elsewhere in the US, in other NATO members, in Russia, and other
countries. An international research team of investigators and
researchers will be dispatched to wherever evidence can be collected.
At the conclusion of these hearings, there will be convened an
International War Crimes Tribunal that will consider all of the
evidence.
Meanwhile the Russian Duma has passed a draft resolution
appointing 20 MPs to form an ad hoc commission to investigate
possible war crimes committed by NATO in its bombing campaign
against Yugoslavia and to interact with the International tribunal.
The credibility of these initiatives rests on the interest shown by both
Russia and the IAC in efforts to investigate possible war crimes
committed by Milosevic and other Yugoslav politicians and military
personnel, as well as members of the KLA/UCK.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated recently that '..unless the
Security Council is restored to its pre-eminent position as the sole
source of legitimacy on the [international] use of force, we are on a
dangerous path to anarchy.' However, Annan has also said that he
thought the bombing campaign was necessary. He points to at least
six instances of the international use of force that had not been
sanctioned by the UN in the period 1994-99.
Some argue that if the 19 nation NATO had not taken action, the
failure to act could have led to worse tragedy as was the case in
Rwanda and Bosnia, and that China and/or Russia would vetoed any
resolution calling for the bombing of Yugoslavia.
Others argue that a UN-sanctioned approach could at least have been
attempted, and another strategy could have been devised and
supported by Russia and China. If that was seen not to be working,
NATO would still have had the option of taking the action it did.
*
[1] International Action Center, http://www.iacenter.org
email: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*
{33. global conventions and international law; 2. peace and conflict
resolution}
*
*
*
CALENDAR
31 July 1999 Commission of Inquiry Hearing into possible war
crimes committed by NATO in its bombing campaign of Yugoslavia.
New York http://www.iacenter.org, email: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
11 July 1999 World Population Day
19 July 1999 World population reaches 6 billion according to
Princeton Uni population clock http://opr.princeton.edu/popclock/
12 Oct 1999 World population reaches 6 billion according to UN
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA).
*
*
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Richard A. Slaughter (1999) 381 pages
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Global Futures Bulletin #86
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR) Tue, 29 Jun 1999 17:42:16 -0700
