Arthur Cordell:
>
>Does this mean that we have to accept the unravelling of the success of
>economic development as though it is entirely outside our control? Are
>there no policy options or actions that we can develop?
>
>Much of my thinking and angst is to develop ways in which the broad
>middle class can continue to be a broad middle class. It seems to be an
>admission of failure to turn to citizens in other, less developed,
>countries for lessons in life skills. For lessons in favela living.
>This, it seems, is something we wish to avoid. A middle class, replete
>with careers, etc. has been a core element in creating and maintaining
>social cohesion. A lot of workers gave up a lot so that citizens in the
>developed countries could have many aspects of universality. Sure, with
>globalization there will be continuing pressures to harmonize downward.
>I would question these pressures and argue that gloabalization is really
>about trying to get others to move upaward: in environmental laws,
>health and workplace safety, potable water, univeral literacy, etc. etc.
>etc.
>
>There is a certain fatalism in Ed's posting, a certain feeling that
>market forces have brought us here and the same forces will bring some
>sort of resolution.
>
>If we know that a problem is developing, one for which there may be a
>menu of possible remedies, it is , I believe, incumbent on policy
>analysts to develop and maintain such remedies ready for thoughtful
>hearing and analysis when conditions are appropriate and when the
>political voice has identified the appropriate time and mustered
>sufficient courage. >
Ray Evans Harrell has taken me to task on this as well in a couple of
off-list postings. I do have to admit I'm a pessimist, but hopefully not a
fatalist. I see the three decades following WWII as being something of a
golden age for those of us who were fortunate enough to be borne in the rich
world. For a time, we could do almost anything we wanted to by way of
economic development and social programming. Never mind that our prosperity
derived from a disastrous war in which only we suffered no real destruction.
In the 50s and 60s we saw prosperity going on forever.
Our world has become a much tighter and more difficult place since then. I
do not deny the value of developing a range of policy options, explaining
them to policy makers, and helping them to make wise choices. But I would
argue that this has become a much more difficult and uncertain process than
it used to be. Some thirty or forty years ago we could convince ourselves
that almost anything would work. We could pump money and planners into
Canada's outbacks and, behold, have regional economic expansion. We could
mobilize our young and restless, send them into the slums or aboriginal
communities and achieve social change. We could establish a slate of
universal social programs and make people happier, healthier and more
self-sufficient. For a time, these things seemed to work. Some continue to
work, but many represent money, hopes and dreams poured down a lot of tubes.
The draining reality of a more competitive, tighter and difficult economic
world has moved in. Policy options have become narrower, fewer, and more
difficult to implement. Our ability to do real things (or think we can do
them) has too often been replaced by smoke and mirrors.
I recognize that the middle class has been a source of social cohesion in
our society. But I would suggest that the middle class is a phenomenon
which developed slowly during the first half of the 20th Century, literally
exploded in the decades following WWII and is now in decline. From what
statistical information I have seen, it is splitting, with the upper part
getting richer and the lower part getting poorer. It is also splitting
generationally. My adult kids, all well educated, are not nearly as well
off as I was at their age, and only one of the three has a long-term job.
The same is true of most of my friends' adult kids. I have no doubt that
there will continue to be a middle class, but it will continue to change,
perhaps greatly. A proportion, smaller than at present, will remain on what
I termed "career paths" in a previous posting. A proportion, probably much
larger than at present, will, as I put it, "work strategically" out of small
home offices or backyard shops, either as individuals or small groups
assembled to do particular jobs. Since "middle class" implies security,
tenure, steady pay and a relatively sedentary lifestyle, many of the latter
will not see themselves as belonging to this class. However, because they
will be educated and mobile and capable of generating enough income to look
after their needs, they will not count themselves as among the poor either.
What they might be called remains an open question. All we can say is that
they already exist and that there will likely be more of them with the
passage of time.
There are, of course, all kinds of hybrid possibilities here. People could,
as they do now, move from a career path to a strategic mode of work, or vice
versa. Being on a career path would undoubtedly be preferable for most
people. A great deal would therefore depend on the continued abundance of
career type jobs. This is not too certain given automation, downsizing and
re-engineering.
I do appreciate Arthur's point about the middle class and the maintenance of
social cohesion, by which I understand something like having faith in
society and public institutions, and a willingness to help resolve serious
social issues. Will it be possible for people who do not have a career path
and must essentially behave selfishly to have such faith? This is where the
policymakers are faced with a real challenge. How can people who must move
from job to job with periods of no job in between maintain a sense of
security strong enough to keep them from becoming "just a bunch of sharks
floating around" as a colleague in the oil patch once expressed it? How can
they be made to feel that the state is essentially benevolent and society
good? An expanded employment insurance scheme or a guaranteed annual income
would likely be a minimum. Yet here we run into our tighter, poorer and
more difficult world and the question of affordability.
In a previous posting, I should perhaps not have used Brazilian favelados as
an example of strategic workers. Nevertheless, though the operate at a much
lower standard than Canadian or American strategic workers, the favelados
are not a bad example. Their loyalties are essentially to themselves, their
families and the groups they form in the favelas, and they are very good at
survival.
Ed Weick
