Ouch, I'm sorry. This for those who couldn't get into the WSJ.
Here is the complete story. Among the doom and gloom - a little light! Also, I've just heard there were only 13 incidents in yesterday's Iraq election. As against 640 in the last one. Don't know the casualties, but last time 42 died for daring to vote. Harry ------------------------------------------------------------ ---- A SMALL VICTORY IN TAL AFAR, AS SUNNIS, SHIITES FORM RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE COL. HICKEY'S RAMADAN FEAST By GREG JAFFE Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL October 14, 2005; Page A1 TAL AFAR, Iraq -- At an old British fort at the edge of town here, about a dozen sheiks gathered at 6 p.m. last Friday for a traditional Ramadan feast. Some were Sunni. Some were Shiite. The results were predictable for a region in which months of violence and tit-for-tat assassinations and car bombs have created deep sectarian divides. A Sunni complained that masked Shiite informants were spreading lies about innocent Sunnis to Americans. "We have to get rid of these people who wear masks!" he yelled. The lead Shiite present stormed off to a corner to sit by himself. But the session had a surprising ending. The shouting gave way to discussion, and the sheiks laid plans to form a local reconciliation committee composed of six Sunni and six Shiite representatives. It was a small victory for the American military leader, Lt. Col. Chris Hickey, who arranged for the feast with just such a goal. Col. Hickey commands a 1,000-soldier cavalry squadron in Tal Afar that has taken heavy casualties over the past six months in intense urban combat. While his primary missions are to battle the brutal insurgency and rebuild a crumbling infrastructure, the 41-year-old officer increasingly has found himself in the role of peacemaker, trying to close religious divides and prevent a civil war. The mission has taken on a heightened urgency in advance of Saturday's constitutional referendum, which many U.S. commanders fear will only fuel the fire. Col. Hickey and his commanders have developed a three-prong strategy for mending the deep divisions in Tal Afar. One is to convince Sunnis that the city's new government won't oppress them. He is pushing to recruit Sunnis for the government and the local police force. And he allows Sunni sheiks small victories, like getting credit for the release of prisoners. The second prong is to reassure Shiites of their safety even as the Sunnis amass more power, sometimes literally moving U.S. troops into the homes of Shiites who say they have been threatened. The third is to try to make peace between the two sects, as with the Ramadan feast. Military commanders across Iraq are facing similar challenges from internal Iraqi conflicts that had been largely suppressed under Saddam Hussein. "Sectarian fault lines in Iraq are inexorably pushing the country towards civil war unless we actually intervene decisively to stem it," warned one U.S. Army analysis, written in August and distributed to some commanders in the northern part of the country. The religious feuds have turned especially violent in Tal Afar. Bombs exploded on consecutive days this week, the first in a Shiite market about 100 yards from Col. Hickey's headquarters, the second at the very fort where the colonel held his Ramadan feast. More than 60 civilians were killed. The attacks were thought to have been orchestrated by Sunni religious extremists, seeking to fan the sectarian hatred and fear Col. Hickey is working hard to suppress. Since last November, violence has led to hundreds of deaths as this ethnically mixed city became a battlefield for Islamic extremists, foreign fighters and Iraqi insurgents. Last month, the U.S. intervened. About 8,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops stormed Tal Afar, arresting over 800 suspected Sunni insurgents and killing 300 more. Now, American and Iraqi officials are working to rebuild the police force and the city government. They are also spending $50 million to rebuild Tal Afar's decrepit water, power and school systems. But enough bad blood between Shiites and Sunnis remains to keep ripping the city apart. "Reconciliation is the key to this thing," says Col. H.R. McMaster, the commander of all U.S. forces in northwestern Iraq, including Tal Afar. "This insurgency depends on sectarian tension to move and operate. Its goal is to create a sense of resentment and victimology among all parties." For Col. Hickey, fashioning some sort of peace between Tal Afar's Shiites and Sunnis has become an often-frustrating obsession. The former Army brat, in his second year-long deployment to Iraq, lives with his staff in the ruins of a 400-year-old Ottoman Empire castle atop a hill in the center of the city. They have no hot food and no showers. They lack even portable toilets. Sitting in his dingy office, the colonel often admits to being mystified by the anger and resentment that have grown in the city. "I often wonder, How did we get to this point?" he says after an exhausting 17-hour work day. "The Shiites and the Sunnis look the same. They speak the same language. Both of them want the same things: security, safe schools, power and water. I'm not sure I'll ever really understand." LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE The animosity dates to the seventh century, when a leadership struggle following the death of the Prophet Muhammad led to a schism in Islam. In Iraq, the Shiites make up about 65% of the population. They were brutally oppressed under Saddam Hussein, while the Sunnis, who account for about 20% of the population, were favored. Lt. Col. Chris Hickey (in sunglasses) and an Iraqi police officer walk amid the rubble of a Shiite marketplace in Tal Afar, Iraq, after a car bomb exploded, killing 40 people. In Tal Afar, near the Syrian border, the proportions are reversed: It's about 70% Sunni, 25% Shiite. Before the U.S. invasion in 2003, the two groups lived largely in peace. Intermarriage was common. Many neighborhoods were mixed. The peace broke after the U.S. reduced the size of its force in the city in February 2004 to about 500 troops from 3,000. Problems between Sunnis and Shiites began almost immediately. After the U.S. invasion the Shiite political parties began to amass power in Baghdad. They also started to organize and recruit Shiites in Tal Afar. Sunni areas of Tal Afar -- home to many of the city's former elites -- coursed with fears of "sinister attempts" by the Shiites to take over the city and drive out the Sunnis, according to the Army analysis. "The Sunni have begun to articulate the view that a Baghdad- directed and Iranian-supported conspiracy is planning to take over the city," the analysis stated. Iran, a traditional enemy of Iraq, is predominantly Shiite. Believing themselves to be under siege, the Sunnis invited religious extremists from Mosul and Syria to help them battle the Shiites, the Army analysis said. By late 2004, Abu Musab Zarqawi's group was in the city, launching horrific attacks on Shiites. Sunni extremists organized into eight cells, each containing several hundred fighters. The cells were broken into various smaller groups focusing on kidnapping, assassinations, propaganda and religious education. In May 2005, not long after he arrived in the city, Col. Hickey sat in on the interrogation of a 17-year-old member of a Sunni assassination cell. Under questioning, the boy explained that his job was to hold the legs of the victim while someone else lopped off the head. When the interrogator asked the boy what he aspired to, "he responded that he wanted to be the guy who got to cut off the head," Col. Hickey recalls. "It was chilling." The Shiites responded to Sunni attacks by taking over the police force, transforming it into tribal militia bent on revenge against the Sunnis. "The police force essentially became a death squad, which magnified the problem," Col. Hickey says. Schools and shops closed, and the city quickly fell into chaos. Last month's U.S.-led assault on the city appears to have driven the worst of the Islamic radicals out of the city. But Col. Hickey knows that if he can't get the Sunnis and Shiites to put aside their differences, the radicals will be back. A top priority is winning the confidence of the Sunnis. Col. Hickey and his immediate commander, Col. McMaster, have pressured the Iraqi government to bring in a new mayor and police chief from nearby Mosul. Both are Sunnis. About 200 Sunni police officers, also from Mosul, were dispatched to the city. The police force is still more Shiite than the city overall, and to get the demographics in line, Col. Hickey now is lobbying the Sunni sheiks inside Tal Afar to provide 1,000 Sunnis to join. It has been slow going, with only about 220 signing up. "What I really need is Sunnis passing the message to Sunnis," Col. Hickey says. To that end his regiment is laying plans to train Iraqi Army officers in Tal Afar to spread the word of the changes in the city as they walk foot patrols. And the colonel is also courting powerful Sunni sheiks, many of whom supported the extremists. Recently U.S. forces in Tal Afar infuriated many conservative Sunnis by arresting a woman with close ties to the insurgency. After a few days Col. Hickey and Col. McMaster decided they had to set her free -- but instead of just releasing her into the city, Col. Hickey turned her over to a powerful Sunni sheik so he could say that he had convinced the Americans to give her up. "Most of the Sunnis in town don't support the radical extremists," he says. "They are terrified of them and realize they made a mistake. But for them, working with the coalition is admitting weakness and defeat." BIG WORRIES As he courts the Sunnis, Col. Hickey knows he must take care not to lose the Shiites. One of his biggest worries is that horrific attacks like this week's suicide bombings -- which make three in seven days targeting Shiites or Iraqi Security Forces -- will spur the Shiites to take revenge. To calm them, U.S. and Iraqi Army forces mount regular patrols in their neighborhoods. Most U.S. troops live on large bases away from major cities, but Col. Hickey's troops are scattered throughout Tal Afar. When Shiites report being harassed by Sunnis, he offers to send a platoon of soldiers to set up a temporary base in their home for two or three days. "I know living in the city is draining for my guys," he says. "You are in the fight all the time. You don't have the down time you get when you can go back to a base. But I really believe our daily presence is changing the city." And then there are the efforts to get the two groups actually talking to each other. Col. Hickey was racking his brain to come up with a dramatic event to bring together Shiite and Sunni leaders. The Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which began last week, looked like the perfect opportunity. During Ramadan, Muslims fast during daylight hours and typically hold a big feast after sundown. If he could get the sheiks to attend a Ramadan feast on neutral ground, Col. Hickey figured, he might make some headway. "Respect and personal relationships are everything in this culture," he said, shortly after hitting on the idea. "I am hoping I can use the backdrop of their religious holiday to get them to start building some kind of relationship." After consulting the new police chief, a Sunni who is seen by both sides as relatively impartial, he decided to invite a group of sheiks to a dinner at the 1920s-era British fort. For his Ramadan feast to work, he knew there were two sheiks he really needed to have there: Shiite Sheik Wali Ali Retha and Sunni Sheik Falah al Farhat. Sheik Wali's tribe had suffered more than any other at the hands of Sunni insurgents, and seemed the most bent on revenge. Indeed, just last week Col. Hickey intercepted a confidential planning document written by the sheik that decried the failure of local security forces to safeguard Shiites, and called on the Shiites to form armed teams and take the fight to the Sunni terrorists. Col. Hickey quickly confronted the Shiite leader. "If I see any armed teams in Tal Afar I will crush them," he warned. The sheik listened quietly and then asked for his document back. Col. Hickey stared at him in disbelief. "I am not giving it back. You need to write a new document," he said. "If you do this, you will fail." Col. Hickey then softened his harsh tone and touched Sheik Wali on the arm. "You and I have worked together for many months. We both lost good men," he said. "I don't want to end on a bad note. How about tomorrow night I invite you to a dinner in honor of Ramadan?" At first, the sheik declined, arguing that to get to the dinner he would have to pass through Sunni neighborhoods. "I am honored, but it is too dangerous," he said. Col. Hickey offered to drive him to the dinner in his armored Bradley fighting vehicle. But the sheik countered that if he rode with the Americans, his fellow tribal leaders would mock him. "Why don't you just come to dinner at my house as my personal guest," asked Sheik Wali, who seemed to be missing the point of what Col. Hickey had told him would be a Sunni/Shiite event. Finally they agreed that Sheik Wali would ride in his own car, surrounded by U.S. fighting vehicles. The sheik meekly asked if he could carry a weapon in his car. Pointing to the turret of his Bradley, Col. Hickey told him he didn't need one. "I've got plenty of weapons," he said. Col. Hickey asked the police chief, Gen. Aziz Ali Hussein, to invite the Sunni Sheik Falah for him. Most Americans suspect Sheik Falah aided the insurgency in Tal Afar. He spent five months in Abu Ghraib prison earlier in the year. But to Col. Hickey, the sheik's support for the insurgents seemed more coerced than voluntary. If Iraqi and U.S. security forces could guarantee his security against Sunni extremist reprisals and Shiites bent on revenge, Col. Hickey believed he might put pressure on the extremists in his tribe to drop their fight. The day of the dinner, Col. Hickey called Sheik Falah to make sure he was coming and to ask for a favor. A car bomb had detonated in a Shiite part of town, wounding five civilians. Shortly after it exploded, a Sunni mosque near the neighborhood broadcast messages designed to inflame the crowd that had formed. Col. Hickey wanted the loudspeakers shut off. The sheik agreed to talk to the head of the mosque and get him to turn off the calls to jihad. Then he asked for a favor in return. "On Ramadan it is tradition that you give me a gift," Sheik Falah said. He asked Col. Hickey to release some of the members of his tribe who had been arrested during the big U.S. offensive on the city in September. Col. Hickey said he would try, and brought to the dinner a list of 10 Sunni prisoners the U.S. plans to release. 'A LOW PROFILE' The feast began just after sunset. The sheiks all took seats on couches arranged in a U shape. As a non-Muslim, Col. Hickey was leery about playing too big a role. "I want to keep a low profile and let them talk, eat and socialize," he said earlier that day. So to jump-start the conversation, Col. Hickey asked Gen. Hussein, who had been invited along with the mayor, to make a short speech. The police chief, a bear of a man with the broad, flat face of a prize fighter, immediately began chastising the sheiks. "When I heard what was happening in Tal Afar I couldn't believe it," he yelled. "We are the oldest civilization in the world. For us to behave this way is shameful." Then in gory detail he described the scene a week earlier when a woman, standing in a crowd in a Shiite neighborhood of Tal Afar, blew up herself and a 3-year-old girl she was holding by the hand. "I wish Col. Hickey had brought the photos to show you," the chief said. "This has nothing to do with religion. It has nothing to do with Islam." When he finished, the sheiks sat quietly on their couches, but soon the screaming and finger-pointing started. Col. Hickey sat in the background and watched. Occasionally he nudged his Sudanese-American translator and asked him what the Iraqis were saying. At a couple of points during the confusing cross-talk and yelling, the translator answered simply, "It is hard to tell." When a Sunni suggested that masked Shiite informants caused the tensions in the city by tricking Americans into arresting innocent Sunnis, Sheik Wali stormed off to a corner of the room to sit by himself. Eventually a Sunni sheik took Sheik Wali by the arm and led him to the couch, sitting the small, skinny former farmer next to the more refined Sheik Falah. The two men fidgeted awkwardly, not making eye contact. But the screaming in the room began to die down and discussions about a reconciliation commission began. The group had its first meeting three days after the dinner. Col. Hickey, knowing the progress made that night was fragile, will keep pushing. As the dinner broke up, he said he'd host a second Ramadan feast tonight, the eve of tomorrow's constitutional referendum. "Let's kill some goats next Friday," he offered. "I'll buy them if you slaughter and cook them." Write to Greg Jaffe at [EMAIL PROTECTED] Copyright C 2005 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved ******************************** Henry George School of Social Science of Los Angeles Box 655 Tujunga CA 91042 818 352-4141 ******************************** -----Original Message----- From: M.Blackmore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, October 14, 2005 2:42 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Futurework] A giant Leap Subscriber only. Wozzit about? On Fri, 2005-10-14 at 11:32 -0700, Harry Pollard wrote: > Hi! > > > > I liked this from the Wall St. Journal. > > > > http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112925326708268413.html?mod= djemTMB > _______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [email protected] http://fes.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
