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If you’ve read
it, Gen. Clark’s policy recommendations walk in step with the “Ten Things
Congress could demand from Bush” that Prof. Juan Cole* posted earlier this
week. He describes this
neighborhood as The 6+2: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Kuwait, plus observers
Egypt and Bahrain, the combination of foreign ministers that met in November 2004
to discuss a dateline for Iraqi sovereignty. KwC Before It's Too Late in Iraq OpEd by Wesley K. Clark,
Washington Post, Friday, August 26, 2005; A21 In the old, familiar
fashion, mounting U.S. casualties in Iraq have mobilized increasing public
doubts about the war. More than half the American people now believe that the
invasion of Iraq was a mistake. They're right. But it would also be a mistake
to pull out now, or to start pulling out or to set a date certain for pulling
out. Instead we need a strategy to create a stable, democratizing and peaceful
state in Iraq -- a strategy the administration has failed to develop and
articulate. From the outset of the
U.S. post-invasion efforts, we needed a three-pronged strategy: diplomatic,
political and military. Iraq sits geographically on the fault line between Shiite
and Sunni Islam; for the mission to succeed we will have to be the catalyst for
regional cooperation, not regional conflict. Unfortunately, the
administration didn't see the need for a diplomatic track, and its scattershot
diplomacy in the region -- threats, grandiose pronouncements and truncated
communications -- has been ill-advised and counterproductive. The U.S. diplomatic failure has magnified
the difficulties facing the political and military elements of strategy by contributing to the increasing
infiltration of jihadists and the surprising resiliency of the insurgency. On the political
track, aiming for a legitimate, democratic Iraqi government was essential, but the United States was far too slow in
mobilizing Iraqi political action. A wasted first year encouraged a rise in sectarian militias
and the emergence of strong fractionating forces. Months went by without a U.S.
ambassador in Iraq, and today political development among the Iraqis is
hampered by the lack not only of security but also of a stable infrastructure
program that can reliably deliver gas, electricity and jobs. Meanwhile, on the
military track, security on the ground remains poor at best. U.S. armed forces still haven't received
resources, restructuring and guidance adequate for the magnitude of the task. Only in June, over two years into the
mission of training Iraqi forces, did the president announce such "new
steps" as partnering with Iraqi units, establishing "transition
teams" to work with Iraqi units and training Iraqi ministries to conduct
antiterrorist operations. But there
is nothing new about any of this; it is the same nation-building doctrine that
we used in Vietnam.
Where are the thousands of trained linguists? Where are the flexible, well-resourced,
military-led infrastructure development programs to win "hearts and
minds?" Where are the smart operations and adequate numbers of forces --
U.S., coalition or Iraqi -- to strengthen control over the borders? With each passing month the difficulties
are compounded and the chances for a successful outcome are reduced. Urgent
modification of the strategy is required before it is too late to do anything
other than simply withdraw our forces. Adding a diplomatic
track to the strategy is a must. The United States should form a standing conference of Iraq's
neighbors, complete with committees dealing with all the regional economic and
political issues,
including trade, travel, cross-border infrastructure projects and, of course,
cutting off the infiltration of jihadists. The United States should tone down
its raw rhetoric and instead listen more carefully to the many voices within
the region. In
addition, a public U.S. declaration forswearing permanent bases in Iraq would
be a helpful step
in engaging both regional and Iraqi support as we implement our plans. On the political side,
the timeline for the agreements on the Constitution is less important than the
substance of the document. It is up to American leadership to help engineer,
implement and sustain a compromise that will avoid the "red lines" of
the respective factions and leave in place a state that both we and Iraq's
neighbors can support. So no Kurdish vote on independence, a restricted role
for Islam and limited autonomy in the south. And no private militias. In addition, the
United States needs a legal mandate from the government to provide additional
civil assistance and advice, along with additional U.S. civilian personnel, to
help strengthen the institutions of government. Key ministries must be
reinforced, provincial governments made functional, a system of justice
established (and its personnel trained) and the rule of law promoted at the
local level. There will be a continuing need for assistance in institutional
development, leadership training and international monitoring for years to
come, and all of this must be made palatable to Iraqis concerned with their
nation's sovereignty. Monies promised for reconstruction simply must be
committed and projects moved forward, especially in those areas along the
border and where the insurgency has the greatest potential. On the military side, the vast effort
underway to train an army must be matched by efforts to train police and local
justices. Canada, France and Germany should be engaged to assist. Neighboring
states should also provide observers and technical assistance. In military terms, striking at
insurgents and terrorists is necessary but insufficient. Military and security operations must
return primarily to the tried-and-true methods of counterinsurgency: winning
the hearts and minds of the populace through civic action, small-scale economic
development and positive daily interactions. Ten thousand Arab Americans with full language
proficiency should be recruited to assist as interpreters. A better effort must
be made to control jihadist infiltration into the country by a combination of
outposts, patrols and reaction forces reinforced by high technology. Over time
U.S. forces should be pulled back into reserve roles and phased out. The growing chorus of
voices demanding a pullout should seriously alarm the Bush administration,
because President Bush and his team are repeating the failure of Vietnam:
failing to craft a realistic and effective policy and instead simply demanding
that the American people show resolve. Resolve isn't enough to mend a flawed approach -- or to save the lives of our troops.
If the administration won't adopt a winning strategy, then the American people
will be justified in demanding that it bring our troops home. The
writer, a retired Army general, was supreme allied commander in Europe during
the war in Kosovo. He was a candidate for the 2004 Democratic presidential
nomination. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/25/AR2005082501623.html * Cole: Ten Things Congress could
Demand from Bush (Aug. 22nd) http://www.juancole.com/ |
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