Snagged from Economist Brad deLong’s webpage http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/
<http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/>

NAFTA should have stopped immigration, right?
By Louis Uchitelle, New York Times, Feb. 18, 2007
The North American Free Trade Agreement, enacted by Congress 14 years ago,
held out an alluring promise: the agreement would reduce illegal immigration
from Mexico. Mexicans, the argument went, would enjoy the prosperity and
employment that the trade agreement would undoubtedly generate — and not
feel the need to cross the border into the United States.
But today the number of illegal migrants has only continued to rise. Why
didn’t Nafta curb this immigration? The answer is complicated, of course.
But a major factor lies in the assumptions made in drafting the trade
agreement, assumptions about the way governments would behave (that is,
rationally) and the way markets would respond (rationally, as well).
Neither happened, yet Nafta remains the model for trade agreements with
developing Latin countries, including the Central American Free Trade
Agreement, (CAFTA) passed by Congress in 2005. Three more Nafta-like
agreements are now pending in Congress — with Panama, Columbia and Peru.
When Nafta finally became a reality, on Jan. 1, 1994, American investment
flooded into Mexico, mostly to finance factories that manufacture
automobiles, appliances, TV sets, apparel and the like. The expectation was
that the Mexican government would do its part by investing billions of
dollars in roads, schooling, sanitation, housing and other needs to
accommodate the new factories as they spread through the country.
It was more than an expectation. Many Mexican officials in the government of
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari assured the Clinton administration that
the investment would take place, and believed it themselves, said Gary
Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for
International Economics in Washington who campaigned for Nafta in the early
1990s. “It just did not happen,” he said.
Absent that investment, foreign factories congregated in the north, within
300 miles of the American border, where some infrastructure already existed.
“Monterrey is quite good,” Mr. Hufbauer said, “but in a lot of other cities
the infrastructure is terrible, not even enough running water or electricity
in poor neighborhoods. People get temporary jobs, but that is all.”
Meanwhile, Mexican manufacturers, once protected by tariffs on a host of
products, were driven out of business as less expensive, higher quality
merchandise flowed into the country. Later, China, with its even-cheaper
labor, added to the pressure, luring away manufacturers and jobs.  Indeed,
despite the influx of foreign-owned factories, total manufacturing
employment in Mexico declined to 3.5 million by 2004 from a high of 4.1
million in 2000, according to a calculation of Robert A. Blecker, an
American University economist.
As relatively well-paying jobs disappeared, Mexico’s average wage for
production workers, already low, fell further behind the average hourly pay
of production workers in the United States, and Mexicans responded by
migrating.
“The main thing that would have stemmed the flow of people across the border
was a rapid increase in wages in Mexico,” said Dani Rodrik, an economist and
trade specialist at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. “And
that certainly has not happened.”
Something similar occurred in agriculture. The assumption was that tens of
thousands of farmers who cultivated corn would act “rationally” and continue
farming, even as less expensive corn imported from the United States flooded
the market. The farmers, it was assumed, would switch to growing
strawberries and vegetables — with some help from foreign investment — and
then export these crops to the United States. Instead, the farmers exported
themselves, partly because the Mexican government decided to reduce tariffs
on corn even faster than Nafta required, according to Philip Martin, an
agricultural economist at the University of California, Davis.
“We understood that the transition from corn to strawberries would not be
smooth,” Professor Martin said. “But we did not think there would be almost
no transition.”
A financial crisis also dashed expectations. One expectation was that the
Mexican economy, driven by Nafta, would grow rapidly, generating jobs and
keeping Mexicans home. The peso crisis of 1994-95, however, provoked a steep
recession, and while there was some big growth later, the average annual
growth rate over Nafta’s lifetime has been less than 3 percent.
The financial crisis struck just months after Nafta came into existence,
undermining, early on, the Mexican government’s ability to spend money on
roads, education and other necessary government functions.
“We underestimated Mexico’s deficits in physical and human infrastructure,”
said J. Bradford DeLong, an economist at the University of California,
Berkeley, and a Treasury official in the Clinton administration. But, he
says, without Nafta the migration would have been even greater. For
instance, he says, there would not have been as much investment in the north
of the country.
Finally, the steady flow of Mexicans to the United States has produced a
momentum of its own — what Jeffrey Passel, a demographer at the Pew Hispanic
Institute, calls a “network effect,” in which young Mexicans travel to the
United States in growing numbers to join the growing number of family
members already here.
The upshot is that Mexican migration to the United States has risen to
500,000 a year from less than 400,000 in the early 1990s, before Nafta, Mr.
Passel estimates. Roughly 80% to 85% of immigrants are here illegally, he
says. The peso crisis, recession, the network effect — their impact may have
been beyond anyone’s control, but not the assumptions about how the market
and the government would act.  “We have indeed had one disappointment after
another on this score,” Mr. Rodrik said, noting that the same assumption
about government spending is part and parcel of the agreements, now before
Congress, with Columbia, Peru and Panama.
While there is opposition to these proposals, it is mainly from Democrats
who want a better safety net for American workers who might be hurt.
The European Union, in contrast, assumes little about government spending on
the part of economically weaker nations joining it. The union itself has
hugely subsidized the improved services needed by entering countries like
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Poland, rather than leave financing to the
relatively meager resources of entering countries.
The money is used not only for public investment, Mr. Rodrik noted, but also
to subsidize companies setting up operations in the new countries and to
support government budgets. “I am not saying Nafta was a bad agreement,” Mr.
Rodrik said. “But more than a trade agreement is required for countries to
converge economically. And Nafta has been viewed as a shortcut to
convergence without having to do all the other stuff.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html>

_______________________________________________
Futurework mailing list
[email protected]
http://fes.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework

Reply via email to