Hi!

 

I guess I have to say it again and again. It's not a housing crisis - it is a 
land crisis. It is always a land crisis. The problem with land values is that 
they can be $100,000 today and a $1.95 tomorrow. Bankers know this and back in 
the days of prudent banking they would never lend on land.

 

But economists made a crucial mistake that verged on stupidity.

 

They said land is capital and proceeded to merge something not man-made with 
something that is man-made. How so-called scientists can mix together such 
disparate concepts is a mystery.

 

Out of this comes the "housing crisis", even though the cost and price of 
improvements hasn't much altered.

 

The "credit crisis" and "banking crisis" are no more than extensions of the 
basic problem -- high-priced land in the economy that gets out of control.

 

So have luck with your housing crisis, but remember it all rests unhappily on 
poor definition of basic economic terms.

 

Harry

 

******************************

Harry Pollard

Henry George School of Los Angeles

Box 655

Tujunga  CA  91042

(818) 352-4141

******************************

 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of M.Blackmore
Sent: Monday, March 17, 2008 1:46 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Futurework] Yanks wuz conned and con artists got away across state 
line from lynch mob sayz Guardian...

 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/mar/17/economics.useconomy


America was conned - who will pay? 


The South Sea Bubble ended in riots as trust was lost. Wall Street also duped 
the public



*       Larry Elliott <http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/larryelliott> , 
economics editor 

*       The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian> , 

*       Monday March 17 2008 

*       Article history 


About this article 


Close This article appeared in the Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian>  on Monday March 17 2008 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2008/mar/17>  on p30 of the Financial 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2008/mar/17/mainsection/financial3>  
section. It was last updated at 00:05 on March 17 2008. 
Bear Stearns marks the moment when the global financial crisis went critical. 
Up until last Friday, it had been possible - just about - to believe that the 
worst was over and that things were about to get better. That pretence was 
stripped away when JP Morgan, at the behest of the Federal Reserve, stepped in 
when the hedge funds pulled the plug on the fifth-biggest US investment bank.

It is now clear that no end is in sight to the turmoil, and the reason for that 
is that the Fed and the US treasury are no closer to solving the underlying 
problem than they were eight months ago. The crisis will only end when house 
prices stop falling and banks stop racking up huge losses on their loans. Doing 
that, however, will require the US government to intervene directly in the real 
estate market to end the wave of foreclosures. Ideologically, it is 
ill-equipped to take that step and, as a result, property prices will fall and 
the financial meltdown will go on and on.

Ultimately, though, action will be taken because there will be political 
pressure for it. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that there is not already 
rioting in the streets, given the gigantic fraud perpetrated by the financial 
elite at the expense of ordinary Americans.

The US has just had its weakest period of expansion since the 1950s. 
Consumption growth has been poor. Investment growth has been modest. Exports 
have been sluggish. But if you are at the top of the tree, the years since the 
last recession in 2001 has been a veritable golden age. Salaries for executives 
have rocketed and profits have soared, because the productivity gains from a 
growing economy have been disproportionately skewed towards capital.

Patriotic 

For ordinary Americans, though, it has been a different story. Real wages have 
been growing slowly; at just 1.6% a year on average over the latest upswing, 
well down on the experience of earlier decades. Business, of course, needs 
consumers to carry on spending in order to make money, so a way had to be found 
to persuade households to do their patriotic duty. The method chosen was 
simple. Whip up a colossal housing bubble, convince consumers that it makes 
sense to borrow money against the rising value of their homes to supplement 
their meagre real wage growth and watch the profits roll in.

As they did - for a while. Now it's payback time and the mood could get very 
ugly. Americans, to put it bluntly, have been conned. They have been duped by a 
bunch of serpent-tongued hucksters who packed up the wagon and made it across 
the county line before a lynch mob could be formed.

The debate now is not about whether the US is in recession but how deep and 
long that recession will be. Super-bears have started to say that this is 
perhaps "The Big One", by which they mean the onset of a new Great Depression. 
The need to rescue Bear Stearns has done little to still those voices.

As the economics team at HSBC recently pointed out, there has been a 
"catastrophic breakdown" of trust, and when that has happened in the past - the 
US in the 1930s, Japan in the 1990s - chucking extra money at the banks in the 
hope that they will start lending again proves ineffective.

It's not hard to see why trust has become such a rare commodity: Wall Street at 
the height of the securitisation mania had, in effect, become London at the 
time of the South Sea Bubble crisis in 1720. Vast quantities of funny paper 
were changing hands even though those involved in the deals had no idea of 
their true worth. Nor did they care. Inevitably, now the bubble has burst and 
the huge Ponzi securitisation scam has been exposed, there has been a reaction. 
The securitisation market is dead, there is less money sloshing round the 
system, banks are hoarding their cash.

Having allowed the housing boom to rage out of control for too long and then 
delaying cuts in interest rates until the housing market was gripped by 
recessionary forces, the Fed is now trying to make up for lost time with a 
burst of hyperactivity. It will cut interest rates on Wednesday and keep 
cutting them: financial markets expect the Fed funds rate to be 1% by the 
summer, and they are probably right. In most downturns, easier monetary policy 
does the trick. Lower interest rates make it cheaper to borrow and also change 
the trade-off between saving and spending. This may not be the usual sort of 
downturn, however, with consumers going through a period of debt revulsion 
after the excesses of recent years, even so the consensus is that after two or 
three quarters of falling output, a slow and sluggish recovery will be under 
way.

Deflation 

These hopes are likely to be dashed, unless there is intervention at home and 
internationally to tackle the crisis. Domestically, the priority should be to 
stop homes that have been foreclosed being auctioned on the open market, since 
by selling them at a 50% discount property prices are driven down. The US does 
not seem to have learned the lessons from Japan, which encouraged a fire sale 
of property in the 1990s and was sucked into a classic debt deflation trap as a 
result. Those who argue, with some force, that it would be counter-productive 
to intervene in the market because the US needs to work the rottenness out of 
its system must recognise that the cold turkey option will be very long and 
painful.

The second form of intervention should be to shore up the dollar, the collapse 
of which is worrying countries that rely heavily on exports and is the main 
reason for the surge in commodity prices. Co-ordinated intervention by the 
major central banks needs to be at the top of the agenda at next month's G7 
meeting in Washington, and there could be action even sooner if the dollar 
continues to tank. 

In the longer term, lessons must be learnt from the turmoil. One is that you 
don't solve the problems of a collapsing bubble by blowing up another, which is 
what Alan Greenspan did after the dotcom fiasco in 2001 - the most 
irresponsible behaviour of any central banker in living memory.

The second lesson is that there has to be far stricter regulation not just of 
the US real estate market but of Wall Street, to prevent the return of 
irresponsible lending as soon as the recovery is firmly under way. If this is, 
heaven help us, The Big One, one of the only consolations will be that the 
repugnance at the orgy of speculation that has sapped the strength of the US 
economy will put a new New Deal on the political agenda.

But for this to happen there has to be a political response and even though 
this year's presidential election will be held in the shadow of recession, 
there appears not to be a potential FDR among the contenders for the White 
House. Yet if this crisis really does get as bad as some are forecasting, the 
public will rightly demand more than a slap on the wrist for Wall Street. 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




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